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Abstract
This thesis discusses caste-based discrimination in the Himalayan foothills of East Nepal.
It is based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork among the Bishwakarma (previously
known as Kāmi), a Dalit caste whose traditional occupation is blacksmithing. While social
practices that denote the Bishwakarma as ‘untouchable’ have largely disappeared from the
public sphere, they endure in domestic contexts. In the face of this ongoing discrimination,
the Bishwakarma deploy a number of strategies to improve how they are perceived by oth-
ers. The first part of the thesis discusses these strategies as well as their limitations. The
second part argues that a cognitive bias known as ‘psychological essentialism’ plays a sig-
nificant role in the ongoing stigmatisation of the Bishwakarma and Dalits more generally.
The extent to which this is the case has been overlooked in previous anthropological stud-
ies, and this has been detrimental to academic understandings of the phenomenon and
to efforts to improve Dalits’ social status. Conversely, caste has largely been overlooked
in existing studies of psychological essentialism, which have focused on gender, race and
ethnicity. The recognition of the role that psychological essentialism plays in the social
construction of caste leads to a different interpretation of two types of action that have
been used to alleviate caste-based discrimination. One is based on identity politics; the
other tries to reduce the essentialisation of Dalits by promoting mixing with non-Dalits.
Promoting intercaste marriage between Dalits and others, a fringe phenomenon in Nepal,
is an example of the latter; an analysis of the promotion of such marriages is offered in the
last part of the thesis. Finally, a suggestion is made that recognising the role of psycholog-
ical essentialism can lead to a more informed comparative study of discriminatory social
systems across different cultural contexts.
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Figure 1: Map of Nepal, with the fieldwork area marked in red.
Own work based on raw data from OpenStreetMaps, licensed under ODbL.
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FIELDSITE
Places named in this thesis
Note: AVDC (‘VillageDevelopment Committee’) is part of the oﬀicial geography ofNepal;
it is an administrative area further divided into 9 ‘wards’. Each VDC comprises multiple
smaller locations that are part of the informal geography, used by locals to refer to places,
but not contiguous with wards.1
• Bensitaun: A locality at the bottom of the large hill on which Sammagaon is located.
Bensitaun is part of the VDC called Puranogaon.
• Bishwakarma / Dehegli tol: A tol is a group of houses whose inhabitants, with
some exceptions, belong to one or a small number of patrilines. The Bishwakarma /
Dehegli tol in Sammagaon is where I spent most of my time in the field.
• Dhungagaon: A VDC neighbouring Sammagaon and Puranogaon.
• Kathmandu: Capital city of Nepal, some 150km away from Sammagaon.
• Parvat: A VDC neighbouring Sammagaon and Puranogaon.
• Puranogaon: A VDC next to Sammagaon in which I lived for six months in 2010.
• Sahu bajār: A VDC neighbouring Sammagaon.
• Sammagaon: The VDC which I consider my main fieldsite. Sammagaon’s lowest
elevation is approximately 800 metres; it’s highest approximately 2800 metres.
• ‘Sammagaon-5’ or ‘Ward 5’: One of the nine oﬀicial ‘wards’ into which Sammagaon
is divided. Sammagaon-5 is where the de facto administrative centre of Sammagaon
is; it includes the VDC’s oﬀicial building, the health post, and the police station.
Tindu is in ward 5 but is not perfectly contiguous with it.
• Tindu: A locality within of Sammagaon whose borders are not precisely defined; it
contains the Biswhakarma tol.
1. The terminology used here reflects that which was used during my fieldwork; there has since
been a restructuring of the administrative geography of Nepal.
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Introduction
‘I can’t walk. I can’t walk any further.’
Chini Maya, the 67-year-old woman whom I had become used to calling ‘mother’ (āmā)
over the past few months, was displaying clear signs of exhaustion. Her heavy breathing
was interspersed with whispered complaints, exclamations of pain, and calls to the gods.
None of it seemed to help.
The light was developing a soft, golden quality. In normal circumstances, this might have
put us in a contemplative mood. Now, the beauty of the mountains and forests surround-
ing us was hard to take in, as we grew increasingly concerned about Chini Maya. We
had been walking since morning, and over the past few hours, her pace had dwindled to
something slow and sluggish, devoid of all energy. It had been a hot day. On an earlier
stretch, Chini Maya had almost fainted. I had caught her in my arms and asked Ganga,
her husband and the person whom I call ‘father’ in Nepal, what we should do.
‘We’ll get there before night,’ had been his only answer.
By now, it was clear that he had been mistaken. The sun would set well before we reached
home. In fact, we were starting to wonder whether we’d make it all the way.
We were walking back to Sammagaon, the village where Ganga and Chini Maya live and
the heart of my fieldsite, after attending a relative’s wedding in a distant location. The
celebration had lasted two full days. Many of the guests had stayed up throughout the
second night. There had beenmusic anddancing, ceremonial offerings, quietly enunciated
readings by the priests (purohit), and old men sitting around the fire, chanting verses into
the night. The hosts had ensured that there was no shortage of food or millet beer. Rakshi,
13
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a strong, home-made spirit had been served directly out of five-litre jerry cans; nobody
had held back. It was no wonder that Chini Maya was having trouble on the long walk
home.
Eventually, we reached a village and stopped at the house of some of Ganga’s friends, a
couple belonging to the Sherpa ethnic group. I expected that they would bring us tea,
as is customary on such occasions. We would sit in front of their house, talk for a while,
then head off again. To my surprise, the Sherpa couple did a lot more. They brought
us indoors, fed us potatoes in spicy soup, and insisted that we stay for the night. The
three of us naturally felt relieved, but I also experienced a sense of puzzlement. Ganga
and Chini Maya belong to the Bishwakarma caste, which makes them Dalits, people who
would earlier have been called ‘untouchable’ (achhut). Despite caste-based discrimination
having receded in recent decades in Sammagaon, it is still standard for Dalits not to enter
non-Dalit houses, to avoid ritually ‘polluting’ these houses. At this point, I had spent
almost three months in the area and until then, not once had I seen this norm violated.
The Sherpa couple, however, did not seem to care about it at all.
Later that evening, as the conversation turned to the topic of the foreigner—me—
accompanying Ganga and Chini Maya, Ganga said something which added to my
confusion. He explained that I was a student from Switzerland who had come to live with
him and his family to write a book about Dalits in Nepal. He then unexpectedly added,
‘He wants to understand why Dalits used to be untouchable, but are not any more.’
This caught me off-guard. Seemingly out of the blue, on an evening during which Ganga
and Chini Maya’s caste was, as far as I could tell, a non-issue, Ganga described untoucha-
bility as a phenomenon belonging to the past. This was contrary to what I had observed
so far, and I was not sure what to make of it.
This dissertation is about caste, the ongoing stigmatisation of Dalits, and the efforts put
into trying to overcome this stigmatisation. In the broadest sense, the dissertation is an
examination of the contemporary conditions of life of the Bishwakarma, a Dalit caste en-
compassing the one previously known as ‘Kāmi’, in theHimalayan foothills of EastNepal.2
2. The term ‘Bishwakarma’ has various transcriptions, including ‘Bishwokarma’, ‘Vish-
14
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The traditional ‘caste occupation’ of these people is blacksmithing, though only very few
practise the craft today, let alone depend on it for their livelihood. In Sammagaon and
the surrounding area, most are subsistence farmers, though several have access to various
sources of monetary income.
As is well known, Dalits fall at the very bottom of the social hierarchy in India and other
South Asian countries.3 Throughout the sub-continent and in some diasporic and transna-
tional communities originating from this part of the world (e.g. Svensson 2014; Adur and
Narayan 2017), Dalits have been subjected to striking forms of marginalisation and injus-
tice. The types of discrimination, violence, and exclusion which they face exist in myriad
domains, including the social, political, and cultural. Recent studies have made it clear
that Dalits continue to face economic inequality, poverty, and exploitation. In the context
of contemporary, neoliberal India, this phenomenon not only endures; in several ways it
is on the rise (Shah et al. 2018). Macroeconomic indicators confirm that Dalits in Nepal
also face dire poverty (CBS 2005, 2011; WB-DFID 2006; Bennett, Sijapati, and Thapa 2013).
The ongoing poverty of Dalits is often tied to landlessness, which is itself a vestige of the
patronage system called jajmani in India and bali-ghare or riti-bhagya in Nepal.4 In this sys-
tem, described extensively in classical anthropological literature, Dalits used to work as
artisans and service providers for upper-caste land-owners. They were placed in relations
of subjugation to their upper-caste patrons, depending on them for their livelihood.5
In Sammagaon, on a purely economic level, the Bishwakarma are not distinguishably
better- or worse-off than non-Dalits. I do not have precise quantitative data that demon-
strates this, but my evidence for this statement will follow in chapter 1. Briefly, the
central point is that there is considerable economic disparity within the Bishwkarma caste,
which makes any assessment of their situation as a group problematic, and therefore,
wakarma’, and other similar variations. It can be abbreviated ‘BK’, which is usually pronounced
‘bi-ka’, in accordance with the corresponding abbreviation in the devanāgari script. It derives from
‘Viśhwákarma’, the Hindu God who is the architect or engineer of the Universe. The Bishwakarma
group technically includes all earlier metalworker castes, but Nepalis primarily associate it with
the ‘Kāmi’. ‘Kāmi’ is still used on occasion, but it is considered derogatory.
3. Note that despite my use of the term ‘hierarchy’, the notion of caste as an overarching and
organised ‘system’, presentedmost famously by Dumont (1980[1966]), does not reflect the current
reality in Nepal and South Asia (Gupta 2005; Das 2015).
4. For a detailed discussion of the role of Dalits in the riti-bhagya system of West Nepal, see
(Cameron 1995, 1998)
5. For a Nepali example, see Prindle (1977)
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any overall comparison to other castes or ethnic groups in the area fallacious. Some
of the Bishwakarma live in poverty, struggling to feed themselves, but others possess
considerable wealth. Some own land, including occasionally in Kathmandu, Nepal’s
capital city, where even a small plot has extremely high value. Several routinely employ
non-Dalits to work in their fields in exchange for money or grain, in a striking inversion
of the traditional patronage system. Several factors have contributed to the relative
economic success of (some of) the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon. Labour migration, in
particular to the Arabian peninsula, is important. A number of households regularly
receive remittance from a relative, usually a son or husband working in Qatar, Saudi
Arabia or another Gulf country. This is in line with the patterns of labour migration that
have become common in Nepal more generally, and that are profoundly affecting the
country’s economy (Seddon, Adhikari, and Gurung 2002).
Some literature suggests that, in situations where poverty and caste do not obviously map
onto each other, anthropologists should favour a class-based analysis. For example, in a
study of cardamom cultivation in the easternmost part of Nepal, a few hundred kilometres
away from Sammagaon,6 Fitzpatrick suggests that
…[a] transition from inter-ethnic or inter-caste economic differentiation to
class-based differentiation is illustrated by the fact that the poorest households
… are no longer solely the Dalit groups (2011:118).
Consequently, he contends that
…while an ethnic or caste-based analysis is suﬀicient for understanding histor-
ical processes of economic and social change, a class-based analysis is much more
useful for examining contemporary economic and social differentiation (2011:117, em-
phasis added).
Similar remarks could be made about Sammagaon: the Bishwakarma, while Dalits, are
no longer the poorest people in the area. A study of emerging class-based differentiation
among them as well as across other groups might therefore be fruitful. If one were to
adopt a purely economic lens, Gardner’s description of her fieldsite in Bangladesh would
seem to carry over to Sammagaon. There too, there exists
6. There are no cardamom plantations in Sammagaon.
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…a ‘worldview’ in which another form of movement, to foreign places, is seen
as the only way to get ahead. In this context, migration and social status are
inextricably interlinked. (2008:479)
And yet a class-based analysis is not what I undertake in this dissertation. What struckme
in Sammagaon was the resilience of caste despite the Bishwakarma’s relatively comfortable
economic situation. I was struck by the fact that even the wealthiest of the Bishwakarama
do not escape—at least never fully—the negative ascriptions that come with being Dalit.
Classic literature on South Asia documents the historical possibility of ‘caste mobility’: en-
tire castes have, on occasion, successfully claimed a higher status than the one which they
were previously ascribed (Srinivas 1956:491ff; 2007[1968]; Das 2015:223). It is, however,
usually recognised that suchmobility does not occur for Dalits, and in this regard, the situ-
ation in Sammagaon is no exception. The Bishwakarma have not achieved a higher status
as a group, and additionally, no Bishwakarma individual successfully escapes all of the
ascriptions of lowliness associated with being Dalit.
It is this resilience of the Dalit condition to which I attend in this thesis. I do not focus
on any history of economic subjugation—nor emancipation therefrom—because doing so
would not allow me to explain this resilience. Instead, my focus is on the non-economic
way in which Dalits have historically been ostracised, namely, the ascription of a defiling,
ritually impure status. I attend centrally to the question of untouchability, askingwhat has
become of this phenomenon in the present day. What interests me is the extent to which
the Bishwakarma continue to be ascribed a lowly status despite their relative economic
success, and—aswill become obvious—despite living in a context of rapid andprogressive
political change.
However, the fact that the Bishwakarma continue to be seen as lowly is not the whole story.
Recall the events described in the opening of this introduction, the evening during which
Ganga, Chini Maya and I were unexpectedly hosted by a Sherpa couple. This evening
presented the first strong, explicit challenge I encountered to the ethnographic picture
which I had been forming until then. I filed it as an exceptional event in my fieldnotes and,
for a long time, I pondered on how to interpret the Sherpas’ unusual hospitality to Dalits,
and how to make sense of Ganga’s puzzling words: ‘he wants to understand why Dalits
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used to be untouchable but are not anymore’. Had Imissed something obvious until then?
Had untouchability actually disappeared, and were all my observations of discrimination
against the Bishwakarma documenting an altogether different phenomenon? Or, on the
contrary, was this just an exception, an event best disregarded, as one sometimes deals
with outliers in statistics? Why had Ganga said that untouchability had disappeared, an
aﬀirmation that ran contrary—it seemed to me—to his usual insistence that Dalits are still
‘shamed’ by non-Dalits? Had this just been a polite thing to say to hostswhohadwelcomed
him into their home? Or was this a subtle message to me, a way of telling me to pay more
attention to the fact that there are at least some people who do not treat the Bishwakarma
as lowly or defiling?
I never obtained a truly satisfying answer to all of these questions. A few days later, when
I talked about the event with Ganga and his family, they waved my question away, saying
simply that the Sherpa community, unlike most, does not care about caste and untoucha-
bility, but that caste-based discrimination did continue to occur. Their casual tone led me
to believe that this had indeed been a case of over-attentiveness on my part. I had built up
a sense of deep significance that the event simply did not hold for my hosts.
Be this as it may, the event did shift my own perspective, making me attentive to the com-
plexity of the issue of caste-based discrimination today. That the Sherpa in Sammagaon
are less stringent about caste rules than other communities was new to me, but it made
sense that I would not have noticed this until then, since there were no Sherpa people
living close to Ganga and Chini Maya’s home, where I was based. That Ganga had ex-
plicitly said that Dalits were no longer untouchable, however, was something which I could
not fully shake off. In the weeks and months that followed, I gradually became aware of
a phenomenon which I had not been paying suﬀicient attention to until then, but which
I came to realise is central to the way in which caste is talked about in Sammagaon. This
is a tendency to place caste and caste-based discrimination in the past, against the fairly
obvious evidence that they nevertheless continue to matter a great deal in everyday life.
Ganga’s assertion that ‘Dalits used to be untouchable but are not anymore’ was unusually
explicit, but I would later encounter multiple people insisting that, regardless of what I
was observing, caste-based discrimination somehow belonged to ‘the past’.
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As I paid increasing attention to such assertions, I began to form a new impression. In
Sammagaon, the ongoing discrimination against Dalits is real, but it is talked about almost
as a historical accident, a fluke, an outdatedway of thinking and behaving. As I took notice
of this, a number of new questions emerged. Why were people, Dalits and non-Dalits
alike, saying such things even though discrimination against Dalits was still observable in
countless details of everyday life? Why would upper-caste people regularly tell me that
there is ‘only one kind of human’ but, in the same breath, admit that they would never eat
food cooked by a Dalit or let a Dalit into their house?
That people do not behave in line with what they say, and that they regularly say things
which do not fully reflect their deeper mental representations, is a well-known fact. For
example—in an admittedly entirely different context—Leach suggested that ‘dogmatic as-
sertions’ say ‘absolutely nothing of the inner psychological state’ (1966:40) of the people
whomake them. In the upcoming chapters, I will consider the possibility that the denial of
caste-based discrimination operates as a ‘dogma’ in Sammagaon, that it is a proposition to
which people adhere not because it is accurate or descriptive, but for extraneous reasons.
I will suggest that while this is occasionally the case, such an explanation is too simplistic.
In Sammagaon, people do not only say that caste belongs to the past; they make efforts
to effectively place it there. It is therefore important not to do away too quickly with the
tension that exists between, on the one hand, people making conscious efforts to get rid of
caste-based discrimination and, on the other, the persistence of this phenomenon. Many
of the upcoming chapters deal with this tension in one way or another.
Thesis outline
The first chapter offers ethnographic and anthropological contextualisation. It opens with
a general description of the fieldsite in which I conducted my research and describes how
I built rapport with my hosts. The caste ‘structure’ and the relation between caste and
ethnicity in East Nepal are discussed here, and reflections on my overall theoretical orien-
tation are offered.
The rest of the thesis, chapters 2 and following, is divided into three parts. The first part
documents various strategies used by the Bishwakarma and others in an attempt to do
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away with caste-based discrimination in Sammagaon. These strategies focus on changing
the public image of the Bishwakarma, shifting it away froman image of ‘lowliness’ towards
one of prestige. The second part offers an explanation of why, despite these strategies
being deployed, the Bishwakarma and Dalits more generally continue to be perceived as
a distinct, different kind of people. The explanation I offer is uncommon in anthropology;
it is based on research conducted primarily in the disciplines of social and developmental
psychology. I argue that the ongoing stigmatisation of Dalits is, in part, attributable to a
cognitive bias known as ‘psychological essentialism’. This argument, in turn, leads me to
re-evaluate the strategies presented in part I and to discuss an altogether different strategy
in part III. This final strategy, which I call ‘mixing’, does not attempt to change the image
of the Bishwakarma and Dalits more generally. Instead, it tries to do away with these
social categories altogether by blurring or otherwise re-negotiating the boundary which
separates Dalits from others.
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Background
This chapter has several goals. First, it introduces the reader to the general setting inwhich
the fieldwork was conducted and describes how I established rapport with my hosts. Sec-
ond, it describes the caste ‘structure’ and relation between caste and ethnicity in Samma-
gaon. Third, it discusses my overarching theoretical orientation.
Ethnographic setting and methodological considerations
Sammagaon
In the introduction, I described Sammagaon as a ‘village’. This is a somewhat mislead-
ing appellation. Sammagaon covers a much larger area than the word ‘village’ typically
evokes. It is what was known at the time of my fieldwork as a VDC (Village Development
Committee), which is a unit in Nepal’s oﬀicial geography.1
A VDC is primarily an administrative and economic entity. It figures on people’s citi-
zenship documents, determines where a person can vote, and receives a yearly budget
from district authorities which is spent on infrastructural development. Thus, in certain
contexts, VDCs matter a great deal. However, they are too large to capture the informal
geographies which are used to navigate and describe places on an everyday basis. These
1. The 2015 Constitution of Nepal, which was promulgated a few months after I returned from
the country andmarked the final step in the country’s transition to federalism, reorganisedNepal’s
geographical and administrative divisions. The information included here reflects the administra-
tive organisation of Nepal during my fieldwork.
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informal geographies comprise elements such as the ‘gaun’ (‘village’), the ‘tol’ (which is
usually a group of houses whose inhabitants are from the same caste, ethnic group or
lineage), ‘jangal’ (forests, which can spread over vast areas between separate gaun or tol),
‘nadi’ (rivers), and many more features of physical and human-shaped geography.
According to the 2011 national census (CBS 2012, 2014), the VDC of Sammagaon boasts
a total population slightly over 3,500 individuals, who live in almost 750 households.
Among these, 6.2 per cent declare themselves to belong to one of the three Dalit castes
present in the area.
Sammagaon covers a large stretch of steep terrain spread between two valleys. It is essen-
tially one very large hill whose base lies at an elevation of about 800 metres and whose
highest point is 2000 metres higher. To climb from the lowest point to the highest takes
at least five hours, and this must be done on foot. There is a treacherous dirt track that
goes part of the way, but it is so badly maintained that no vehicle can use it, apart from
Sammagaon’s single tractor, owned by a family of the Sunuwar ethnic group and used to
provision shops with merchandise.
Sammagaon, like all VDCs, is divided into nine numbered wards, smaller and mostly in-
significant administrative units whose sole purpose is to add granularity to the oﬀicial
geography. Ward 1 is at the very bottom of the hill; ward 9 at the very top. Ganga’s house,
which is where I lived for the entire duration of my fieldwork, is in ward 5, almost exactly
half-way to the top of Sammagaon, at an elevation just shy of 1800 metres. It is also in a
place which the inhabitants of Sammagaon call ‘Tindu’, the informal denomination of an
area slightly smaller than ward 5.
Elevation affects which crops can be grown. The two main concepts which people use to
describe elevation are ‘bensi’ and ‘lek’. The former describes the bottom of valleys, places
where the climate is almost tropical, the staple grain is rice, and fruit and vegetables such
as tomatoes, mangos, jackfruit, and pineapples grow. Rivers in the bensi provide ample
irrigation; the terrain is flat and easy to cultivate, the earth fertile. The term ‘lek’, in contrast,
describes places higher up in the hills, where corn and millet are staples, and common
fruit and vegetables include the chayote, spinach, pears, mulberries, etc. Here, the terrain
is steeper and irrigation takes more work. Tindu is in the lek, but it is not far from the
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bensi. On occasion, when I would walk to higher places, where the air felt significantly
colder and dryer and the vegetation became sparse, I would be told that this was the lek
proper. Yet even in the highest part of Sammagaon, snow is rare. The whole VDC is part
of the pahād, the Himalayan foothills, sometimes also referred to as ‘mid-hills’. None of
this counts as himal (Himalayan mountains). The latter term is reserved for the snowy
peaks that can be seen to the north of Sammagaon, only a few dozen kilometres away, but
an altogether much harsher environment.
Until roughly half-way through my fieldwork, the best way to get to Sammagaon from
Kathmandu was by bus. The journey was intense. The buses themselves were colourful,
hand-painted in bright designs with a number of auspicious signs. They would leave the
capital at dawn. A few minutes after departure, the driver would turn up the volume
on the sound system. He would usually play naya lok git, a modern take on traditional
music, whose long and repetitive songs celebrate rural life and speak, more often than
not, of romance and marriage. The driver was always accompanied by one or two con-
ductors, teenage boys who would check passenger tickets and charge people who hopped
on and off along the way. As the bus drove further from Kathmandu, the road would
get progressively worse, and narrower; the tarmac gave way to sections paved in roughly
cut stone, which in turn deteriorated into sinuous, mountainous dirt track. Once the last
police checkpoint was passed, the bus would take on more passengers than it was built to
accommodate. With no space left inside, the new passengers would climb onto the roof,
where theywould sit and cling to themetal luggage bars. Young boys are often particularly
eager to experience this thrill.
A slightly more expensive alternative to the bus service was the ‘Sumo’, a transportation
service which was introduced half-way through my fieldwork. Its name is eponymous
with the car model used for this transport, a ten-seater jeep produced by the Indian cor-
poration TATA. Neither buses nor Sumos reach Sammagaon itself. During the dry season,
both stop in Bensitaun, a large gaun which is part of the VDC of Puranogaon, and close
to Sammagaon’s ward number 1. When I started my fieldwork, under good conditions,
the trip from Kathmandu to Bensitaun lasted some ten or eleven hours. Later, a new road
was opened which shaved five hours off this travel time. During the wet season, the trip
was considerably slower and could not always be completed in one day. Passengers regu-
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larly had to get off when the bus or car got stuck in mud, to help dig and push the vehicle.
Moreover, during the wet season, the bus stops several hours’ walk away from Bensitaun,
as the track is destroyed each year by landslides and deep torrents which form sponta-
neously during the monsoon.
Figure 1.1: Young child on the path between Bensitaun and Tindu (photograph by Chris-
tian Deschenaux, reproduced with permission.)
The temperature range in Tindu, the part of Sammagaon I lived in, varies from slightly
higher than freezing in the winter to over 25°C in the summer. The most comfortable
season is in October and November, when it is sunny and the land is at its most fertile.
This is a period of ‘sukha’, a term which is hard to translate, but which evokes a sense of
contentedness, sweetness and fulfilment. It is a time to lie back, relax, and enjoy the fruits
of the land. As the year moves forward, winter brings cold, but not hardship per se. May
and June are marked with blazing heat. The land dries up and vegetables are harder to
grow; instead, one eats gundruk, spinach which has been fermented and dried in the sun
earlier in the year. More than any other event, however, it is the yearly monsoon, which
usually starts in July, that marks the cycle of seasons. With its torrential rains begins a
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period of dukha, of toil and backbreaking work, a frantic rush to plant millet (or rice, lower
in the valley). All the inhabitants of Sammagon buy cheap, translucent sheets of blue
plastic which they tie up in one corner and throw over their clothes as they head out to
the fields. This impractical and ineffective gear provides little protection from the deluge,
but people distract themselves from the rain through the intensity of collective work and
by bantering about their superior planting abilities. Toiling and hardship is part of the
rhythm of life; they are greeted philosophically. When somebody complains too loudly
about how painful the work is, they are reminded by someone else that all this is just part
of dhukha-sukha, the alternation of adversity and happiness which give life a rhythm.
Sammagaon’s ward 5, where I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork, is made of sixty-eight
households. This includes the Bishowkarma tol, which comprises eight households, the
male members of which all descend from one man, Ganga’s great-grandfather. All the
Bishwakarma here share a thar name: Dehegli.2 There is one more Bishwakarma house-
hold in ward 5, but it is not in the same tol, and its members are not related to the Dehegli,
although they maintain friendly relations with them. I spent a fair amount of time in
this house, in part because its owner, Kishor, ran the largest smithy in Sammagaon. As
chapter 4 will discuss in more detail, the Bishwakarma are still heavily associated with
blacksmithing, their so-called ‘caste occupation’, despite the fact that very few of them
actually practise it. As for the other houses in ward 5, an important number of them be-
long to upper-caste Chhetri people, a few to the even higher-caste Bahun, and a few more
to Newars and other janajāti groups (ethnic groups, middle-caste).3 The other Dalits of
Sammagaon, the Darji and the Sārki, live in other wards. I spent some time with the Darji,
who live in a tol some thirty minutes away from the Bishwakarma, but almost none with
the Sārki, whose tol is further away.
Ward 5 is, for all intents and purposes, the administrative centre of Sammagaon. It in-
cludes a small police building, architecturally indistinguishable from people’s residences,
in which three to four oﬀicers live and work throughout the year. There is also a never-
used, decrepit oﬀicial administrative building whose purpose was never made clear to
me. There are a few small shops in the ward, all of which are integrated with their owners’
2. See next section for a description of the thar.
3. See section below on the social structure of Sammagaon.
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homes. One sells thirty-kilo sacks of grain and large blocks of salt; the others are conve-
nience stores selling soap, pencils and instant noodles. Kishor, the owner of the smithy,
also runs a shop-cum-drinking spot.
These shops sell goods at a slightly higher price than those in Bensitaun. Ganga and his
family, who could have afforded to buy goods inward 5, often preferred tomake the trip all
the way down to Bensitaun and carry whatever they needed back up. My large backpack
was often recruited for this purpose, as were my legs. At first, carrying fifteen kilos of
goods up to Tindu, a steep, three to four hour walk, was diﬀicult for me. Over time, I
came to enjoy doing so. I would regularly offer to make the trip, as I found the walk a
good way to spend a few hours alone, something that would not happen often otherwise.
I also made it a point to buy lentils and other basic goods for the poorer households in the
Bishwakarma tol, in particular for a woman I called ‘thuli āmā’ (lit. ‘big mother’, father’s
elder wife)4, who lived with an adopted child in a tiny house, and who had no land to
sustain herself.
There are two more buildings in ward 5 which are noteworthy. One is a small primary
school on the edge of a small forest, teaching grades 1 to 5. When I first arrived in Samma-
gaon, the building was so old that it was not in use most of the year, teachers preferring
to give classes in a clearing above the school. When I left, the building was being recon-
structed by anNGO. The other building is a health post; it is quite large, made of dry stone
and cement rather than the usual stone andmud. The staff are often absent and there seem
to be regular shortages of medicine, but the building is used for village meetings. Public
events are held in front of it; NGO meetings are held in one of its larger rooms.
The course of a usual day in Sammagaon depends on the season. The vast majority of the
population lives by subsistence agriculture. I have already mentioned the frantic month
or two that the arrival of wet season announces. At this time, men, women and children
quite literally work from dawn to dusk, with little to no respite. Each seedling has to be
planted by hand, and failure to do this at the right time and in the right way can lead to a
bad harvest.
4. This woman was the elder of Ganga’s paternal uncle’s two wives; kinship terms can be used
quite liberally to mark respect in Nepal.
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Figure 1.2: Digging mud in preparation for planting rice.
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Figure 1.3: Flattening the ground in preparation for planting rice.
Figure 1.4: Planting rice.
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In calmermonths, there is still plenty to do in the fields and around the house, but the sense
of urgency fades away. People wake up between 5 and 6 am. Some households, especially
but not exclusively upper-caste ones, might start the day with some soft chanting or pujā
(ceremonial worship). Women light fires at the hearth and prepare tea. Buffaloes are
brought out from sheds and tied to the poles where they spend the whole day. Other
livestock—goats, chickens, pigs—are tended to. People cut grass or bamboo leaves that
they bring back for the cattle in a large dhoko (a woven basket carried with a strap around
the head).
The first of the day’s twomeals is taken around 9 or 10 am. It usually includes bhāt (boiled
rice), though on occasion this can be replaced with chekhla (crushed corn) or dhido (a fried
mix of millet flour and water). One of these three staples must be served if the food is
to be considered an actual meal and not only khājā (snack). Dāl (lentil soup) is common,
as is whatever vegetable is in season, though neither of these are seen as necessary in
the same way as rice or one of the other staples. Meat is rarer, and when available, it is
relished. Food is generally prepared by women, with two exceptions. First, unmarried
men whose families do not live in Sammagaon, such as school teachers, might cook for
themselves. Second, men might cook when their wives or daughters are menstruating, as
menstruation is viewed as polluting. This second case is more commonly seen in upper-
caste households, though it also occurs in some Bishwakarma households. Once the meal
is over, for most adults the bulk of the day is dedicated to work in the fields or around
the house. Some specific tasks are reserved for men or women. For example, only men
will guide the oxen used to pull ploughs, and only women will add a new layer to the
floor and porch of a house, a task which requires dipping one’s hands in dung. Most
tasks can however be accomplished by either men or women. Some activities include the
preparation of foods to be stored for longer periods (drying spinach, grinding turmeric,
etc.), preparing rakshi (millet alcohol), making various household items (mats, ladders,
etc.) out of bamboo, and many other everyday tasks.
Children spend relatively little time in the fields, as they are generally sent to school dur-
ing the day. Their attendance rates are low, however, and when needed, they will stay at
home to help with work instead. While I was in the field, the prize for best attendance in
a school in Puranogaon was awarded to a student who had been present on barely over
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seventy per cent of school days. In addition to children, there are some adults who spend
significantly less time than others working in fields. This category includes school teach-
ers, government employees posted in the area (police oﬀicers and staff at the health post),5
the few inhabitants who have found employment with one of the locally active NGOs, and
a small but significant group of better-off villagers who engage extensively in local poli-
tics and take an unusually active part in the numerous meetings that are called by NGOs,
micro-credit associations, and other development-focused organisations. Together, these
people form something of an ‘elite’ rural class. Also less vested in manual labour are the
mostly upper-caste priests who provide ritual services to their patrons, the pastor in Sam-
magaon’s only church, and the more active among the jhakri (shamans).
The day ends soon after the second meal, which is identical to the first and consumed in
the evening, between 6 and 8 pm. The recent arrival of televisions and satellite antennas
means that some villagers stay up for a few hours after eating, and a few others might go
drinking, but most go to bed early.
Choice of fieldsite
Citing Pratt, Ahearn notes that ethnographies often open with a narrative of the ethnog-
rapher’s arrival in their fieldsite (2001:10). I do not believe that my experience of arrival
and gradually becoming accustomed to life in Sammagaon differs significantly from that
of most anthropologists, so I will keep my remarks on this topic brief. However, it is
worth explaining how I came to conduct research in Sammagaon rather than elsewhere.
Sammagaon may seem like an unlikely choice for research on Dalits, since it is located in
eastern Nepal, where caste-based discrimination is not as pronounced as in the western
and southern parts of the country.
On the 21st of November 2013, one month after arriving in Nepal, I made my way to Pu-
ranogaon, where I had spent six months in 2010. Despite my familiarity with this place
and its people, I had decided not to conduct fieldwork there. In 2010, my primary role
had been that of an English language teacher at a local primary school, a position which
I had been assigned to by a Swiss NGO. The inhabitants of Puranogaon had come to as-
5. There is also an oﬀicial secretary for the VDC, but he has not lived in Sammagaon for years,
preferring to stay in the distant district headquarters.
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sociate me with this role, and I felt that it would be impossible for me to shed the image
of an NGO worker and explain my new purpose as an ethnographer. Returning to Pura-
nogaon in 2013, my main goal was to meet some of the friends I had made there and ask
them about places close to Puranogaon that might be suitable for the work which I now
intended to conduct, but where people did not already know me. My aim for this brief
trip was to start establishing a list of candidate locations for fieldwork, but I was adamant
not to make a final decision before I had also been to other parts of the country.
Ram Prasad and his wife Rasika were some of the people to whom I had grown the closest
in Puranogaon in 2010. After I explained my project to them, Ram Prasad walked me to
Sammagaon, some four hours away from Puranogaon. I stayed there for a few days with
Rasika’s brother, Narayan. Like RamPrasad and Rasika, Narayanwas an upper-casteman,
but he in turn introducedme toGangaDehegli, a retired school teacher and aDalit. Shortly
after we met, Ganga offered to host me and help with my work. I thanked him, told him I
still intended to check a few other possible locations, and promised I would be in touch.
An unforeseeable accident led me to conduct fieldwork in Sammagaon without exploring
other possible fieldsites. This happened a few days later, when I was returning from this
brief expedition. I was sitting with five other people on the back seat of the battered old
bus that goes to Kathmandu. The bus ceiling was low and the road bumpy, so I held onto
the seat to avoid repeatedly hitting my head. We drove into a particularly large pothole;
this sent the bus seat upwards, detaching it from the metal frame to which it was only
loosely attached. When the seat came back down, it caught the tip of my finger, break-
ing the bone, ripping the nail off, and cutting me deeply. I stayed in Kathmandu for the
surgery and healing process, taking lessons in Nepali language and working towards ob-
taining a research visa. By the time the healing was complete and I had solved the various
administrative issues that arose with the visa, nine weeks had passed. I felt that it was
time for me to start my fieldwork in earnest, and Sammagaon was the only entry on my
list of possible fieldsites.
Throughout the duration of my fieldwork, I harboured a sense of unease—anxiety even,
at times—at the reasons for which I had come to conduct fieldwork in Sammagaon. I
was haunted by the sense that there was, somewhere out there, a more suitable location.
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In my mind, there were three main issues with Sammagaon. The first was, as already
mentioned, that it was located in a part of the country where caste-based discrimination is
comparatively low. The second was that it had comparatively few Dalit households, and
more problematically, that these houses were grouped into three separate agglomerations
located quite far away from each other. The third was that no children lived in Ganga’s
household, and that there were only a few children in the neighbouring houses. The latter
was an issue because the project which I originally intended to carry out was focused on
childhood.
I worked around these limitations in ways which will become apparent in the upcoming
material. The lower-than-average caste-based discrimination, in many ways, turned out
to be an interesting context to work in. It led me to study how Dalits try to change the way
in which they are treated in everyday life and made it possible to study phenomena pre-
sumably rarer in other parts of Nepal, such as Dalit–non-Dalit marriage. The separation
of Dalit households into three clusters is what led me to work principally with the Bish-
wakarma. Somewhat paradoxically, focusing on the Bishwakarma later led me to expand
my research beyond the borders of Sammagaon, as I started to spend time with their rel-
atives who lived in other villages and in Kathmandu. The low number of children in the
Bishwakarma part of Sammagaon is what led to the most drastic change in my interests; I
shifted to working with adults and young adults instead.
In retrospect, it is clear that the research I conducted diverged considerably frommy origi-
nal intent, in no small part because of the accident I was involved in. Some anthropologists
relish the vagaries and unpredictability of ethnographic work. I do not share this enthu-
siasm, but I no longer feel the sense of unease which haunted me in Sammagaon. This is
mostly thanks to Ganga and his relatives, who not only made me feel welcome, but per-
suaded me that there was great value in relating their experiences and what they had to
say.
Becoming like a son
My first encounter with Ganga and Chini Maya must have been more surprising for them
than it was for me. Narayan, who had introduced us, had told them only that he was
bringing a foreigner interested in working with Dalits. For our very first meeting, Ganga
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had set out two plastic chairs (unusual furniture in the area) on the front porch of their
house. He sat in one and ceremoniously invitedme to sit in the other. Chini Maya brought
tea and a freshly cut cucumber. She initially stood in the background but graduallymoved
in to take part in the conversation. I made an effort to explain what I had come for, in my
then teeteringNepali. Once the basic idea had somehowbeen communicated—that Iwas a
student, that I wanted to live with them andwrite about Dalits in Nepal—we immediately
discussed practical arrangements: which room I would stay in, how much I would pay
for food and lodging, whether I wished to share food with them, etc. In retrospect, I find
it remarkable that Ganga and Chini Maya were so welcoming. They were immediately
sympathetic and willing to take me in.
Much later, when we had grown close, Ganga and Chini Maya would laugh as they re-
called this initial meeting. They had shown none of their surprise on that day, but they
later explained that they had both expected someone a lot older. Chini Maya in particular
quickly took to calling me ‘babu’ (young child), a term used in endearment. For the whole
period that I stayed in her house, she never stopped worrying about me, insisting that
I call regularly when I was away, reminding me to watch my step whenever we walked
together, making sure that I was constantly fed more than I actually wanted, and telling
me never to go drinking at the local hangout. I was expected, from the start, to call her
‘āmā’ (mother). Kinship terms are widely used in Nepal to address even people whom
one is meeting for the first time, but it is undeniable that Chini Maya’s attitude toward me
rapidly became that of a slightly overbearing motherly figure. On the whole, she would
generally have been a lot happier had I stayed at home each day, all day long. In her eyes,
I was something of a helpless child—a representation which she explicitly vocalised once,
when I was explaining how diﬀicult it was for me to find my way around the many paths
of Sammagaon. She would often chuckle sympathetically at my incompetence with farm
work, and at how quickly physical labour became too hard for me. But above all, Chini
Maya would regularly warn me not to trust strangers, who upon meeting a rich foreigner
like me would certainly be intent on getting me drunk and stealing my money.
Gangawas evenmore explicit about the kinship-like nature of our relationship. He initially
suggested that I call him ‘uncle’ (in English), but this term was rapidly and seamlessly
replacedwith ‘bua’ (father). He often described our relationship as ‘bua-chhora’ (father and
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son). Unlike his wife, for all his initial surprise at how young I was, Ganga always treated
me like an adult son. He took a strong interest in my relationship with a Nepaliki chhori
(daughter of a Nepali), offering advice on how to behave with my future father-in-law
and ultimately giving a long and moving speech at the end of my wedding.6 Throughout
my fieldwork, I saw him shed tears twice. The first was when he spoke of the conversion
of his (actual) eldest son to Christianity. This was a major blow for him because it meant
that his son would not conduct the appropriate Hindu mortuary rites after Ganga’s death.
The second was when I left Sammagaon at the end of my fieldsite. I am certain that I had
not become equivalent to an actual son, but I was nonetheless moved.
Ganga and Chini Maya have two sons and three daughters. Only the youngest daughter,
Sirjanna, is unmarried and still lives with them. I only met her after the initial arrange-
ments to live in the house. I call her ‘bahini’ (younger sister), though I use the same re-
spectful pronoun to address her as she has always insisted on using with me, despite the
fact that this pronoun is unusually honorific for siblings. Sirjanna, in someways, is the per-
son in Sammagaon to whom I found it easiest to relate. Our similar age certainly helped,
and I always felt sympathetic to the plight she experienced while searching for formal em-
ployment. Sirjanna had completed a considerably higher level of formal education than
most of her peers, especially in comparison to other young Dalit women. She had lived in
Kathmandu for over a year to attend a course for people aiming to work in development.
The whole time I was in Sammagaon, her goal was to find employment, marry, and leave
this rural area. She sometimes asked me for help; we used my laptop to prepare her CV
and would use the unreliable internet connection on my phone to check for new opportu-
nities. A dutiful daughter, she took excellent care of her parents, but it was clear that she
was dissatisfied with the current situation.
A fieldsite bounded by kinship
The kinship system of the Bishwakarma is identical to that of the upper-caste Bahun (Brah-
man), described extensively by Bennett (1983:especially 16–22) and Stone (2010:93–110).
A fewwords on this system are necessary here because kinship is the way in which I came,
6. My wife, whom I met before fieldwork, is Nepali. While I was in Sammagaon, she lived with
her father in Kathmandu. We were not married yet, but we celebrated our wedding towards the
end of my fieldwork, in 2015. Ganga and his family were, of course, invited.
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quite unconsciously at first, to ‘bound’ my fieldsite.
ego
parivar
kul
thar
jat (caste)
(marriage)
Dalits
Figure 1.5: A simplified model of different kinship groups
Together, Chini Maya, Ganga and Sirjanna form a parivār, a term which can loosely be
translated as ‘family’ or ‘household’. The parivār is the smallest unit that ego is part of.
A larger unit is the kul, which is described both as a patriline tracing back to a common
ancestor and, more often, as a group that worships the same kul devtā (lineage gods). As
noted by Bennett (1983:18–21), the size of the kul can varywidely, as a parivār can choose to
begin a new kul at any given time and for a number of reasons. Usually larger than the kul,
but not necessarily so, are the thar and gotra. Both of these are agnatic descent groups. The
gotra, which is sometimes translated as ‘clan’, is not a categorywhich is paid close attention
to in everyday life; it is mainly important when selecting a spouse because it is exogamous.
Many of the people whom I worked with could not tell me what their own gotrawas. The
thar, on the other hand, is a commonly used category. In part this is because it can operate,
for legal purposes, as a surname. Ganga, Chini Maya and all the other Bishwakarma of
Sammagaon belong to the thar called ‘Dehegli’, and this is the namewhich figures on their
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identity documents, at least if they own them. The thar is also strictly exogamous.
There are categories larger than the thar, though these can hardly be thought of as ‘kinship’
terms. Mainly, there is is the jāt, the term usually translated as caste, though it also has
the more general meaning ‘sort’, ‘kind of’, and even ‘species’; thus there are jāts not only
of people, but also of spinach, leeches, buffaloes, etc. When talking about caste, the me-
dia and legal documents favour the term ‘jāti’ (‘community’), as this is considered more
modern and can apply to the ethnic groups of Nepal as well as castes.7 The term is used
by some of the more educated and politically active people in Sammagaon, but in prac-
tice, its extension is identical to that of ‘jāt’, and many people use the two interchangeably,
without much concern for their different connotations.
Ganga and his relatives belong to the ‘Bishwakarma’ jāt.8 The jāt is very strictly endog-
amous. Thus, a Dehegli must marry someone who is a Bishwakarma, but not another
Dehegli. In the second part of this thesis, where I address violations of this rule, I use the
term ‘intercaste marriage’; this is equivalent to ‘jāt exogamy’.
Still larger than the jāt is the category ‘Dalit’, which is recognised universally in Nepali pol-
itics and the Nepali administration. The term is generally known in Sammagaon, though
some peoplewithout formal education have never heard it. The category ‘Dalit’ comprises
a number of jāt or castes. The other two which are present in Sammagaon and the sur-
rounding area are the Darji and the Sārki; together with the Bishwakarma, these groups
are sometimes referred to as ‘Hill Dalits’ to distinguish them from the different Dalit castes
that live in the Southern plains.
The Bishwakarma are, like other Dalits and the upper-caste Bahun and Chhetri, patrilineal
and virilocal. Thus, Ganga and Chini Maya’s sons, having married and moved out, have
each started a parivār of their own, though they still belong to the same kul as their parents.9
Of these two sons, I nevermet the eldest, whowasworking in Saudi Arabia throughout the
duration of my fieldwork. I did however regularly meet his wife and their two sons, who
live in Jorpathi, Kathmandu. I met Ganga’s younger son and his own family on several
7. See section below on social structure.
8. See introduction on the difference between ‘Kāmi’, the older caste name, and ‘Bishwakarma’
9. Although in this regard, the status of the eldest son, who has converted to Christianity, is not
quite clear.
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occasions; they also live in Jorpathi.
Ganga and Chini Maya’s two eldest daughters are married. They not only have their own
parivār now, but have also been ritually ‘transferred’ to the kul, thar, and gotra of their hus-
bands, during the wedding ritual of khanyādān (‘gift of a virgin’). Consequently, they refer
to their parents’ home as their māiti (married woman’s natal home and consanguineous
relatives) rather than parivār. Ganga and Chini Maya’s eldest daughter lives in Parvat, not
far from Sammagaon, where she is married to one of the most talented blacksmiths in the
area. She visits her parents regularly. The younger daughter lives in Kathmandu, though
in a different location from her two brothers; her husband alsoworks in the Gulf and sends
her remittance.10
I mentioned above that I bounded my fieldsite along kinship lines. A more precise state-
ment would be that, by and large, the proximity which I developed to various people in
Sammagaon and elsewhere followed what could be expected if I had been an actual mem-
ber of Ganga’s parivār. The people whom I came to know the most intimately were the
members of this household. Beyond this, I maintained close relations with all but one De-
hegli household in Sammagaon, and particularly that of Ganga’s younger brother, who
lived in the house immediately next to ours. Later in my fieldwork, I took increasingly fre-
quent trips to other villages, where I was usually introduced either to Dehegli relatives of
mymain hosts, or to Bishwakarma people belonging to a different thar, often aﬀines of the
Dehegli. As mentioned, I also maintained close relations with some of Ganga’s relatives
living in Kathmandu.
I did not spend time exclusively with the Dehegli and other Bishwakarma people. Sam-
magaon is a location in which a number of castes and ethnic groups live in tight proximity.
The relations which I developed with others in the village were, however, often construed
as friendship rather than kin-like. At some point, I did feel a need to spend more time
with non-Dalits in order to broaden my perspective. When I decided to do this, I was con-
frontedwith the problemof choosingwhich people to approach, andwhy. I chose the path
of least resistance and started taking regular trips to Bensitaun, the home of Ram Prasad
and Basika, the upper-caste people I had known since my 2010 trip to Nepal; they were
10. All the marriages mentioned so far are caste-endogamous. Of all the Dehegli in Sammgaon,
only one woman married a non-Dalit.
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always extremely welcoming. There I developed a secondary set of connections, similar in
structure to the one which I had with Ganga’s kin, but this time among Ram’s upper-caste,
Bahun relatives. This second set of relations never reached the same level of proximity as
I had among the Dehegli, but it was nonetheless significant.
Beyond allowing me to develop deeper connections with non-Dalits, the regular stints of
work which I did in Bensitaun had a second advantage. Bensitaun and Sammagaon had
very different experiences of the 1996–2006 ‘People’s War’. The presence of Maoist insur-
gents in the former was much stronger. Maoists did pass through and stay in Sammagaon,
and people there share memories of how they set fire to the police station and enrolled a
few young people in their ranks, but the Maoists did not implant themselves as firmly as
in Bensitaun. Working in Bensitaun enabled me to understand much better the effect of
the War and Maoist insurgency for Dalits, a topic which I address in chapter 5.
In addition to working with the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon, in the surrounding villages
and in Kathmandu, and with Ram Prasad and his kin in Bensitaun, towards the end of
my fieldwork, I conducted formal interviews with a broader set of people both in the area
of Sammagaon and in Kathmandu, many of whom I had not met beforehand. Most of
these interviewswerewithDalit–non-Dalit couples; the results are discussed in the second
part of the dissertation. In Kathmandu, I benefited from the help of an excellent research
assistant, Ratna BK.11
The method of following kinship ties to increase my social circle in the field was not so
much a deliberate decision as the result of letting my relations grow organically. It was
only after a prolonged period and only in retrospect that I came to think of this as a way
of—loosely—boundingmy fieldsite. Somemight find this controversial. In a well-cited ar-
ticle, Candea (2007) defends bounding one’s fieldsite arbitrarily rather than following the
existing boundaries which separate places and groups (tribes, ethnic groups, castes, and
villages, districts, etc.). His recommendation is to choose one or several locations which
are restricted spatially or otherwise, but which do not form a coherent social ‘entity’ or
‘whole’. The aim is to observe how the complexities of social life play out in an ‘arbitrary
11. As per a previous footnote, BK is an abbreviation often used for ‘Bishwakarma’. In addition
to helpingme in Kathmandu, Ratnawas supposed to joinme in Sammagaon for one to twomonths
at the end of my fieldwork. The very day he made the trip, a major earthquake hit Nepal. Ratna
reached Puranogaon but returned to his home, which was destroyed, as soon as possible.
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location’, and to avoid painting too homogeneous an overall picture of ‘the field’. By now,
it should be clear that I did not follow this advice: the choice of working with the Bish-
wakarma was arbitrary in a sense, but once this initial choice was made, I followed ties of
kinship that made sense to the people with whom I worked.
In defence of my choice, while I agree that there is value in observing how complex social
systems play out in specific locations, my experience in Nepal is that it is perfectly possible
to do so while still bounding one’s fieldsite, roughly, in a way that makes sense to the
people with whom one is working. Following kinship lines introduced me to a breadth of
topics. One does not needmany hops on theDehegli kinship diagram, for example, to shift
from a Dalit activist living in Kathmandu to an old woman in Sammagaon who has never
heard the term ‘Dalit’ before, or from a self-proclaimed communist school teacher to a
fervent Christian convert. In fact, my experiencewas far from the type of homogeneity that
Candea’s method intends to prevent. I often found myself overwhelmed by the diversity
that I was observing even among individuals who recognise themselves as closely related
to each other, to the extent that during fieldwork, I often wondered how I would manage
to produce any valid generalisation. Still, I do attempt to generalise here, and to the extent
that I succeed, it is appropriate to describe this dissertation as an ethnography addressing
caste and Dalit issues in Nepal, with a specific focus on the Bishwakarma, but which also
comes replete with the idiosyncrasies and particularities of the Dehegli of Sammagaon
and their relatives.
What this dissertation is not, in contrast, is a classic ‘village study’ in the tradition, for
example, of Caplan’s (1972) Priests and Cobblers. The latter, one of the early studies of caste
and Dalits in West Nepal, reads like small-scale economic sociology. The bulk of the book
concerns village economy, studying which sources of income are available to members
of which caste groups and how this affects caste relations. The result, while convincing,
lacks a sense of the flow of life, an account of the daily experiences of the people whom
the author was working with. In my own work, I privileged the latter.
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Caste in Sammagaon
Here I present two different ways of viewing the social organisation of Sammagaon and
of the hilly areas of Nepal more generally. These two views will play an important role in
chapter 4, where I will discuss attempts by some Bishwakarma to ‘ethnicise’ their identity.
One of these is based on caste and is strongly hierarchical. The other is based on ethnicity.
While not egalitarian, it does not imply the same hierarchy as caste.
The hierarchical view
Duringmyfirstweeks in Sammagaon, Iwas struck by two simple yet remarkable facts. The
first is that virtually everybodywas in complete agreement on how the different castes and
ethnic groups in the area are ranked relatively to each other. This is not to say that caste
in Nepal has remained—or possibly even ever was—the type of overarching, total social
system famously described by Dumont (1980[1966]), in which hierarchy is a ‘paramount
value’ that everybody subscribes to unquestioningly and that governs all aspects of life. In
many ways, caste in Nepal is closer, like in India, to an ‘identity’ marker (Gupta 2005; Das
2015). These remarks notwithstanding, it is also incontestable that the different castes and
ethnic groups of Nepal are not equal in status.
In Sammagaon, it is still common to hear the terms ‘thulo jāt’ (big caste), ‘māthlo jāt’ (upper
caste), ‘sāno jāt’ (small caste) and ‘tallo jāt’ (lower caste). These terms are not used to
indicate absolute position, but rather to express the relation of another group relative to
ego or ego’s own group. For example, the Bishwakarma talk—without pause or unease—
of the Sunuwar or the Bahun as ‘hāmi bhandā thulo’ (bigger than us), but of the Darji as
‘hāmi bhandā sāno’ (smaller than us). Because such terms are commonly used, it was easy
for me to position the various groups present in Sammagaon relatively to each other. In
doing so, I found that virtually everybody agreed on an overarching ranking.
The second striking fact is that the ranking elicited in this way is in perfect accordance
with the one described in the 1854 Muluki Ain (henceforth MA), the first civil code of
Nepal. In his detailed study of this legal text, Höfer (2004[1979]) shows how nineteenth-
century legislators fromKathmandu attempted to create a unique, national caste hierarchy
sanctioned by the state. Thus, Nepal’s first civil code was filled with never-ending rules
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on how people of different caste should and could interact with each other, and on the
punishments to be administered to transgressors.
Upper-caste groups
'Thagadari' in Muluki Ain
'Bahun-Chhetri' in vernacular use
'Khas-Arya' in current oicial terminology
Janajati-Adivasi
'Matwali' in Muluki Ain
'Tribal' in older academic literature
includes many distinct groups:
 Rai, Tamang, Magar, Sunuwar, etc.
Dalit
'Pani nachalne' in Muluki Ain
'Untouchables' in earlier vernacular
Includes three castes in Sammagaon:
Bishwakarma, Darji, Sarki
Figure 1.6: Caste hierarchy
At the broadest level, the social hierarchy in Sammagaon is tripartite (see figure 1.6). This
is not to say that there are only three castes; rather, there are three overarching groups into
which the multiple castes and ethnic groups of Sammagaon are placed.
At the top are the Bahun and the Chhetri. They are the only people whose men wear a
sacred thread, called ‘janae’, around their torso. The thread is in principle worn for the
first time by a boy around the age of seven, during a formal ceremony called bratabandha.
In all the brahabandha ceremonies which I attended, the boy was in fact much older, be-
tween twelve and fifteen. The thread is said to mark the ‘second birth’ of the child, which
nobody else experiences. The thread is often viewed as a symbol of the superiority of the
Bahun-Chhetri. It is still the norm for most Bahun people to wear it, although the younger
generations are progressively abandoning the practice. The Bahun-Chhetri were collec-
tively called the ‘Tagadhari’ in the 1854 MA, a term referring to their unique ‘twice-born’
status. Today, the oﬀicial terminology used in Nepal, both by the media and the gov-
ernment, calls the upper-castes ‘Khas-Ārya’, a term which refers to linguistic and racial
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features.12 This is a very recent change, which postdates my return from fieldwork. The
term ‘Bahun-Chhetri’, which was used previously, is still common, and it is the one I will
use in this thesis. For readers familiar with the Indian context, it is worth noting that the
term ‘Bahun’ is the Nepali equivalent to ‘Brahman’, and ‘Chhetri’ to ‘Kshatriya’.
Below the Bahun-Chhetri are a host of groups collectively referred to as the janajāti or
sometimes janajāti-adivasi. These groups correspond to those which the 1854 Civil code
referred to as mātwali, a term denoting the fact that it was acceptable for them, unlike for
the Bahun and Chhetri, to consume alcohol. Earlier academic literature referred to these
groups as ‘tribes’, following the terminology used in the Indian context. Today, it is more
common to see it rendered as ‘ethnic group’, and this is the terminology which I will use
here. There are a large number of different ethnic groups in Sammagaon that belong to this
category, e.g. the Rai, Tamang, Magar, Sunuwar, etc. The 1854MA further split themātwali
into ‘enslavable’ and ‘non-enslavable’ groups. This distinction is entirely absent today, but
some older upper-caste people speak of a time when wealthy families in the area used to
‘own’ Bhujel servants. More generally, people in Sammagaon loosely agree on the fact that
some ethnic groups are more thulo (big) than others; the Magar in particularly are seen as
‘high’ and worthy of respect, in no small part because they continue to be associated with
the military.13
Below the janajāti still are the Dalit, the category which includes the Bishwakarma. They
are the people who used to be referred to as ‘untouchable’ (achhut), and whom the 1854
code designated as those from whomwater was not to be accepted. This later appellation
is still used in Sammagaon occasionally, in a shortened form (pāni nachalne). On figure
1.6, the Dalit are separated from other groups by a thicker and darker line, to represent
the much deeper divide that exists between them and the rest of society. As in the In-
dian context, ‘the singular division between Dalits and non-Dalits … is qualitatively dis-
tinct from, and irreducible to, the multiple divisions between individual castes’ (Roberts
2016:3). This is the line which, in the traditional understanding, separates ‘pure’ and ‘pol-
luting’ groups, and across which water and cooked foods may only flow downwards, not
upwards. Additionally, this line is one across which marriage was and continues to be
12. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the ‘ethnicisation’ of caste. See also Reddy (2005).
13. For a complete monograph on the Magar in recent history, see Hangen (2009)
42
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND
seen as particularly abhorrent or reprehensible. As part III of the thesis will discuss, any
person from the Bahun-Chhetri or janajāti-Adivasi group who marries a Dalit is said to
therefore become a Dalit themselves, a status which they will then keep for the rest of their
lives. In contrast, while the various upper-caste and ethnic groups aremostly endogamous,
exogamy among these groups was always permissible to a much greater extent. In fact,
hypergamousmarriages between a Bahunman and a janajāti womanwere one of the prac-
tices through which Hinduismwas spread in the nascent Nepali state (Gellner 2007:1823).
Suchmarriages would lead to no loss of status for the upper-casteman, and the children of
such a couple would become ‘Khattri’, a sub-group of the Chhetri, only marginally ‘lower’
than the Bahun and still considered ‘twice-born’.
This portrayal of the Nepali social hierarchy is standard, and reproduced in many places.
What it does not show is a fact that all Nepalis and most researchers focusing on Nepal
are aware of. This is the fact that the division between Dalits and non-Dalits is reproduced
among theDalit themselves. Thus, for example, the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon consider
the Darji ‘polluting’ to them in the same way as non-Dalits consider all Dalits polluting.
Figure 1.7 shows this by adding a second line separating the Bishwakarma and Sārki from
the Darji. The Bishwakarma consider that the Darji are polluting to them in the same
way as Dalits as a whole are considered polluting to upper castes and the janajāti-Adivasi.
The relationship between the Bishwakarma and the Sārki is not always clear. While these
groups do not intermarry, the Bishwakarma tend to say that the Sārki are ‘neither higher
nor lower’ than themselves.
Upper-caste groups
Janajati-Adivasi
Bishwakarma Sarki
Darji
Figure 1.7: Caste hierarchy, showing the phenomenon of ‘replication’
The existence of this hierarchy among Dalits is well-known. Some forty years ago, Mof-
fatt (1979), observing the same phenomenon in a South Indian context, described it as
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‘replication’; the replication, that is, of a macroscopic caste structure at a smaller scale,
among Dalits themselves. Moffatt considered that the existence of replication indicates
that Dalits ‘consent’ and ‘participate willingly’ in their own oppression, a controversial
proposition which generated much discussion. One particularly significant intervention
was made by Deliège (1992), who convincingly argued that replication does not, in and of
itself, imply consensus. Dalits, he pointed out, may well treat other Dalits in stigmatising
ways without this necessarily implying that they accept the way in which they themselves
are treated. One author offering an alternative explanation is Parish (1996:115–116), who
conducted research in the Nepali city of Bhakatapur. He argued that the phenomenon is
best understood as a way for the various Dalit castes to deny that they are at the bottom of
the social hierarchy. Such a denial, he suggested, requires finding somebody—anybody—
‘lower’ than oneself. As evidence for this interpretation, Parish pointed to the existence,
in his fieldsite, of an ‘imagined’ lowest caste to which nobody actually belongs. The sole
purpose of this imagined caste, he argued, was to allow those Dalits who are actually in
the ‘lowest’ position to state that there was a caste lower than themselves .
I will not offer an alternative explanation for replication here. I note the phenomenon
to make two points which I think are significant. Firstly, working with the Bishwakarma
meansworkingwith peoplewhofind themselves both on the ‘receiving’ and on the ‘giving’
end of caste-based discrimination. As such, they offer insights on caste that one could not
glean while working, e.g. with upper castes or with the Darji, who are always on the same
‘side’ of the giving-receiving relation. Secondly, the Bishwakarma are well aware that they
are Dalits and that the rest of society sees them as ‘lowly’. They generally acknowledge
this fact, yet they also maintain a subdued view according to which they actually are not
that low. They sometimes portray themselves as ‘the Brahmans of the Dalit’. Though these
terms are misleading in a number of ways, the subtle sense that they are ‘high among the
low’ matters in ways which will become evident in chapter 3.
The ethnic / racial view
There is another way of portraying the social organisation of the eastern Hills of Nepal.
This is based on a different set of categories than the caste-based view, but these categories
are nevertheless commonly used by the people of Sammagaon to classify each other. Chap-
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ter 4 will discuss the implications of this view for Dalits in muchmore detail, so here I will
only give a brief overview.
The second way of viewing the social organisation in Nepal is broadly bipartite. It divides
people into two overarching categories, which might be thought of as ethnicities or, more
closely to the way in which people talk about this, as two ‘racial groups’. One of these
groups is referred to in Nepali as the ‘Ārya’, a term usually translated as ‘Aryan’. The other
is colloquially referred to as ‘Bhote’, which translates as ‘Tibetan’, and which in academic
literature is sometimes referred to as ‘Tibeto-Burmese’.
Janajati-Adivasi
Bahun-Chhetri
(Khas - Arya)
Dalit
Figure 1.8: Ethnic / racial division.
This division is a racial one in the sense that the two groups are said to have different
physical features. The former are believed to have darker skin, longer noses and more
angular facial features, whereas the latter are thought to have lighter skin, epicanthic folds,
and generally ‘Mongolian’ features, a term which is used as a synonym for ‘Bhote’.
In this bipartite division, both upper castes andDalits are said to belong to the same, Aryan
group. The various janajāti, on the other hand, are all said to belong to the latter. In the
current political climate inNepal, thisway of understanding society is gainingprominence,
even if the caste-based one is still present. This raises the question ofwhether this newview
has any advantage to offer to Dalits, since it appears less hierarchical by lumping together
Dalits and upper castes in the same category, rather than putting them at polar opposites.
I return to this topic in chapter 4.
Theoretical orientation
As alluded to in the introduction, this thesis does not follow an approach rooted in political
economy. Rather than an analysis focusing on thematerial inequalities that caste generates,
sustains or otherwise enables, I focus instead on the way in which Nepalis think about
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Dalits. I focus, in other terms, on representations—on what is inside of people’s heads, to
borrow Strauss and Quinn’s aphorism (1997). On the whole, therefore, I am sympathetic
to Ambedkar’s claim that
[c]aste is a notion; it is a state of mind. The destruction of caste does not there-
fore mean the destruction of a physical barrier. It means a notional change
(2014[1936]:286).
And similarly, to Berreman’s statement according to which
[c]aste is people, and especially people interacting in characteristic ways and
thinking in characteristic ways. Thus, in addition to being a structure, a caste
system is a set of human relationships and it is a state of mind (1967:58).
Some readers will take issue with this theoretical framing. In particular, those favouring
Marxist ormore generallymaterialist approachesmight object to it. Theymight say that, to
understand the ongoing oppression of Dalits in Nepal and contemporary South Asia, one
should investigate the processes which keep Dalits in a state of economic exploitation and
marginalisation. This is the strategy followed, for example, by the authors of a recent wide-
scale collaborative study focusing on India (Shah et al. 2018). In this country, economic
growth has been considerable, but its effects have not trickled down to the people at the
bottom of the hierarchy. The authors conclude that
The spread of capitalism has used social division to its own end, in processes
we have explored here as ‘conjugated oppression’ which, crucially, involve the
inseparability of class relations from caste, tribe, gender and region (2018:203, em-
phasis added)
As these researchers’ work shows, the new, and in many ways more pronounced, inequal-
ities that emerge in neoliberal India not only follow existing caste- and identity-based di-
visions, they exacerbate them. Hence the claim that caste and class are inseparably bound
to each other.
I am sympathetic to one part of this argument, but the study leaves one important ques-
tion unanswered. It shows that one specific, commonly held hypothesis is false: economic
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liberalisation does not act as a social levelling mechanism; it does not enable social mobil-
ity where caste divisions previously made it impossible. What the study says less about,
however, is caste divisions themselves. That capitalism does not get rid of them is one
thing, but beyond this, what makes them endure? A materialist might suggest that a rad-
ically different, more egalitarian form of economic organisation would indeed get rid of
caste-based discrimination. This is entirely possible. Note, however, that to defend this
view, one must make fairly strong assumptions. Namely, one must posit strong causal
connections between ‘economy’ and social ontology, between, as it were, base and super-
structure. My view is more humble: I propose simply that economic inequality is not the
only factormaintaining caste-based discrimination, and therefore, not the only thingwhich
needs to change for caste divisions to be eliminated.
As mentioned in the introduction, the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon are not in a noticeably
worse economic situation than other castes and ethnic groups. Given that they primarily
live off subsistence agriculture, it is noteworthy that there is no obvious difference be-
tween them and non-Dalits with regards to land ownership. This surprised me, at first.
Cameron’s (1998) monograph on Dalits in West Nepal describes an altogether different
situation, in which a complex patronage system called riti-bhagya, similar to the Indian jaj-
mani system, regulates labour and exchange betweenDalits and non-Dalits. In this system,
landless Dalits work for upper-caste landowners in exchange for grain. Another classic
ethnography (Caplan 1972), also based on fieldwork conducted in the western part of the
country, concurs with a portrayal of Dalits as landless, bonded labourers. Höfer (1976)
gives a similar description of the Bishwakarma (then Kāmi) in East Nepal.
I did not collect precise data on land ownership in Sammagaon—my attempts at doing so
were fruitless, as many people could not or would not quote the precise number of ropani
(a local unit of land) they owned. I attempted several times to ask people about their in-
come and livelihoods, and found most very reticent to give figures or even estimates. I
did consider going to the District headquarters to try to obtain data on how much land
people owned, but felt—mistakenly perhaps, in retrospect—that the cost in time and ef-
fort outweighed the benefits to my research project. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the
Bishwakarma were no worse off than others. Ganga’s family, for example, could generally
feed themselves off their own fields and would complete any lack by buying food with
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the money from Ganga’s state pension. Similar arrangements were to be found in the ma-
jority of Bishwakarma households in Sammagaon and in the neighbouring VDC of Sahu
Bajār, where the produce from a household’s own fields was complemented with mone-
tary income from a separate economic activity, often a family member sending remittance
from the Gulf. The only household in Sammagaon with a situation somewhat similar to
Cameron’s description was that of a young man named Niraj. Niraj has a very small forge
next to his house and had at least one upper-caste patron who would bring him tools to
repair and pay him on a regular basis, but even he does not rely on this for subsistence.
The origins of the Bishwakarma’s (relative) wealth in Sammagaonwere also a topic which
I found diﬀicult to obtain precise answers to. When it comes to monetary income, Ganga’s
employment as a school teacher explains the situation of his own household; more on this
topic figures in chapter 3. A number of other households had onememberworking abroad
and sending remittance. I was never told how much each family received, but I was told
that a decent income in the Gulf for a migrant labourer is roughly NPR 50,000 per month,
i.e. multiple times more than a school teacher in Nepal. As for the land which the Bish-
wakarma own in Sammagaon, I was told that an earlier member of the Dehegli patriline
had gained ownership over it through a process that could be described as ‘pawning’. A
Sunuwar man in need of money had offered this land as collateral when he borrowed
money from one of Ganga’s ancestors, and when he failed to pay back, the land was trans-
ferred to this ancestor. It was later divided among his descendents. How this ancestor
had obtained the money that he lent the Sunuwar man in the first place, however, nobody
could tell me.
More striking even than the fact that many Biswhakarma own land in Sammagaon
and have access to monetary income is the fact that, in several households, it is the
Bishwakarma who employ other, higher caste but poorer people to work in their own
fields. There are four systems in place for the exchange of labour in Sammagaon:
• parma: Aperson from household Aworks for one day in the fields of household B. In
exchange, a person of household B will work for one day in the fields of household
A.
• sajha: The fields of household A are cultivated exclusively by household B. House-
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hold A and B each receive half of the harvest. Household A must provide the land
and seeds, but labour and tools are provided by household B. In addition, household
A may be required to provide a mid-afternoon meal to the members of household B
on the days they work in the fields.
• thekkā: Similar to sajha, but the amount of grain that goes to household A is fixed
rather than a proportion of the harvest. Household B cultivates the fields of house-
hold A. After harvest, household B will have to give household A a fixed amount of
grain. If the harvest is higher, they will make a profit, if it is lower, they will make a
loss.
• khetalā: Work for daily wages. People are called to work in a landowner’s field on
a daily basis. Each day of labour is paid for. For standard work in fields, the daily
wage is NRs 150 for a woman and NRs 200 for a man. This salary can change for
more specialised labour, e.g. ploughing with bulls.
Ganga’s household had some fields that were cultivated by members of the Newar janajāti
under the sajha system. In the fields which Ganga’s family cultivated themselves, they
would also regularly pay others to help them under the khetalā arrangement. Two families,
on Newar and the other Bhujel, would regularly come to work in Ganga’s fields under this
system.
I should note that not all the Bishwakarma of Sammagaon and neighbouring VDCs are in
a comfortable situation. I have already alluded to the tiny house of the woman I called
thuli āmā, and to Niraj’s small forge. Niraj’s family more generally struggled, as they had
no access tomonetary income, little land, andmany children to feed. As noted in the intro-
duction, discrepancies such as this mean that an overall evaluation of the Bishwakarma’s
economic situation would be fallacious. Nevertheless, as will become clear in the upcom-
ing chapters, even those Bishwakarmahouseholdswho are relativelywell-offdo not escape
the stigmawhich affectDalits inNepal: hencemynon-economistic theoretical orientation.
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Ongoing stigmatisation
In this descriptive, ethnographic chapter, I show that untouchability has disappeared from
the public sphere in Sammagaon, but that it endures in what I call the ‘domestic’ sphere.
I also argue that even if the notion that Dalits are ‘polluting’ or ‘defiling’ is on the decline,
there nonetheless exists a cluster of negative representations regularly associatedwithDal-
its. This chapter functions as a backdrop to the next three, whichwill discuss the strategies
used by Dalits to do away with these negative representations.
Recalling a more discriminatory past
Older Bishwakarma people in Sammagaon remember a time when discrimination against
them was common and, to a much greater extent than today, public. They recall various
forms of social ostracising that were usual in the past, practices that singled them out as
people from whom ‘water’ was ‘unacceptable’ (pāni nachalne), and who themselves were
‘untouchable’ (achhut). They remember being perceived and treated as such by members
of both the Khas-Ārya upper castes and the various janajāti living in the area, the latter
being Nepal’s ‘ethnic’ or ‘indigenous’ people.1
1. There is a considerable body of literature examining the extent to which the janajāti adopted
Hindu practices, including discrimination against Dalits, as a result of state-led Hinduisation. Re-
cent janajāti politics have endeavoured to form indigenous identities that distance themselves from
past Hindu influence (see e.g. Gellner 2007; Hangen 2009; Lecomte-Tilouine 2009a:122–156; Is-
mail and Shah 2015:113–114). This recent history notwithstanding, when it comes to the question
of untouchability, Dalits in the area where I conducted research say that the janajāti used to, and
continue to, treat them in the same way that upper-castes do.
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According to the accounts of the older Bishwakarma in Sammagaon—especially those
aged sixty and above—some four to five decades ago, the stigmatising image according to
which they were ‘polluting’ or ‘defiling’ was made publicly visible in several ways, many
of which are well-documented in classic and contemporary literature on caste. Rules and
prohibitions concerning food and space are those which my interlocutors mentionedmost
often. They explained that commensality betweenDalits andnon-Dalitswas avoided,with
a strict emphasis on preventing the consumption by a non-Dalit of specific types of food
cooked by a Dalit.2 A number of public spaces were off-limits for Dalits, especially tea
shops. Those shops in which Dalits could consume food often had a policy of making
them wash their own dishes, so that the shop owners would not have to come in contact
with a soiled plate or glass. Temples, which are another space that Dalits have been pre-
vented from entering in many parts of South Asia were not, in living memory, off-limits
for Dalits in Sammagaon itself. However, people mentioned that temples in nearby vil-
lages used to be closed off to them. Untouchability in the narrowest sense—the avoidance
of physical contact—is not something that was practised universally in the area, but some
recounted being told by non-Dalits not to sit next to them or being threatened in case they
accidentally came into physical contact.
In addition, a number of embodied and linguistic practices reinforced the image of Dal-
its as lowly or defiling. Some older Bishwakarma recounted being expected to give non-
Dalits a wide berth when crossing their path. They recall sitting separately in school or
during other public events, and they recall an old greeting which Dalits were supposed
to use when encountering a non-Dalit. This consisted in bringing one hand to one’s fore-
head, bowing slightly, and pronouncing theword ‘jadau’, a termwhose etymology is either
‘give victory’ or—the more likely origin here—‘hail divine one’ (Turner 1931). They also
mentioned that non-Dalits would address them using the disrespectful pronoun ‘ta’ and
corresponding verbal forms.
The Bishwakarma who recall such practices unequivocally state that the prejudice against
them has diminished. This is not to say that they understand the present as a unilaterally
‘better’ time. There are new hardships today, many of which stem from the absence of the
2. The precise rules followed a variant of the well-known distinction between raw foods, those
cooked in ghee or oil (pakka), and those boiled in water (kachha); these details bear little relevance
to the material presented here.
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young, in particular youngmen, which in turn is due to Nepal’s extreme rates of outmigra-
tion. But as far as the question of caste-based discrimination is concerned, all of my older
interlocutors agreed that the situation has improved. They explained that untouchability
was either subsiding or had disappeared entirely from public contexts, a claimwith which
my ethnographic observations accord. Dalit students now sit with others in school. On
the bus between Kathmandu and Sammagaon, Dalits sit together with others, and eat in
the same restaurants when the bus stops. When they make trips to distant VDCs that are
further than a day’s walk, Dalits sleep in the same hotels. When a meeting is called by the
local forestry association or another NGO, Dalit participants sit among non-Dalits and eat
together the customary khājā (snack) served on such occasions. Dalits enter the health-
post and are treated there in the same way as others. Over eighteen months of fieldwork, I
found only one tea shop in whose kitchen Dalits were not allowed. Elsewhere, Dalits enter
freely, sit among the other patrons, eat or drink as they please. In sum, segregation has
disappeared from the vast majority of public spaces. As for language, terms of address
are gradually evening out. The word ‘jadau’ is all but forgotten, and pronouns used by
non-Dalits to address Dalits are gradually becoming more respectful, although there is
noticeable variation here.
This situation might suggest a fairly uncomplicated history of social change in which, over
the course of roughly one human lifetime, the situation for Dalits in the hills of East Nepal
has improved dramatically and stigmas of the past are dying off rapidly. Yet, as I will
now endeavour to show, this is far too simple a picture. I will focus on two facts that chal-
lenge this description. The first is that, even without strict rules of untouchability, Dalits
continue to be perceived as a ‘different kind’ of people, a kind with which a cluster of neg-
ative representations is regularly associated. The second is that although untouchability
is mostly a non-issue in public, it continues to exist, more privately and discreetly, in what
I call the domestic realm.
A cluster of negative representations
Dalits are routinely and readily ascribedmultiple negative propertieswhich do not, strictly
speaking, pertain to ritual impurity. Below, I list the more frequent ones.
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Ignorance, ineptitude
Dalits in Sammagaon are commonly assumed by non-Dalits to be ignorant, lacking in
knowledge or uneducated. They are also assumed to have weaker intellectual abilities.
The space where this is most obvious is in school. Teachers in the schools of Sammagaon
and neighbouring villages belong to the upper castes or the janajāti; they are almost never
Dalit.3 Several among these teachers expect different levels of intelligence from their stu-
dents, depending on the student’s caste. In 2010, when I was working as an English lan-
guage teacher in Puranogaon, I was regularly told that I was wasting my time by trying
to teach Dalit students who, I was told, ‘had no intelligence’ (dimāg nahunne). This is not
a simple attribution of ‘lack of knowledge’, but rather an assessment of an individual’s
innate mental capacities. In chapter 7, I will argue that the category ‘Dalit’ has high in-
ferential power: upon learning that an individual is a Dalit, a non-Dalit makes numerous
inferences about this individual. The case of intellectual abilities is a good example.
Additionally, the upper-caste Bahun told me that one of the discerning features of Dalits
is that they do not use a polite register or vocabulary, but are loud and boisterous in their
speech. This representation is tied to the notion that Dalits are ignorant; it contributes to
creating a general picture of Dalits as lacking in refinement or, perhaps, in a local version
of what Bourdieu (1984) would have called ‘distinction’. It is in stark contrast with the
stereotypical view of the upper-caste Bahun, who are described as reserved, quiet, poised,
and learned people.
Alcoholism
The consumption of alcohol carries multiple connotations in Nepal. On the one hand, it is
a substance that carries warmth and helps to create conviviality. To enjoy rakshi or jandh, lo-
cally preparedmillet drinks, is a sign that one is sociable and not the type to look down on
local products. In this sense, alcohol consumption can be positively connoted. However,
the consumption of alcohol carries two other connotations. First, alcohol is traditionally
off-limits for the upper-caste Bahun, in line with the idea that the Bahun should be care-
ful to maintain bodily ‘purity’. While this prohibition is often overlooked by individual
Bahuns, there remains a general, latent view that being upper-caste means not consuming
3. Ganga, my host, is an exception. See chapter 3.
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alcohol. The second negative association made with alcohol is that of irresponsibility and
immorality. He or she—but mostly he—who consumes alcohol in excess is depicted as an
immoral individual, an alcoholic incapable of taking care of his own family and prone to
public violence. This representation is commonly propagated in schools, where children
are taught the dangers of alcohol to an extent which they internalise and repeat with re-
markable verve. The immorality of alcohol was further reinforced during the 1996–2006
People’s War by the Maoists, who were severely opposed to its consumption, which they
saw as an obstacle to the ‘new consciousness’ they set out to create (see e.g. Shneiderman
et al. 2016:2062).
In this context, it becomes significant that Dalits are often portrayed as drunks. One of
the reactions non-Dalits regularly had, when learning that I was living with Bishwakarma
hosts, was to tell me to avoid drinking. As it turned out, such advice was entirely un-
necessary, as the members of the household which I lived in were opposed to alcohol
consumption.
Filthiness
This is perhaps the most common stereotype about Dalits in Sammagaon. Although few
non-Dalits describe Dalits with terms directly associated with ritual impurity, Dalits are
nevertheless commonly described as physically ‘dirty’ (mailo) or ‘filthy’ (phohor). Thus,
non-Dalits variously suggested to me that Dalits wear old and ‘dirty’ clothes, have ‘dirty’
bodies (and ‘dirty’ children) which they do not wash, ‘dirty’ houses in which they allow
‘dirty’ animals, that they drink ‘dirty’ drinks, etc.
In reality, my Bishwakarma hosts were highly attentive to their external appearance. They
maintained an impeccable house and would regularly admonish me for the dust that
would accumulate on my clothes and backpack if I did not brush it off regularly. They
carefully kept separate sets of clothes for working and for occasions when they would
meet others. I often felt that it was because of the propensity of non-Dalits to call Dalits
‘dirty’ that my hosts were careful not to give non-Dalits an opportunity to validate their
biases.
Gopal Guru suggests that ‘in western societies … it is the corporeal body that carries phys-
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ical dirt and hence can become an object of humiliation’, whereas ‘the idea of dirt in India
is unique and deeply structural in nature’ (2009:14). He adds:
In the Indian social cultural context one might hold the Brahmanical social or-
der responsible for producing and reproducing the idea of dirt and squalor […]
Within the Brahmanical mode of conceptual construction the untouchable rep-
resents the combination of multiple stigmatized images which make him/her
untouchable, unseeable, unapproachable. It is in this sense that the untouch-
able’s body is perceived and treated as a ‘sociological danger’ (2009:14).
Where this description resonates with my experience in Sammagaon is in its use of the
phrase ‘combination of multiple stigmatized images’ to describe how Dalits are perceived
by others.
What is less clear, in my mind, is the extent to which the South Asian conception of ‘dirt’
is distinct from that which prevails elsewhere. The purported distinction is not the ‘cor-
poreal’ character of dirt. Guru holds that ‘dirt’ in South Asia is, as in the West, tied to the
body—in fact, he agrees that it is so to the extreme. What he seems to imply, however, is
that dirt in South Asia is corporeal in a different, singularly structural way. The singular
South Asian aspect is that dirt—more precisely, the dirty body of a Dalit—constitutes a
‘sociological danger’. What Guru is referring to here is the potential for a Dalit’s body to
‘pollute’ and ‘defile’ that of someone else.
The extent to which the idea of pollution through contact with a Dalit is still present in
Sammagaon is the topic of chapter 9. To pre-empt the argument I will make in that chapter,
pollution is no longer feared to the samedegree as itwas in the past. The only case inwhich
a Dalit can actually defile a non-Dalit is through intermarriage.
It seems tome that, as the idea of pollution is being slowly eroded in Sammagon, a transfor-
mation is taking place in the kind of ‘dirt’ which is attributed to Dalits. Dalits are still said
to be dirty, but the dirt is not as ‘dangerous’ as in the past; it is more banal, material, tan-
gible. Indeed, the way in which non-Dalits talk about Dalits reminded me, at times, of the
stereotypical way in which my own grandmother used to complain of the ‘stinky’ foods
that Portuguese migrants living close to her would prepare, or of the supposed ‘stench’
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that students and some teachers in my secondary school in rural Switzerland attributed
to black people. The stigma remains, but its distinctly South Asian character is, perhaps,
fading away.
Blackness of skin
In some ways, the attribution of ‘dirt’ goes further still. Indeed, Dalits are regularly said
to have ‘blacker’ skin than others, and this blackness is loosely associated with a state of
uncleanliness.
Early in my fieldwork, I became interested in the question of whether the inhabitants of
Sammagaon could tell Dalits and non-Dalits apart from each other by sight. To distinguish
the janajāti from other groups is not hard, as they have obvious phenotypical differences.
However, I personally found myself incapable of telling Dalits and Bahun-Chhetri appart
on the basis of appearance alone. Many Dalits told me this was because there is no dif-
ference, whereas many Bahuns told me that this was just because I didn’t know what to
look for. The Bahun first told me to look for a number of superficial properties, as per
the stereotypes listed above: ways of talking, poor and dirty clothes, etc. When I asked
them whether one would be able to tell the difference without such indicators, on the ba-
sis of physiognomy alone, they insisted that this is possible. They said that the Bahun have
sharper features, and in particular a sharper nose. More often still, they said that Dalits
have ‘darker’ or ‘black’ skin.
The attribution of blackness is significant in a part of theworldwhere being ‘fair’ is a sign of
beauty. Blackness is also associated with being ‘dirty’. In the case of the Bishwakarma, the
link between a black skin and a ‘dirty’ state is sometimes made through their traditional
caste activity, blacksmithing. On one occasion, I was told by a local school teacher that the
reason my Bishwakarma hosts were ‘blacker’ was that they worked at the forge. In doing
so, soot accumulated on their skin, and it was this (dirty) soot that gave them a darker
tone. I pointed out that this could not be correct since almost none of the Bishwakarma in
Sammagaon are actual blacksmiths. The teacher replied that while this was true, it must
have been a recent change. Their ancestors had worked at the forge for many generations,
he argued, and the blackness of the soot had seeped into them. Using a single English
word in his explanation, he suggested that it had become part of their ‘genes’.
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One night, Ganga was hosting relatives. It was the night before a wedding, and there had
been plenty to drink. A middle-aged relative of Ganga, whom I had never met before,
engaged me in drunken conversation. He spoke some basic English, which he told me
he had picked up while working as a taxi driver in Saudi Arabia. He told me that it was
very important for me not to refer to the Bishwakarma as ‘blacksmiths’ in English. ‘We are
smiths, only smiths! We are not blacksmiths,’ he repeated time and again, with increasing
anger in his voice. Everybody around us was laughing, so I initially mistook this for a
joke that I did not understand, perhaps a word-play on the common English name ‘Smith’.
It was only much later, re-reading this anecdote from my fieldnotes, that I realised my
mistake. The man was almost certainly protesting the attribution of ‘blackness’ that he
saw in the term ‘black-smith’.
Verbal attribution of ‘smallness’
The term ‘achhut’, whose literal translation is ‘untouchable’, is rarely heard in Samma-
gaon. There are however, other terms that are still in use and that explicitly refer to the
lowly or defiling character of Dalits. Prominent among them are ‘sāno jāt’ (small or in-
ferior caste), tallo jāt (low-caste), and the old term ‘pāni nachalne’ (literally ‘water-does-
not-circulate’). Moreover, as noted in the background chapter, people regularly speak of
other caste groups as ‘lower than us’ (hāmi bhandā tallo), another indication that the view
of Dalits as ‘lowly’ endures to an extent.
Each of the three Dalit castes present in Sammagaon has two distinct caste names. The
older of these two names is now seen as derogatory. When I first arrived in Sammagaon,
I was not aware of how insulting the older terms, which I had encountered in academic
literature, were. One of the very first things which my hosts taught me was never to refer
to them with the older name. In the case of the Bishwakarma, this was ‘Kāmi’. The Darji
used to be referred to as ‘Damāi’. ‘Sārki’ is the older name for the third group, which, in
Sammagaon, does not have an accepted, less derogatory alternative (although some of the
Sārki in the area are pushing for the use of the term ‘Mijar’). Generally, non-Dalits know
that the older names are considered offensive or diminishing, but continue to use them
colloquially. In theworst of cases, combinedwith specific pronouns and verbal forms, they
can function as outright insults (‘Ta Kāmi (chhas)!—You Kāmi! / You’re Kāmi!). Early in
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my fieldwork, when my hosts began telling me about the ostracism which they continue
to endure, they said that others made them feel ’shame’. The most common illustration
they offered was being called ‘Kāmi’ or ‘Kamini’ (the feminine form).
Pronouns are a significant way in which respect or denigration can be communicated lin-
guistically. Nepali has four commonly used second person singular pronouns, each of
which marks a different level of respect or deference to one’s interlocutor.4. A Dalit’s so-
cial status is important in determining whether they will in fact be addressed with one of
the more respectful pronouns. As one person put it to me, a Dalit who is educated is likely
to be addressedwith the honorific ‘tapai’, whereas a Dalit who has not acquired similar lev-
els of respectability is still likely to be addressed with the diminishing ‘ta’ because of his
caste. Lest this remark appear dry and scholarly, I should note that the use of different
forms of address is in fact very significant in Nepal. To address someone owed respect as
ta is quite unthinkable, and conversely, the deliberate use of this pronoun in the wrong
context can be highly insulting.5
Untouchability in the domestic sphere
In a study of intercaste and interethnic relations among Nepali migrant labourers, Ad-
hikari and Gellner (2017) note that caste is a non-issue for Nepalis working in the Gulf.
Dalits and non-Dalits share rooms indiscriminately, they cook and eat together, and only
very few of them report occurrences of caste-based discrimination. Unlike what is ob-
served in certain other studies of South Asian diasporas (e.g. Svensson 2014; Adur and
Narayan 2017), Nepali Dalits working in the Gulf do not face significant caste-based dis-
crimination. One questionwhich the authors ask their research participants concernswhat
will happen after returning to Nepal. Will the participants be able to maintain relations
unfettered by caste after returning home? The answers are clear. Both Dalits and non-
Dalits report that while it is fine to share kitchens, food and living spaces abroad, it will
be impossible to continue doing so when they return home. To explain this, Gellner and
Adikhari suggest that while abroad, a sense of Nepali unitymight prevail over one of caste
4. From least to most respectful: ta, timi, tapai, hajur. There is a fifth pronoun that has fallen into
disuse, which was exclusively reserved for royalty.
5. ‘Ta’ is used ‘appropriately’ in relation to one’s younger sibling, for example, or by a husband
for his wife. For anybody less intimate, it is wholly unsuitable.
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antagonism.
Not entirely dissimilar was the situation reported by Parry (1999) two decades decades
ago, in his ethnography of the Bhilai Steel Plant. Among the permanent workers in this
factory, of whom a significant proportion are Satnami (Dalits), Parry observed no form of
caste-based discriminationwhile theywere in theworkplace.6 On the shop floor, Satnamis
and others ate together, shared food, and seemed generally unconcerned with caste rules.
Yet away from the steel plant, in the residential areas which surround it, the situation
was very different. Multiple forms of caste-based avoidances and untouchability were
still firmly in place: the Satnami still lived in separate quarters, food and liquid did not
circulate as easily, etc.
Both Nepali Dalits in the Gulf and the Satnamis in the Bhilai Steel Plant are brought into
close proximity with non-Dalits at work. One might suggest, in an argument reminiscent
of what social psychologists call the ‘contact hypothesis’ (Allport 1979[1954]; Amir 1969;
Hewstone and Swart 2011), that it is propinquity that leads to the relaxation of caste rules.
Yet both of these studies also suggest that the context in which this occurs is bounded in
space and time. In one case, the relaxation is limited to time spent abroad, far away from
home. In the other, it is limited to time on the shop floor, away from home in a more local
sense and for shorter bursts of time, but away nonetheless. These further observations
mitigate the ‘contact’ explanation.
The context of the two studies just mentioned is very different to that of Sammagaon. Both
are based on settings in which industrial labour is prevalent. In my fieldsite, small-scale
agriculture is the norm. Nevertheless, one of my own observations falls strikingly in line
with the two studies. In Sammagaon too, caste-based discrimination continues to exist in
people’s private homes despite having been mostly eliminated from the public sphere.
In Sammagaon, there are different kinds of spaces. Everybody recognises that some places
are ‘public’ (sāmājik), whereas others are not. For reasons thatwill soon become clear, I call
the non-public spaces of Sammagaon ‘domestic’ rather than ‘private’. In the vernacular, it
is common to refer to these domestic spaces as ‘own houses’ (āphno ghar). In such spaces,
6. The situation is somewhat different for non-permanent workers, but this is not relevant to the
topic at hand. I should add that I am skipping over Parry’s central argument here, which concerns
reservation policies.
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two avoidances are particularly common: non-Dalits avoid eating with Dalits, and Dalits
strictly avoid entering non-Dalits’ houses.
Thus, when non-Dalits come to Ganga’s house, they are sometimes offered tea or a snack.
Some non-Dalits who are particularly close to Ganga—for example, members of his po-
litical party or former colleagues—will accept, but these are a small minority. More of-
ten, non-Dalits turn down the offer. The second avoidance always takes place at a non-
Dalit’s house, which Dalits never enter. When a Dalit visits a non-Dalit, the former does
not attempt to enter the house and the latter simply does not invite them in. This gener-
ally happens spontaneously; the non-Dalit does not need to tell the Dalit to stay outside.
The fact that Dalits must not enter non-Dalit houses becomes a lot more evident—and
embarrassing—when Dalits and non-Dalits are invited together to a non-Dalit’s house. I
foundmyself in this situation a number of times. Accompanied by a Bishwakarma person,
I would be invited into non-Dalits’ houses, but the person accompanyingmewas expected
to stay outside. Often, in order to avoid a diﬀicult situation, I would say that I was happy
to stay outside myself. Occasionally, people would insist on my going in. When this hap-
pened, the Bishwakarma person accompanying me would either stay outside alone, or
more often sit at the very threshold, from where they could take part in conversations
without actually setting foot in the house.
There are some other forms of discrimination which are occasionally observable in the do-
mestic sphere, but the two which have just been mentioned are the most common. Actual,
full-blown avoidance of physical contact does exist, but only in small traces. On one occa-
sion, I was accompanying Ganga through Sammagaonwhen he signalledwe shouldmake
a detour as he wanted to introduce me to a friend of his, a member of his political party.
The friend in question was Chhetri. When we reached his house, we sat on the porch,
outside. Ganga’s friend greeted us cheerfully and sent his wife to prepare tea. She came
back carrying two glasses. She handed one to me and was handing the other to Ganga
when she froze for an instant, pulled her hand back and placed the drink on the floor,
within Ganga’s reach. Only after she had retreated by one or two steps did Ganga pick it
up. I asked Ganga about this later, as we were walking away. He initially became angry:
the woman’s behaviour had clearly been humiliating, and the fact that I had noticed only
made things worse. Only several days later, when the offence was not so fresh, did he
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explain to me that the woman wanted to make sure she avoided all physical contact with
him because of his caste.
Why does untouchability endure in domestic settings even when it has been mostly elim-
inated from the public sphere? I suggest that this is part of a more general set of contra-
dictory attitudes towards caste and caste-based discrimination which I examine in detail
in chapters 6 and 7. Here, I will offer only precursory remarks and an initial explanation,
according to which untouchability prevails in domestic settings because this is where kin-
ship is made. To make the case for this explanation, I must first describe how people relate
to their houses in Sammagaon.
Though each house has a parivār, i.e. a precise set of people who are its inhabitants proper,
more distant relatives come and go somewhat freely from one house to another. They can
turn up with no other purpose than to socialise, to chat (gāf garnu). They might want
to exchange the latest gossip, watch TV, taste a fresh batch of alcohol, borrow a missing
ingredient, or something similar. In contrast, people who are not relatives are far less
likely to appear without a more definitive purpose. Similarly to what Benett noted in
her study of upper-caste households, ‘villagers are reluctant to go uninvited or without
specific purpose into the courtyard of a nonkinsman’ (Bennett 1983:2).
There are, however, a number of ‘specific purposes’ for which a non-relative might show
up. This is particularly true for houses whose inhabitants participate more extensively
than others in public life—by taking part, for example, in meetings organised by local
NGOs or one of the numerous ‘mother’s associations’, by participating in local politics,
teaching or being otherwise involved in the schooling system, providing ritual services
or (for the very few Christian households) attending church, etc. Because Ganga and his
family are involved in multiple organisations, unannounced guests do regularly show up
at their house with business of one kind or another.
When this happens, the unannounced guest is almost never rejected. Instead, they sit in the
courtyard or, if they are close to the family, they are invited into the house. They are then
offered tea, millet beer (jandh) or liquor (raksi), and possibly a snack (khājā), depending
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on the time of day and onGanga andChiniMaya’s inclination. Occasionally, and generally
only after spending a significant amount of time with the guest, Ganga and his family will
explain that they have to tend to their crops or attend some event outside of the house.
This hint usually suﬀices for the guest to leave of their own accord.
Thus, houses are not places which offer shelter from public life. Similarly, they afford virtu-
ally no privacy to the household’s individualmembers. When Imoved into Ganga’s house,
I was given my own room, whose only door conveniently led immediately outside. Yet de-
spite the relative physical separation of this room from the main house, it quickly became
clear that the space was not really mine, but was quite open to other family members.
Furthermore, it is not primarily the fact that houses are private property which distin-
guishes them from ‘public’ spaces. A number of places, shops or restaurants for example,
are private property in the same legal sense as familial houses, but are nevertheless de-
scribed by the local population as ‘public’. This is because they are the kind of place in
which anyone can come and go freely. The fact that shops and restaurants belong to a spe-
cific person does not prevent them from being ‘public’ in the same way as, say, the VDC
headquarters or the village’s health-post, both of which are owned by the government.
What does set houses apart frompublic spaces is the fact that they are heavily and uniquely
associated with the people who inhabit them. The following statement rings true of Sam-
magaon: ‘The house and the body are intimately linked. The house is an extension of the
person’ (Carsten andHugh-Jones 1995:2). In other terms, houses are intimate; they are dis-
tinct from public spaces not so much because they belong to someone specific as because
someone specific belongs in them. Hence my use of the term ‘domestic’ to describe them,
rather than ‘private’.
The association between houses and the specific people who inhabit them manifests itself
in various ways. Sammagaon is a place in which a great diversity of ethnic groups and
castes live. These different groups hold different cultural understandings of houses. Nev-
ertheless, all seem to recognise a basic separation between the inside parts of the house,
which are more intimate, and the outside parts, which are less so. The courtyard, the out-
side part, is a zone of contact between the house and the non-house, and thus between
the family and the rest of society. It is a zone which anybody can enter freely but which
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is nonetheless unquestionably part of the house. Entering somebody else’s courtyard is
a call to attention; it is an act which demands some kind of reaction, however small, by
the owner of the house. A word of greeting is the bare minimum. Going further into the
house, passing the door and reaching the inside is altogether more significant and more
regulated. Only one’s relatives and close friends will enter a house without being invited;
others will wait to be asked. Some houses, like Ganga’s, may be formed of more than
one physical building. The main building is the one in which food is prepared, and those
people who would not enter the main building uninvited might enter the auxiliary one,
if they have previously been told this is acceptable. Following a pattern which I observed
in several places, Ganga had strategically placed his television in the auxiliary building
rather than the main one, which maximised the number of people who could come in and
watch.
In the case of Dalit and upper-caste houses, which I am most familiar with, the inside of
the house is often further divided into increasingly intimate areas. Thus, inside the house,
it is not uncommon to see two fire-places. External guests will sit around one of these. The
other, which can be replaced by an earthen or, occasionally, metal stove, is usually located
in a corner. Around it, a large part of the floor is raised by one to two inches; this is known
as the ‘chulo’ (hearth, stove, cooking place). This area is in principle off-limits to anybody
who does not belong to the household’s patriline, and guests who are not relatives stay
clear of it. A newly-wed daughter-in-law, upon arriving at her new house, has to undergo
several rituals before she canpass into the chulo and cook for the new family. It tookmonths
before I was—quite unexpectedly—invited into this part of Ganga’s house. This happened
in an utterly unceremonious way, as if I had been mistaken to think that the chulowas ever
off-limits to me, but nevertheless, when I was allowed in, I felt a new sense of proximity to
my hosts. Some houses have another intimate section, often upstairs, where the kul devtā,
the god of the lineage, resides. In Ganga’s house, such a god had its quarters on the upper
floor.
This description does not apply everywhere. There are a number of houses, often owned
by younger people, which have only one fireplace and no raised ‘chulo’ at all. When asked
about this, the owners of such houses sometimes state that they do not want to cut off one
part of the house. It is hard to assess exactly how significant this is. Such houses certainly
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make one feel at ease, since one does not have to worry about offending the inhabitants
simply by seating oneself in the wrong place. Nevertheless, even houses without a chulo
keep the fundamental division between the inside and the outside, and even in these, non-
relatives do not enter freely.
That houses are intimate and familial spaces is not only reflected in rules concerning who
can enter which of their parts; it also transpires in their material, outward appearance.
As intimate spaces, houses require constant care. Their appearance is a reflection of the
social prestige (‘ijjat’) of the families who inhabit them. Everybody in Ganga’s house was
extremely conscious of the house’s appearance. In addition to planting flowers all around
it, keeping the porch swept clean, and hurriedly hiding any laundered underwear I had
left to dry in plain sight, Chini Maya or Sirjana would regularly clean the house more
thoroughly. In a procedure called ‘ghar lipnu’, carried out at least once amonth and usually
on days with particular ritual significance, they would quite literally re-make the floor.
After sweeping away any dust or dirt, ChiniMaya or Sirjanamixed earth, buffalo dung and
water in a bucket and used a rag to lay down a small layer of the resulting mud all over the
floor, inside as well as in the courtyard. As this layer dried out, it formed a homogeneous
crust which gave the house a fresh appearance. In a not entirely dissimilar fashion, once a
year, the walls of a house are white-washed with lime.
The division between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the house is also made materially
salient. Families often hang photographs and other documents above the main door of
their house, at the precise boundary between the porch and the inside. Photographs hung
in this way highlight the domestic character of the house; they show family members at
various ages, with a prominent place for wedding pictures. Next to these photographs
are documents which evoke the public lives of the household members. These include
school leaving certificates and other diplomas. Ganga’s oﬀicial certificate of qualification
as a primary teacher has been on display for almost four decades just above his front door.
Finally, a number of families hang large calendars outside their houses. These calendars,
printed and distributed by various political or other organisations, give some indication of
a family’s public engagements: the choice to display a calendar with Hindu or Christian
imagery or, as is more often the case, reference to a specific political party serves as a
discreet but noticeable disclosure of a household’s external aﬀiliations.
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If one is invited into a house, the intimacy of the space takes on a new phenomenological
sense. Most houses are made of stone and mud.7 The walls of traditional houses are thick,
doors are low, windows small and far apart. Because of this, the inside of houses always
contrasts strongly with the outside world. On bright and hot days, the inside is cool and
shady, and it takes several seconds for the eyes to adapt to the darkness. In the evening; the
exact opposite happens. As night falls outside, people turn on the CFL bulbs installed by
a local NGO. These cast a flickering, wavering light whose electric blue tones seem almost
surreal in a space where everything is usually orange and earthy.
To sum up, houses are heavily associated with the people who inhabit them and who
form the most basic kinship unit, the parivār. The association between kinship and houses
is emphasised in two ways. First, houses are the places in which the lineage gods reside.
Second, as one moves through a house’s sub-divisions, from the courtyard to the hearth,
one enters areas reserved to progressively closer relatives.
In addition, houses are the place in which family members eat together and, as noted by
many anthropologists, commensality is a major way in which people develop and main-
tain ‘relatedness’ (Bloch 1999), especially in South Asia (e.g. Lambert 2000). The food
which is prepared in houses by the female members of a family has this relation-building
potential to a much greater extent than the food which is served in tea shops and public
spaces. To eat together inside someone’s house means, far more than in public, to be or be-
come ‘alike’. Thus, the reason untouchability and caste-based avoidances remain stronger
in homes than in public is that the same interactions have a much stronger potential to
create ‘proximity’ or ‘similarity’ when they happen in the domestic sphere.
One piece of evidence supporting this explanation can be observed during weddings, gen-
erally large events to which a great number of guests are invited, often several hundred.
In this sense, one might mistake them for ‘public’ events. In fact, they are quintessentially
‘domestic’ because they are one of the moments during which the making of kinship is
most salient. The central ritual in a Nepali wedding is khanyādān, the ‘gift of a virgin’. It
involves awoman being passed from one kul (patriline, note that the sameword is used for
this as for the god associated with the patriline) to another. It is also the event which will,
7. Housesmade of cement are seen asmore prestigious and are becoming increasingly common,
but they are still a minority.
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ultimately, lead to the creation of a new household, when the bride and groom build their
own house. If one were to think of weddings as ‘public’ events, one might expect them
to be a context in which there is no manifestation of caste or untouchability. In reality,
the exact opposite obtains. A Dalit wedding almost always requires two separate kitchens,
onemanned by relatives of the people gettingmarried, the other by hired, non-Dalit cooks.
The former kitchen prepares the food for all of the relatives of the bride and groom, i.e. for
Dalits, whereas the latter prepares the food for the non-Dalit guest attending the wedding.
Thus, weddings are a wide-scale and open, but not public event; they are also the context
in which the segregation of Dalits and others is most visible today.8
The case of weddings supports the notion that it is when and where kinship is made and
manipulated that caste and untouchability endure.
Conclusion
This chapter has set the background for the upcoming three. I have made two main obser-
vations. One is that, while untouchability has mostly disappeared from the public sphere,
it continues to be practised, in somewhat subdued ways, in domestic contexts. I provided
an initial suggestion for why this is the case, which is that domestic contexts are spaces
in which kinship is made, and therefore, where the risk of ‘pollution’ is more serious. A
much more elaborate discussion will follow in chapters 6 and 7. The other observation
which I made in this chapter is that even if untouchability is receding in Sammagaon, this
has not left Dalits with a status that is equal to others. There is, in particular, a cluster of
negative representations that is commonly and readily associated with them, chief among
which is the idea that Dalits are inherently and physically ‘dirty’.
The three upcoming chapters will examine some of the strategies deployed by Dalits and
by people who sympathise with them to combat their stereotyping and to eliminate un-
touchability altogether, including in domestic contexts.
8. Parry (1999) notes the exact opposite in Bhilai, namely that weddings are the ‘most public’ of
all events, and that they are the ones in which caste is the least visible.
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Ganga: dispelling ignorance
Ganga is an old man now. He jokes about it sometimes, putting on an air of wisdom. ‘I
have become budho,’ he says, using a colloquial term for old age, remarkable in that it says
very little about the actual number of years one has lived. It can refer to a truly ancient
person but also, and almost more commonly, to one barely past the age of marriage. Thus,
people in the field would taunt me: ‘Oh Ivan-dāi (older brother), you have become a budho
now! Where is your wife? Don’t you know you should have children by now?’
As we shall see, the equivocal character of the term ‘budho’ is well-suited for Ganga, who,
despite his years, seems inhabited by an almost youthful energy.
Aged 69, Ganga is a grandfather of four. He receives a pension from the government,
having taught in primary schools for decades. Despite this source of income, like almost
everyone in the area, he is also a farmer, and it is in his capacity for hard work that his
energy is most visible. He and his family work the terraced fields which they own, a few
ropani1 around the house for corn and millet, and a few more lower in the valley, where
they grow rice. In the past, Ganga and his family would tend to the crops themselves
in both of these locations. Today, only his wife and one of his daughters, Sirjana, live in
the same house so, as mentioned in chapter 1, the distant rice fields are worked by others
under the sajha system. As is common in the area, Ganga and his family do not keepmuch
livestock: one pig, a couple of buffaloes, one or two goats, and a few chickens at most.
1. 1 ropani = 508.72 m2
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Ganga’s inner energy also transpires in his appearance. Time has not taken as sharp a
toll on his body as it has on those of his contemporaries. Some of its effects, naturally,
are inevitable. The years have dug wrinkles into his forehead, left a few scars here and
there—traces of the inevitable accidents that occur when one manipulates the khukuri (a
large, curved knife with innumerable uses) every day. Time has also turned Ganga’s hair
a less vivid black—not the whitish grey towards which parts of his beard are veering, just
a shade duller than its former, saturated tint. A large bulge has appeared on the right
side of his neck, but the doctors in Kathmandu say that it is benign, so he has not had
it removed. These lingering marks of age, however, are not what is most striking about
Ganga’s appearance, at least not in my mind’s eye, nor in my favourite photograph of him.
In both of these images, what shines through is an overall sense of ‘sharpness’, for want
of a better word. Ganga’s body is lean and energetic. He can travel longer distances on
foot than his own children and grandchildren, who live in the city and have become, as he
deplores, dependent on their motorbikes. Ganga carries himself with dignity at all times;
he stands straight and moves carefully, precisely, but never hastily. Above all, it is his face
which is truly remarkable, almost a perfect rectangle, delineated by a wide forehead and
a chiselled jawline. His eyes sit recessed, but they convey a calm awareness at all times.
Ganga’s voice, too, is unique. Many of his relatives pronounce Nepali with loud, nasal
inflexions, but Ganga himself, perhaps as an effect of having taught the language in school
for so many years, has a more deliberate, articulated diction and a deeper, poised timbre.
If Ganga presents himself with such controlled dignity, it is in no small part because he
is acutely aware of the prejudice and stereotypes which are common in the area about
people like him, a Dalit. In part, Ganga’s dignified presentation is a way for him to project
an image that goes against the grain, against these stereotypes, in the hope of bringing
them into question or, at the very least, escaping them personally.
Not one to sing his own praises, Ganga did not usually describe his own life as a project
to ‘uplift’ himself and his relatives. Yet such an interpretation is compelling, as I will
show. I should note that if, in the process, I pay something of a (fragmentary and wholly
unsuitable) homage to the personwho tookme under his wingwhile I was in the field, for
whom I have great admiration and to whom I owe much of what I know now, I consider
this an advantage rather than a problem.
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I have multiple goals in this chapter. First, I wish to highlight the way in which Ganga
personally overcame some of the stigma afflicting Dalits, becoming a charismatic and re-
spected individual despite his caste. I do this by presenting his life-story, which I collected
over the entire time that I spent in Nepal, and in particular during extended interviews
with a total duration slightly in excess of 10.5 hours, recorded with him at the end of
my fieldwork. Elements of this life-story will confirm the overall historical trajectory of
discrimination described in chapter 2, according to which full-blown untouchability has
receded to domestic contexts, although a more latent stigmatisation of Dalits endures.
I should note at the outset that Ganga’s account will contain one glaring hole: it will say
nothing of the effect of the 1996–2006 People’s War on caste-based discrimination. Ganga
did not comment extensively on this topic for a number of reasons. In part, this was be-
cause he himself is an activemember of theCPN-UML(Communist Party ofNepal–United
Marxist Leninist), a party which has not always been on the best of termswith theMaoists
who led the insurgency.2 In part, it was because Ganga and his relativeswere ‘non-aligned’
citizens during the war, i.e. people who sided neither with the Maoists nor the Nepali
Army and who, as a result, reacted to the conflict primarily with fear, similarly to the peo-
ple whom Pettigrew writes about (2004, 2013). In part still, it was because the Maoists’
methods were far more violent than what Ganga, who describes himself as an admirer of
ahimsā (non-violence), would advocate. I gleaned a much more in-depth account of this
period by interviewing an ex-Maoist leader in Bensitaun. That account is presented in
chapter 5.
My second general goal in this chapter is to account for Ganga’s own theory of caste-based
discrimination. This is a topic which Ganga has thought about extensively and to which
he has dedicated much energy. I will show that Ganga equates the discrimination with
ignorance. His remedy is therefore education, writ large. My third goal is to engage critically
with Ganga’s own view, to ask to what extent his strategy has been effective.
2. In 2018, the CPN-UML and the largest Maoist party of Nepal merged, but this happened after
my return from the field, and well after the People’s War.
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From untouchable to guru
A significant part of Sammagaon’s population addresses Ganga as ‘guru’. I noticed this
early in my fieldwork. Initially, I took note of it but was not sure what, if anything, to
make of it. Upon meeting me for the first time, people would ask where I lived. When I
told them that I was renting a room inside of Ganga’s house, after expressing surprise at
the fact that I was more than a tourist or passer-by, many people, especially men, would
add a remark about Ganga. They would say something along the lines of ‘he is our guru,
don’t you know?’ Most people who made this kind of remark were in their thirties or
forties and, as I later understood, all had been students of Ganga in primary school.
The term ‘guru’ came as a surprise. The only other person to whom it was applied in
Sammagaon was an old Sunuwar man, a friend and ex-colleague of Ganga’s. They had
gone through professional training together and had taught in many of the same schools.
The term ‘guru’ is sometimes translated as ‘teacher’, but it was clear that in applying it to
Ganga and to his Sunuwar colleague, the people of Sammagaon were doing more than
merely recalling these men’s prior employment as school teachers. Had they intended to
do only this, they would have used one of the usual terms for ‘school teacher’, ‘shikshak’,
or the English word ‘sir’. ‘Guru’ was far more respectful. This was visible in the demeanor
of ex-students who used the term to address Ganga in person. On occasion, one of them
would walk up to him, displaying a combination of friendliness and deference, a wide
smile on their face but their hands joined and head slightly tilted. ‘Oho! Guru-ji namaskār,’3
they would interject loudly and demonstratively. Ganga would respond by wrapping his
arm around their shoulders, smiling at the esteem which he had just been shown.
Theword ‘guru’ is, of course, not entirely foreign to English speakers. One usually encoun-
ters it as a name for cult leaders. Generally speaking, in the South Asian context, a guru
is indeed the leader of a spiritual movement, although the term (arguably) does not carry
the same negative connotations as in the Western context. On the Indian subcontinent,
the guruwas initially a Brahmanical teacher of theVedas, ancient religious texts, but a shift
away from this exclusively upper-caste realm took place with the emergence of the Bhakti
3. ‘Namaskār’ is a more polite and deferential greeting than ‘Namaste’, which equals address to
each other. The suﬀix -ji is a mark of respect which can be added at the end of a name or formula
of address.
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tradition (Mlecko 1982). The guru came to be seen as a worldly subject of worship and,
importantly, as a personal guide. The term itself derives from Sanskrit; its literal meaning
is ‘dispeller of ignorance’, but of ignorance writ large:
The guru is a dispeller of ignorance, all kinds of ignorance; thus, there are gu-
rus not only for specifically spiritual development but also for dancing, music,
wrestling, and other skills (1982:33).
At least some people are aware of this meaning inmy fieldsite. An upper-caste pandit from
Puranogaon explained to me that the guru is a person who ‘makes the darkness disappear’
(andiaro hataune). Others did not give precise definitions, but older, upper-caste men in
particular stated that gurus were more common in the past. They spoke of the ‘gurukul’
as a system which pre-dated the construction of schools in the area, under which a guru
would take boys under his wing in order to teach them and guide them towards adult-
hood. Regardless of whether people knew the etymology of the term, there was certainly
a diffuse sense that the guru is more than a simple school teacher, that he is the kind of
person who contributes to one’s personal growth and development. The institution of the
‘gurukul’, it is noteworthy, was evoked mostly by upper-caste men, and they agreed that
the system as a whole was, traditionally, an upper-caste (and male) affair. This only adds
to how remarkable it is that Ganga is regularly referred to using this term.
Ganga is not a spiritual leader. He is, however, a ‘mentor’—the type of person who dispels
the darkness in other people’s minds. In what follows, I will show that one of his goals has
been to dispel the ignorance that others demonstrate, in his view, when they treat Dalits
as inferiors. To do so, an account of his life story is in order.
Ganga was born in 1948. His date of birth was auspicious, coinciding with Shree Panchami,
an important festival dedicated to Saraswati, the goddess of knowledge. This was a befit-
ting birthday for a man who would become the first Dalit teacher in his district. Ganga
was his father and mother’s first child. His mother died when he was eighteen months
old, before she could give birth to any other children, and Ganga laments the fact that he
‘does not even know what her face looked like’. He knows none of his maternal relatives
and was raised mostly by his paternal grandmother.
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When Ganga was a child, his father taught him that he belonged to a ‘sāno jāt’, a ‘small
caste’. He explained to Ganga that upon meeting an upper-caste person, the proper thing
to do, in principle, was to greet them by bringing his hand to his forehead and saying
‘Jadau! jadau!’.4 While Ganga’s father did teach his son about the word, he himself was
already opposed to it. He did not like its demeaning character, and he did not want his
children to pick up the habit. Ganga says that his father was already conscious of the fact
that one should not think of oneself as ‘lowly’, regardless of one’s caste.
A school opened in the vicinity of Ganga’s house when he was twelve years old, in 1960.
He joined and studied up to grade eight. Ganga and Chini Maya were married before
Ganga had completed his schooling; both were eighteen years old at the time. In 1968,
leaving his wife with her in-laws, Gangawent to what was then called the ‘Normal School’,
in Kathmandu, to train as a teacher. One of his own teachers had told him about the
training programme and recommended he try to join it. This teacher, whowas particularly
fond of Ganga, wrote a recommendation letter and told him to bring it to the head of the
District Education Oﬀice. He also gave Ganga a tip, which was to bring some home-made
ghee (clarified butter) along with the letter, as the oﬀicer was particularly fond of this.5
When Ganga followed the advice, the oﬀicer was so pleased that he gave Ganga a book in
exchange, telling him to study it hard since all the questions for the entrance exam would
be selected from it.
Ganga returned to Sammagaon in 1970 after successfully completing the training pro-
gramme and receiving the highest mark. He started working as a government-employed
Nepali language teacher, an occupation which he would exercise for 38 years in Samma-
gaon’s various primary schools. This had several important consequences. One was to
offer him a fairly stable and desirable economic situation. He had received a scholarship
at the Normal School, and then a full-fledged salary. He started saving, with a view to
building his own house, which he achieved in 1980. Until then, he and his wife had lived
with a large number of relatives—sixteen to eighteen by his reckoning—in the housewhich
4. A self-diminishing term. See chapter 2.
5. Given the prejudice that existed against Dalits when Ganga was young, one might find the
extent to which the (non-Dalit) teacher helped him surprising. Ganga offered two explanations.
The first was that the teacher was from Darjeeling where, he believed, caste-based discrimination
is weaker. The second is that the teacher particularly enjoyed Ganga’s performances in after-school
plays (natak).
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is still known by the Bishwakarma as the mul ghar (main house; today, only two people
live there permanently).
Ganga’s employment drastically improved his and his family’s economic standing. They
have no trouble feeding themselves; they own land in the area. Ganga receives a pension
ofNPR 12,000 amonth (approxUSD 120; a day’swork in someone else’s fields is paidNPR
200, i.e. USD 2) and his son sometimes sends remittance from abroad. Ganga and his wife
have maintained a rural lifestyle, with little luxury other than a satellite TV, something
which is increasingly common in the area. Their youngest daughter, Sirjana, spent a year
and a half in a private ‘training centre’ in Kathmandu, which has enabled her to find spo-
radic employment in various NGOs. Ganga and Chini Maya’s grandsons in Kathmandu
are showing signs that they aspire to the emergent ‘middle class’ lifestyle described by
Liechty (2003). While I was in the field, one of them left for Indonesia and another for
Japan, migratory destinations less usual but more desirable than the Gulf, because they
allow for better working conditions and higher income. Perhaps one of Ganga’s most for-
tunate economic decisions was to buy a plot of land on the outskirts of Kathmandu some
years ago, using money paid to him by a development project that acquired land which
he owned in Sammagaon. Prices in the capital are soaring today. Thus, on the whole, it
is clear that Ganga’s employment led to upward classmobility for him and his immediate
relatives.
This relatively comfortable economic situation is one of the reasons Ganga gained in status
and reputation. People in Sammagaon never reveal howmuch they own ormake, but they
often speculate about the wealth of others. It is not unusual for people to guess that others
have large, hidden amounts of money. Any sign of wealth is gossiped about, from the
acquisition of a new saree or TV set to the building of a cement house or the departure of a
kinsman abroad. Ganga andhis family are thought to be fairlywealthy, andmypresence in
their house only helped to fuel this representation. One person once speculated that I was
a ‘cow that gave never-ending milk’, when in reality I was paying a very modest amount
to my hosts. Being perceived as wealthy can be a diﬀicult situation to manage in rural
Nepal, as it will inevitably attract people looking to borrow money. One of the positive
effects which the image of wealth had for Ganga and his family, however, was to break
the stereotype that Dalits are miserable or poor (garib). In an anecdote which I develop
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below, an upper-caste man told me that Ganga and his relatives were not representative
of Dalits in their ‘natural’ state. One difference which he pointed to was the fact that they
had enough money to dress better and look cleaner than he would otherwise expect of
Dalits.
It was not only Ganga’s income that helped him gain prestige. To become a teacher when
Ganga did was, in and of itself, status-conferring. It allowed him to build up considerable
ijjat (honour, social prestige), as many people pointed out to me. The occupation, at the
time when Ganga entered it, was seen as highly enviable—and indeed today’s teachers
long for the prior prestige of their profession, supplanted as it has been by aspirations to
become engineers, airline pilots, and medical doctors. Moreover, if becoming a teacher
was an achievement for anybody in Nepal a few decades ago, it was all the more so for a
Dalit. The first time that I was told about Ganga—before I first met him—was when an
upper-caste man explained, with an audible note of admiration in his voice, that Ganga
had been the first Dalit teacher in the whole district. Ganga later confirmed that this was
true and added that, of the roughly 400–500 people who had taken part in the teacher
training programme with him, only one other was a Dalit.
The process of becoming a teacher was, unsurprisingly, an uphill battle for Ganga. While
training in Kathmandu, he had to hide his caste identity, lest landlords refuse to rent him
a room and lest he face too much discrimination by his peers. He did so by telling people
that hewas a Chhetri. Hiding one’s caste is still common today in urban environments (BK
2013; Folmar 2007), but it is impossible in a rural setting such as Sammagaon,where people
know each other too well. Ganga hated hiding the fact that he is a Dalit. He explained that
lying about one’s caste means living in fear that others will one day discover the lie, start
asking questions, make accusations, and become physically violent. Still, he explained,
despite such fears, it was nevertheless preferable to hide one’s caste if one could, in the past,
since the prejudice against Dalits was much stronger than today. As it turned out, Ganga’s
fears were not without base: one of his landlords in Kathmandu did in fact discover his
caste and kick him out.6
6. This problem has not disappeared. In fact, Ganga’s son’s family faced it. They too rented a
room and lied about their caste, and when the landlord found out, they were evicted. In principle,
they could have opened a legal case against the landlord, but they chose not to do so because they
feared that having lied about their caste would play against them.
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Moreover, not everybody in Sammagaon welcomed Ganga’s achievement when he re-
turned. His colleagues in school, for example, would avoid sitting on the same bench
as him during meals, which he would have to eat outside of the school building. Similarly,
in the early days, many upper-caste and janajāti pupils would refuse to greet him as they
entered the classroom. They refused to do so, Ganga explained, because they had been
taught at home that one should not show deference to small castes (sāno jāt lāi doghnu
hundaina). While he was not very vocal about how he had conducted day-to-day teach-
ing, Ganga did hint that he had put effort into teaching his students not to discriminate
against Dalits. For instance, he simply did not tolerate the behaviour of those who would
not greet him. He would tell them that they were to say ‘Namaskār’ to him, and if they
still refused, he would punish them. More generally, in the early days of his teaching, he
did not talk about caste openly in school, as this was forbidden, but later, as the political
climate changed, he started to do so. Then, he said, he would seize multiple opportuni-
ties to teach his students that Dalits are no different from other people, and that it is not
acceptable to treat them as inferiors.
Thus, the reaction to Ganga becoming a teacher was mixed. Still, even if not everybody
approved of Ganga’s achievement, what seems clear is that everybody had, at the very least,
to take notice of it. So unusual was it for a Dalit to acquire a prestigious position that it was
impossible for others to ignore the fact. Ganga broke the stereotype of Dalits as poor,
stupid, uneducated and incapable, and he did so very evidently. In his own words:
Ivan Deschenaux: And here, in the village—after you came back, after you
had become a teacher, after you passed the final exam and got a job—what did
others say?
Ganga Dehegli: After this, others said, ‘it seems that we should study. By
studying, even a Kāmi has become a teacher.’ This is how they spoke. Some
said, ‘after this, we… after studying and coming back I… He is not a Kāmi; he
is a teacher’. Some said that one should study, that after studying there is no
meaning to ‘Kāmi’ and ‘Damāi’, to upper- and lower-caste. [They said that]
people are the same. One should study, and by studying anybody can become
[like me].
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There is much more to say about Ganga’s life, but for want of space, I will not go into
detail here. For example, Ganga’s political engagementwould form another long narrative.
To mention but some highlights of this, Ganga joined a number of communist and anti-
monarchical organisations at a time when these were illegal, during what is known as the
Panchayat period in Nepal. He explicitly stated that his main motive for doing so was a
desire to fight untouchability (chuvachhut) and caste-based discrimination (jatiya vedbav).
He was also an early a member of the CPN-UML and acquired a reputation as something
of a dissident in Sammagaon.7 Prior to the popular uprising of 1990, he was denounced
on several occasions by people who, in his terms, were ‘angry that a Kāmi had become a
teacher’. After one such denunciation, he very narrowly escaped losing his employment
and being jailed. During the 1996–2006 People’s War, Ganga’s politics once again put him
at risk. Although in reality he felt little aﬀinity with the Maoist insurgents, the Nepali
Army came to his house five times to search for him. Ganga said they wanted to kill him
because of his aﬀiliation to communist organisations—but he managed to hide from them
each time.
When he was younger, Ganga occasionally engaged in what could be described as ‘direct
action’, that is, he acted in ways which violated the precepts of untouchability directly, in
hope of dislodging them. One example was when he entered a tea shop in a neighbouring
VDC and refused to leave until he was eventually dragged out and beaten. On the whole,
however, such episodes occupied only a small part of his narrative about political activity.
Hemostly talked about his engagement as amatter of propagating ideas, a way of teaching
others about a better way of thinking about society and organising it. He was particularly
proud of the book collection which he had assembled when he was younger and of the
way in which he had circulated pamphlets in order to convince others to join him in the
party.
Ganga’s focus on propagating better ways of thinking about society is not surprising. It
fits—like his career as a teacher—with his own theory of caste-based discrimination. The
latter sees ignorance as the fundamental explanation for untouchability. The following ex-
7. Today, the majority of the population in Sammagaon votes for NC (Nepali Congress, conser-
vatives).
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cerpt from one of our interviews is particularly explicit:
GD: Because of people who have old opinions (purāno bicār), there is still a
kind of disease in society here, today. It is a disease of the mind; it is a se-
rious disease. As long as there remain people with old opinions, as long as
we do not have an educated (shikshit) society, people will primarily need con-
sciousness (chetanā). After they have consciousness, after [society] becomes
educated, they will have the wisdom (gyān) to see that this [caste] is nothing
at all. With regards to caste-based discrimination and untouchability, a revo-
lution will not be successful. A fight cannot be the solution. What is the solu-
tion? To make this thing called caste-based discrimination and untouchability
disappear, what needs to be done is this: the most important thing is the need
for education, the need for consciousness. For example, now, the person called
Ratna BK [my research assistant in Kathmandu, whom I had told Ganga about,
but who never made it to Sammagaon], this man is doing a PhD. Who is going
to keep him outside? [Referring to Dalits being kept out of non-Dalit houses.]
In Ganga’s view, education is the way out of caste-based discrimination. There are two
ways in which he believes this to be the case. First, Ganga sees education as a remedy to
the ignorance displayed by those currently ‘diseased’ with the belief that castematters, that
it picks out something deep, that Dalits are fundamentally different from others. Ganga
mostly attributes this ignorance to non-Dalits, though on occasion, he did deplore that
some Dalits themselves believe that they are ‘inferior’.
Second, education matters because it can confer status to Dalits, as it did to him. Ganga
would sometimes tell me of his frustration at the fact that his own relatives do not put ad-
ditional effort into educating themselves. He complained that they did not see the value of
formal eduction, which could considerably improve their social status. He lamented see-
ing some Bishwakarma children in Sammagaon flunk school or obtain low grades. Ganga
said, in the final interviews I conducted with him, that he wished that his own example
wouldmotivatemore of his relatives to follow in his path. On this point, his remarks about
Ratna BK are clear. Dalits who achieve a high status through education, he believes, will
not be kept ‘outside’ by anybody.8
8. In reality, despite his educational achievements, Ratna does face multiple diﬀiculties because
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How effective is Ganga’s strategy?
The two facets of Ganga’s strategy, it is worth noting, are highly consistent. At its heart,
Ganga’s understanding of discrimination and untouchability attributes these phenomena
to a common, but false, representation ofDalits. This iswhat he calls ‘old opinions’ (purāno
bicār) in the excerpt above. Ganga is aware that non-Dalits think in stereotypical ways,
that they perceive Dalits as ‘dirty’, ‘stupid’, ‘poor’, etc. It makes sense that his remedy
would be two-fold. On the one hand, non-Dalits should be taught that these stereotypes
are wrong; on the other, Dalits themselves should strive to disprove the stereotypes by
becoming prestigious, educated individuals.
This raises the question of how effective Ganga’s strategy has been. It is hard to evaluate
the impact of his direct teaching, in school and in political contexts, that the stereotypes
are wrong. Here, I will focus instead on whether his rise to a respectable, guru-like status
has actually changed the way in which people think about Dalits in Sammagaon. This
is, in a sense, a question about the extent to which individual charisma can effect social
change. I refrain from asking this question in relation to Weber’s famous discussion of
the topic (1922:212–299), however, because this discussion focuses on political power to a
much greater extent than I wish to do.
In what follows, I will argue that Ganga’s life story has had an impact on the way in which
others think about caste, but that this impact is both restricted and limited. Before making
this argument, however, I should address an objection which some readers are likely to
formulate at this point. One might disagree with my overall interpretation of Ganga’s life
story as a project to dismantle caste-based discrimination by shaping himself into an ex-
emplar. After all, personal gain and the desire to escape caste-based discrimination (rather
than the bolder enterprise of dismantling it) would be a suﬀicient motivation to explain
much of what he has done. One might even wonder—as I have myself several times—
whethermy personal admiration and sympathy for Ganga have led to excessive generosity
on my part. I do not deny the importance of self-interested factors in Ganga’s life story,
but remain convinced that my interpretation is adequate. Rather than try to convince the
sceptical reader, however, I prefer to point out that the question about charisma is valid
of his caste, including in his university.
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irrespective of Ganga’s personal motivations. It is undeniable that Ganga is a Dalit with
an unusually prestigious occupation and life-story in Sammagaon, and that he commands
unusual respect from non-Dalits. Even if this situation had obtained purely out of self-
interest, it would be worth asking whether Ganga has, through his exceptional life story,
changed the way in which others think about Dalits. Call this, if you will, the weaker ver-
sion of the question. Below, I will continue to assume that Ganga was legitimately aiming
for more than personal gain, but what I say would remain valid, mutatis mutandis, if one
only asked the weaker question.
The result of Ganga’s efforts, sadly, is not a shift in the way that people think about Dalits
in general. Instead, it is a perception that Ganga and his closest relatives are exceptions to
a stereotype which otherwise remains valid.
The moment at which this appeared to me most clearly was during a conversation which
I had with the Chhetri headmaster of the largest school in Sammagaon. I told him that I
kept hearing descriptions of Dalits as poor, filthy, and uneducated. This confused me, I
said, since none of these properties seemed to apply to my host family and their relatives.
The headmaster immediately answered that I was right, but that this was because the
Bishwakarma of Sammagaon are an exception. He explained that my hosts were not in
the natural state of Dalits, using the term ‘natural’ in English. ‘If you want to see real
Dalits,’ he added, pointing to a part of Sammagaon that I had not yet visited, ‘go to the
Darji hamlet up there’.
When I followed his advice, I discovered that the Darji of Sammagaon live in strikingly
different conditions from my Bishwokarma hosts. I took several trips to the Darji part of
the village after this, and each time, I was struck by their visible poverty.9 The fieldnotes
I took after such trips show how disturbed this part of the VDC left me. The Darji were
obviously in need. In my notes, I wrote of children covered in muck, dressed in rags, and
seemingly malnourished. Even Niraj’s family, the poorest among the Bishwakarma, did
not compare.
I visited several houses in the Darji tol and spoke to various people there, though I did not
9. In the background chapter, I claimed that the Bishwakarma of Sammagaon are not economi-
cally worse-off than non-Dalits; this claim does not extend to other Dalits in the area.
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develop the same proximity as I had with the Bishwakarma. The story of one Darji house-
hold was particularly distressing. The father of this household had died some twenty-two
years earlier. He had married twice. The first wife had given birth to four daughters. The
second wife had given birth to two daughters and three sons, but all three boys had died
early—two within weeks of birth, one at the age of eight months. The second wife, who
was the person who explained this story to me, could not remember the names of her sons.
‘Why would I remember?’, she asked, ‘they all died so quickly.’ As a result, the household
was left with two mothers and five daughters. Once the daughters had married and left,
as per the patrilocal norm, the two ageing mothers found themselves alone, facing dire
poverty. As I was being told all this, one of the older mother’s daughters—who happened
to be visiting—was sitting next to us. When her mother came to the part about the death
of her three sons, she intervened to tell me how she too had lost a three year-old son lately;
he had died during the heavy rains that had hit the country a month earlier.
Undoubtedly, this house was struck with extraordinary misfortune. And yet, poverty and
death seemed to strike the Darji part of Sammagaon with uncanny regularity. Only a few
months earlier, I had been invited to another house in the areawheremortuary ritualswere
being conducted for a young mother who had died. Her husband, who had been working
abroad in the Gulf, came back to Sammagaon to take part in the rituals. He was distressed
by the death itself, but also by what this would imply for the household’s future. He
explained that there was no woman left in his house to take care of his young children, so
hewould have to stay home to take care of them. But if he could not go back towork abroad,
his family would lose its only source of income and be reduced to a very diﬀicult life.
Several months later, when I visited again, he had not found any solution and was starting
to despair. In a similar vein, at the very end of my fieldwork, when a major earthquake
struckNepal in April 2015, more than two thirds of the houses in Sammagaonwere judged
damaged beyond repair. No more than ten human lives were claimed, but, in a cruel twist
of fate, two of these were from the Darji hamlet.
It is of course possible that the inordinate number of deaths in the Darji tol during my
fieldwork was due to chance alone. Nevertheless, in combination with the visible poverty,
the contrast between this part of Sammagaon and the Bishwakarma tolwas impossible not
to notice. This contrast helps to put the headmaster’s remarks about Dalits in context.
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Classic literature on cognitive dissonance suggests that, when one encounters evidence
running contrary to one’s beliefs, this creates unease (Cooper 2007: 1–14). In turn, some
mental adjustment is likely to occur. This can be, for example, a change in beliefs or a denial
of the evidence. When prejudiced non-Dalits encounter individuals like Ganga, who do
not fit their stereotypes, how do they adjust their beliefs? The answer is that they do not
outright reject the stereotype, but rather, they allow for exceptions. It is in this sense that I
suggested that Ganga’s strategy is only effective in a restricted sense. He has successfully
shaken the way in which non-Dalits view him and his close kin, but this has not suﬀiced to
get rid of stereotypes about Dalits altogether. As evidence, consider the words of Ganga’s
own daughter, Sijrana, on the different way in which she and other Dalit children were
treated in school:
Ivan Deschenaux: Please tell me—in school, was it this way for you too? Did
other children insult you?
Sirjana Dehegli:10 They could not insult us, because my father taught all the
friends who studied with me in class. They were scared because they knew
that this was the daughter of a specific person, that this was the daughter of
Ganga sir. It was like this; it was, really.
ID: So please make a comparison. At that time, other students of your age,
other students who were the children of Dalits but who were not the children
of Ganga sir…
SD:…those who were not; they insulted them a lot.
ID:Who insulted them?
SD: Other jātis. They insulted them a lot. What they said was this. When
it was not the daughter of Ganga sir, but the daughter of another, they said
‘Kāmi, Kāmi, Kāmi! Kamini, Kamini, Kamini!’11 Like this, really. For some
people, it can be very different. He who is from a somewhat connected family,
he in whose house, in whose family background, even just one person is formally
10. In all interview transcriptions, unless signalled other wise, italics indicate terms originally
spoken in English.
11. ‘Kamini’ is the feminine form.
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employed, his family is drastically changed. You know? It’s like this. For this
reason, I studied in school; I studied from grade 1 to 12, but nobody could
insult me, insult us. Nobody insulted me. But this was [only] us. The Chhetri
and Bahun higher than us, they could not insult us. Rather than a low level,
we got a somewhat better level because of the employment [of my father].
Furthermore, while Ganga has indeedmanaged to acquire a high status and social prestige
through his employment, this is not to say that he has become identical to a non-Dalit. It is
in this sense that I called his strategy limited. His ‘escape’ from the stereotype is incomplete.
It is still the case that most people will not eat food prepared by his kin—Ganga himself
only cooks extremely rarely—and he must stay outside of non-Dalit houses for fear of
‘polluting’ them. Despite all of his personal achievements, and despite being respectfully
addressed as ‘guru’, Ganga continues to be subjected to some of the most common ways
in which Dalits are singled out as ‘defiling’.
This might seem puzzling. How can Ganga simultaneously be a high-prestige, well-off
individual and yet continue to be resolutely low-caste? Is such a statement not ambivalent
or somehow self-contradictory? As far as I can tell, from the point of view of the people in
Sammagaon, it simply is not. A clear confirmation of this was given tome, unintentionally,
by a leader of theCPN-UML towhomGanga introducedme on a tripwe took to the district
capital. This man explained to me that there are ‘two kinds of untouchability’. ‘One,’ he
said, ‘is for poor people, and the other is for rich people’. When I asked him to explain,
he told me to pay attention to the way in which non-Dalits talk to Dalits. I would then
notice that ‘rich’ Dalits like Ganga are addressed politely. A non-Dalit wanting to make
sure that a rich Dalit does not enter their house might say something like, ‘Brother, why
don’t you sit here, in the sun?’ Similarly, a non-Dalit might make up a polite excuse to turn
down food prepared by a rich Dalit. (This immediately rang true. I had regularly noticed
non-Dalits turning down tea at Ganga’s house by stating that they had just had some or
that they had an upset stomach). The same person, he continued, will talk very differently
to a ‘poor’ Dalit. He might shout, ‘Hey, you [ta, very low-grade pronoun], don’t sit there’
or ‘Yuk! Don’t bring that food near me’.
The UML leader wanted to attract my attention to the difference between these two cases.
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He wanted to make sure that I understood that status and class do in fact matter in Nepal,
that everything does not reduce to caste. I am grateful for his remarks, and agree that
the difference which he pointed out is real and important. Nevertheless, it is striking that
the UML leader’s suggestion was not that ‘untouchability only affects the poor’. That ‘rich’
Dalits are addressed more politely in no way indicates that they are not or no longer un-
touchable. It is just that this status is made somewhat less salient.
Conclusion: a Dalit after all
In this chapter, I have presented Ganga’s life story as an attempt to dislodge some of the
stereotypes commonly applied to Dalits. I have shown that Ganga has his own theory
of untouchability, which attributes caste-based discrimination to ignorance. The remedy,
in his view, is therefore education. The latter can give other people the ‘wisdom’ to stop
seeing Dalits as inferior, and it can raise Dalits to high-status positions. I have shown how,
through his employment as a government teacher, Ganga achieved such status.
In the final part of the chapter, I asked how effective Ganga’s achievements have been. I
askedwhether his becoming aDalitwho so saliently violates people’s expectations has had
the effect of dislodging the stereotype. My answer was that it has done so only marginally.
Ganga’s life story has had a restricted effect insofar as it has made people think differently
only of him and his closest relatives, but not of Dalits more generally. It has had a limited
effect insofar as it has not made Ganga equal to non-Dalits, as is most evident in the fact
that he is still prevented from entering other people’s houses.
In conclusion, despiteGanga’s impressive efforts, he has remained aDalit after all. Though
people may be polite when they point out that there are prohibitions which he must re-
spect, the prohibitions nevertheless remain. Caste is an identity ascribed at birth, and it is
immutable. In the case of Dalits, this immutability means that no matter howmuch effort
one puts into achieving a high-status, one remains ‘lowly’ in at least some regards.
I will analyse this ‘immutability’ of caste in more detail in chapter 7, where I will suggest
that it is best understood as a consequence of a cognitive bias known as ‘psychological
essentialism’. Before I do so, I want to give additional ethnographic evidence for this im-
mutability, by analysing two further ‘strategies’ to get rid of caste-based discrimination,
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both of which are also unsuccessful. This is the topic of the two following chapters.
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Chapter 4
‘No culture of our own’
In this chapter, I consider a strategy for the alleviation of caste-based discrimination in
whichDalits strive to acquire a ‘culture’ that is distinctly their own. The culture in question
is one intending to maximise the difference between Dalits and upper castes and thereby
reject the hierarchical overtones of caste.
To discuss this strategy, I open with an assertion made by several Bishwakarma, according
to which they have ‘no culture of their own’. I discuss what notion of ‘culture’ is at play in
this statement, why the Bishwakarma feel that they do not have one, andwhat the broader
implications of this are in the context of Nepal’s current political climate.
The first few times I encountered it, the claim that the Bishwakarma have no culture of
their own surprised me. Indeed, the Bishwakarma do many things which are ostensibly
‘cultural’, at least under any reasonable definition of this term. They organise complex,
intricateHindu rituals, or, for the fewwhohave converted toChristianity, they go to church
on Saturdays instead. When they fall ill, they sometimes hire the services of a local jhakri,
a shaman who will know how to appease and chase the ghost causing the illness. They
organise long, two- or three-day weddings which require elaborate match-making, visits
to astrologers, feasting and readings of the appropriate sacred texts. They work the land,
plant rice, corn, andmillet, which they harvest and cook in various ways or use to prepare
potent alcohols. A few spend their days working at the forge, where they make and repair
tools and objects that are essential to life in this part of theworld: sickles, knives, fire stoves,
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etc.
Why would people who engage in such complex behaviour, which is imbued with sym-
bolic value, state that they have ‘no culture of their own’? In answering this question, it
will become clear that a specific, reified and instrumentalised notion of ‘culture’ has be-
come central in the current political climate of Nepal, and that this notion has enabled
some groups to distance themselves from upper-caste domination, but that Dalits are not
part of these groups.
Besides discussing a second strategy for the alleviation of caste-based discrimination, this
chapter has two secondary goals. One is to bring some elements of an answer to the ques-
tion of whether there exists a distinct Dalit culture in Nepal. This is a question sometimes
asked by regional specialists, but to which there is no commonly accepted answer. My
own contribution will not be a definitive answer, but I hope to bring some fragmentary
insights to the discussion. Second, this chapter will contribute to the ongoing study of
ethnic and identity politics in Nepal. Considerable literature has been published on this
topic, but only very little of it considers the implications of such politics for Dalits.
Ilesh’s puzzle
Let me open with an account of the most explicit statement I encountered about the Bish-
wakarma’s supposed lack of ‘culture’.
It is the month of māgh (February), an auspicious time to get married. Ganga and I have
been invited to a relative’s wedding in Sahu Bajar, a few hours’ walk from Sammagaon. We
arrive one day before the main ceremony so that we can rest and enjoy the proceedings
fully. Other guests arrive early, in the afternoon and early evening. Food and home-made
millet alcohol are served by the hosts, and guests start to relax and talk. Relatives who live
far apart catch up with each other.
I am introduced to a young man named Ilesh and told that he and I are ‘similar’ (eutai).
This unusual suggestion makes me curious. It quickly becomes clear that our similarity
extends tomore than our common age. I am told that Ilesh is an ‘educated’ person and that,
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likeme, he is studying the Bishwakarma. Eager to knowmore, I sit with Ilesh andwe begin
to talk. Older men gather round us and listen attentively, intervening only rarely. This is
unusual. Ilesh is paid uncommon respect by his older relatives; he is seen as considerably
more thulo (lit. ‘big’, often ‘important’ or ‘high-status’) than is the norm for his age. It soon
becomes clear that this is the case because Ilesh is involved inDalit activism in Kathmandu.
He has been a member of several well-known organisations, including the Jagaran Media
Center and the Samata Foundation.
It seems that Ilesh is as eager to askme questions as I him. He almost immediately enquires
about my ethnographic work, and seems particularly keen to know what I think Bish-
wakarma ‘culture’ is, using—significantly—the term ‘culture’ in English. Having barely
met him, I already feel that I am letting him down when I answer that, despite having
worked in the area for a considerable while, I do not really know. On some level, my an-
swer does seem to disappoint him, but on another, it seems to reassure him too. It is as
if I have confirmed something that he already suspected. He starts to talk candidly and
openly, explaining that he also does not know what Bishwakarma ‘culture’ is, or even if
they really have one. ‘We have,’ he says, repeating a sentence that I had heard a few times
from Ganga and others, ‘no culture of our own’.
Ilesh explains that to fill this void, he has recently created, with a few relatives, the first
organisation aiming to promote Bishwakarma culture in Nepal. ‘The Bishwakarma are
the largest Dalit group in this country!’ he says, with animation. ‘They have so much
talent! And yet, they have no organised society to promote their culture.’1 He begins to
draw a comparison to the Sunuwar, the small but fairly well-known ethnic group whose
homeland we are currently in the heart of. ‘Just look at the Sunuwar,’ he says, ‘There’s
what, a total of five thousand of them, maybe? And yet they have a society to promote
their culture in Kathmandu.’ 2
He goes on to explain what Sunuwar ‘culture’ is: the Sunuwar have their own festival—a
special way of celebrating Chandi every year, which attracts many spectators. But that is
1. ‘Talent’ and ‘culture’ in English.
2. Oﬀicial census figures are closer to 56,000 Sunuwar (CBS 2012), but the comparison remains
striking. The Bishwakarma represent 4.8% of Nepal’s population. The Sunuwar, at 0.21%, are
more than twenty times fewer. However, the Bishwakarma are spread throughout the country,
whereas the Sunuwar all live in this area. As a result, there are more Sunuwar than Bishwakarma
in Sammagaon and the surrounding VDCs.
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not all. They have their own traditional dress and amother tongue of their own. They even
have a ‘Miss Sunuwar’ contest, Ilesh exclaims! ‘How come the Bishwakarma, who are a
much larger group, have none of these things?’ he asks. There is one major yearly festival
dedicated to the Hindu god called Vishvakarman, from whom the Bishwakarma people
derive their name. For a while, Ilesh thought that this might count as ‘their’ culture, but
upon reflection, he realised that this idea does notmake sense because everybody celebrates
this festival in Nepal. Therefore, it cannot truly be theirs.
It is precisely to fill this cultural void, Ilesh further explains, that he has set up the new
organisation in Kathmandu. He hopes that this association will gather prominent Bish-
wakarma intellectuals in order to solve this problem.
A ‘culture of one’s own’
What counts as a ‘culture of one’s own’ in Nepal? We can extract some key elements from
Ilesh’s account. These include
1. a distinctive mother tongue, such as that of the Sunuwar
2. distinctive religious rituals
3. a distinctive material culture (especially a traditional dress)
This conception of ‘a culture of one’s own’, I should note, is not idiosyncratic to Ilesh. The
idea that these three elements are key constituents of ‘culture’ is onewhich, as the next sec-
tion will show, is quite generalised in Nepal’s Eastern hills and, to an extent, in the country
as a whole. It is also, arguably, little more than one specific version of the highly reified,
instrumentalised and essentialised notions of ‘culture’ which anthropologists are used to
encountering, in particular in contexts where discourses of ‘indigeneity’ are prominent
(Kuper 2003:especially 395), as is the case in Nepal.
An important question concerns the sense in which language, rituals, and dress must be
‘distinctive’ to count as a ‘culture of one’s own’. Ilesh uses the example of the Sunuwar. In
his explanations, what seems key is that cultural markers must be heavily or even exclu-
sively associated with one specific group. What matters is that the mother tongue, ritual,
89
CHAPTER 4. ‘NO CULTURE OF OUR OWN’
and dress are exclusively Sunuwar. What Ilesh’s account does not reveal, but which one
rapidly comes to understand while living in the area, is that there is a further sense in
which the markers of a ‘culture of one’s own’ must be distinctive. Indeed, perhaps even
more important than exclusivity is the fact that these markers should be different to those
of the upper-caste Bahun-Chhetri people.
Thus, a ‘culture of one’s own’ in East Nepal might as well be described as
1. a non-Nepali mother tongue
2. non- or not-quite-Hindu religious rituals (the qualification ‘not-quite’, here, is to ac-
count for the fact that syncretic religious practices mixing elements of popular Hin-
duism with other practices can and often do count as ‘distinctive’ in the sense dis-
cussed here.)
3. any traditional garment other than the daura-suruwal (moreover, while clothes are
central here, it would be appropriate to generalise this point and say that what is
needed is a material culture different to that of the Bahun-Chhetri.)
Why and how this conception of ‘culture’ emerged is tied toNepal’s broad political history.
This is the topic to which I now turn.
Who has a ‘culture of their own’?
In 1951, Nepal’s autocratic Rana regime fell and was followed by a brief period of political
liberalisation, sometimes referred to as the ‘democratic experiment’. In 1960, King Ma-
hendra re-seized full power, banning political parties and establishing Nepal’s Panchayat
political system. Much has been written about this period, but for the purpose of this
chapter, what matters is the form of unitary nationalism that marked this political regime.
The following quotation, from a contemporary history of Nepal authored by a prominent
South Asian journalist, summarises it well:3
…Mahendra was shrewd—perhaps the shrewdest leader Nepal has seen in
modern times.
3. I found this passage well after returning from fieldwork. The mention of language, religion
and dress resembles Ilesh’s narrative in a way that I still find almost uncanny.
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He constructed a narrative in which the monarchy was the symbol of the unity
of the nation. And faith in the ‘glorious’ history of the Shah dynasty, a com-
mon language (Nepali), a common religion (Hinduism), and a common dress
(daura-saluwar) tied the country together. This definition of a ‘trueNepali’ im-
mediately privileged a certain group of people—the hill Bahuns andChhetris—
who fulfilled the above criteria (Jha 2014:171).
This unitary nationalism and its definition of a ‘true Nepali’ lasted thirty years. Absolute
monarchy and the Panchayat system were brought to an end in 1990 by what is known as
the ‘People’s Movement I’. Since then, Nepal has been undergoing a period of rapid and
intense political transformation. This has included a ten-year insurgency and civil war led
by Maoists, the complete downfall of the monarchy, and a drawn-out process of constitu-
tionwriting. As a result, the country is now oﬀicially a democratic, federal republic. While
nationalist sentiment is still strong inNepal, the conception of the nation has changed. The
unitary understanding of Nepal which silenced differences in favour of a unique Nepali
identity has given way to pluralism. The opening lines of the new national anthem attest
to this view, using as a metaphor for Nepal and its inhabitants the image of a single gar-
land made of a hundred different flowers. The Constitution which was promulgated in
2015, despite taking a step back from the 2007 interim Constitution on the question of in-
clusiveness, nevertheless attests to this idea of a diverse nation. The following article is a
good example:
Art. 32.3: Every Nepalese community residing in Nepal shall have the right
to preserve and promote its language, script, culture, cultural civilization and
heritage. (Nepal Law Commission 2015)
Again, much ink has be spilled over this recent political history,4 but the aspect which is of
interest to me here is the tremendous rise in identity and ethnic politics which has marked
it.
To cite but a few characteristics of the present political climate, numerous ethnic and caste-
based political parties have emerged, religious revivalisms and ‘returns’ to purportedly
non- or pre-Hindu religions have thrived, the Maoists themselves attempted to create an
4. For two good accounts, see Jha (2014); Adhikari (2014).
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‘ethnic federalism’ whereby different regions would be administered by different ethnic
groups, and in the period that followed the end of the war, the Madeshi movement—
Madesh is the name of the low-altitude plains in the South of Nepal—became extremely
important. In this climate, already existing discourses of ‘indigeneity’ gained further cre-
dence, thanks in part to the influence of various national and international organisations
(Onta 2006; Gellner 2007; Lawoti 2013; Ismail and Shah 2015:esp. 113–115). Unsurpris-
ingly, the different movements and political parties in Nepal today make a great diversity
of claims. Cataloguing all of these would be a tremendous enterprise. Nonetheless, if one
were to extract a single overarching feature that has marked recent political history, this
would be a general opposition to the historical dominance, political and cultural, of upper-
caste hill Hindus, more often than not, through ethnic or indigenous politics (Adhikari
and Gellner 2016).
Despite Sammagaon’s remoteness, its inhabitants are well aware of the rise of identity and
ethnic politics in the country.
The media played a significant role in propagating identity politics in Sammagaon. The
arrival of televisions, phones, andmobile internet access is still recent in the area, but these
technologies are spreading extremely fast. Testifying to the speed at which technology is
developing in the area is the fact that, only four years before my fieldwork, when I lived
in the neighbouring village of Puranogaon, access to electricity was a fresh memory. Mi-
cro power-plants had been installed by a Swiss NGO in 2008. In 2010, only half of the
households had light bulbs. When I returned to Puranogaon in 2014, I was astonished to
see satellite dishes installed on several houses and noticed that many teenagers had their
own cellphone, whereas only a few households had one in 2010. Sammagaon, from what
people told me, had seen a similar technological explosion with the arrival of electricity,
along roughly the same timeline.
While I was conducting my fieldwork, the main object of news reports and bulletins was
the writing of the new Constitution. Discussions about this topic were literally a daily
affair on TV and the radio, and with them came constant debates about the reservation
systems that were being considered, which caste and ethnic groups would be named ex-
plicitly in the new document, whether ethnic federalism would be promulgated, whether
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schools should (and could) provide mother tongue education for various janajāti, and a
host of other topics pertaining to the rights of the different groups living in Nepal and
the valuation of non-upper-caste cultures. Popular comedy and soap operas also touched
upon issues of ethnicity and identity, so that even the people who did not watch political
shows or news reports were exposed to content relating to ‘ethnic identity’.
I should add that this identity-related content was not limited to the question of ethnicity,
though this did figure prominently. Dalit issues were also mentioned regularly, but in this
case, little was said about any ‘culture’ associated with them. The content here focused in-
stead on reservations and, sometimes, on the question of untouchability. Thus, on several
occasions, my adoptive family would call me to watch a report concerning some atrocity
that had been perpetrated against Dalits elsewhere in the country. At other times, there
were spots on the radio reminding people that untouchability is now criminal in Nepal
and punishable by imprisonment.
As a result, it often felt impossible to go anywhere in Sammagaon without being exposed,
mainly through radio and television reports, to the importance of caste and ethnic identity.
In addition, identity politics were also visible in everyday life in Sammagaon. In the meet-
ings called by the various organisations present in the area, the issue of ethnic and caste
identity arose regularly. Thiswas particularly true of themeetings thatwere held to decide
how to spend the yearly budget sent to the VDC by the district headquarters. This budget
is specifically divided into quotas, with considerable sums of money reserved for women
(mahilā), children, the janajāti, Dalits, and people with disabilities. Representatives of all
these groups had to meet to agree on how to spend the money.
Just as visible were various forms of ethnic activism and cultural politics. Sammagaon
itself is home to a diversity of ethnic groups. These include, to cite but a few, theRai, Limbu,
Tamang, Magar, Sherpa, etc. Members of all these groups live in close proximity to each
other and to the Bahun-Chhetri and Dalits. The wider area encompassing Sammagaon
is nevertheless recognised by all as the original territory of the Sunuwar. The Sunuwar’s
political and cultural mobilisation is not a topic which I can address at length, but as noted
by Ilesh, they do in fact have their own cultural sangh (organisation) in the nation’s capital,
and are quite active in the conduct of cultural programmes. They organise events at which
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they perform their own rituals, dances, and generally celebrate Sunuwar ‘tradition’. A
festival called ‘Chandi’ is the most important event of this kind. The Chandi celebrations
in a village neighbouring Sammagaon attract thousands of people, and videos of these
celebrations are filmed by locals and uploaded to Youtube, on channels which sometimes
include other films promoting Sunuwar culture.
During my fieldwork, on several occasions, I was approached by Sunuwar men, in par-
ticular school teachers, who urged me to write about them rather than the Bishwakarma.
They told me about the importance of ‘conserving’ and ‘promoting’ Sunuwar culture. As
an anthropologist working in Sunuwar land, they felt that this was the task that I should
really be undertaking. I explained, as politely as I could, that I really wished to work
specifically with Dalits. The simple fact that I received such requests is an indication of
how important ‘culture’, as a reified concept, has become in Nepal. It is a kind of political,
symbolic capital that one must develop and validate through research, and which lends
political legitimacy.
There are other groups in the area that have their own cultural organisations, amongwhich
the Sherpa are particularly noticeable. Giving details on the activities of each of these
groups would not add much to the argument here. Suﬀice it to say, in summary, that the
hills of the East of Nepal are a place where janajāti people are numerous, and where what
Hangen refers to as the ‘cultural politics’ of Nepal thrive:
Cultural politics includes activities through which indigenous nationalities de-
fine and promote the cultural practices of their own communities. Guiding
these cultural activities is the belief that the indigenous nationalities should re-
ject the culture of high-caste Hindus, which was imposed on them, and revive
their own distinct histories, languages, religions and other cultural practices,
including clothing, dances, and festivals. (Hangen 2009:37)
In the quotation reproduced earlier, Jha remarked that it is through clothing, language and
religious practices that a unitary, upper-caste understanding of the nationwas imposed on
the whole of Nepal’s population during the Panchayat period. It is not surprising that, in
the current climate, it is through these same markers that ethnic activists are seeking to
establish a different, pluralist understanding of the nation. It is also not surprising that
94
CHAPTER 4. ‘NO CULTURE OF OUR OWN’
these very markers are those which Ilesh had picked up on.
What is still unaccounted for, however, is the fact that Ilesh found it diﬀicult to identify the
cultural markers which could be deemed the Bishwakarma’s ‘own’. To explain this, I must
spend some time explaining what the Bishwakarma do in fact consider to be their culture.5
Bishwakarma culture
When I first arrived in Sammagaon, I told people that Iwas a student and that I had come to
study the Bishwakarma, their culture, and how they live today. One of the things which
many Bishwakarma people told me early on was that, with regards to culture at least,
the Bishwakarma—and the Dalit more generally—are identical to the upper-caste Bahun.
Ganga was particularly eager to point this out: ‘Ours and the Bahun’s culture,’ he would
say, ‘is exactly the same’ (Hāmro ra Bahunko sanskār-sanskriti thyakai milchha.). On occasion,
Ganga would tell me about the similarities in more detail. He would point to the fact
that the Bishwakarma and the Bahun speak the same language, are Hindu, perform the
same rituals, worship the same gods, celebrate the same festivals, etc. He was not the only
person to point this out, but he was particularly enthusiastic about these similarities.
It is worth noting that when people explained the similarity between the Bahun and the
Dalit, they generally used the Nepali terms ‘sanskār-sanskriti’ (life-cycle rituals, culture,
traditions) or occasionally ‘riti-thiti’ (practices, customs). They generally did not use the
term ‘culture’ in English in the same way as Ilesh, so it would be wrong to assume that
they had the same, highly reified and politicised concept inmind. Nevertheless, theywere
still bringing my attention to the fact that the Bishwakarma and the Bahun partake in the
same religion, rituals, and life-cycle events, and that they speak the same language. Even
if the connotations of the Nepali and English terms for ‘culture’ are different, the concepts
have considerable overlap in their extensions.
As far as I could tell, the cultural similarity between the Bishwakarma and Bahun is factual.
Nepali is indeed the Bishwakarma’s mother tongue and, usually, the only language which
they speak fluently. Like the Bahun, the Bishwakarma practice popular Hinduism, save
5. It goes without saying that the Bishwakarma do not think they have no culture at all; they
simply say that they do not have a culture ‘of their own’.
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for a few households who have converted to Christianity (one in Sammagaon, and a few
in neighbouring VDCs). Their year is marked by the same major festivals (Dasain, Tihar,
Teej, Shree Panchami, etc.), which they celebrate in the same way, and they conduct pujā
(worship) in similar ways, mostly to the same pantheon.6
One similarity that I did not expect concerned ritual specialists, or more precisely, Hindu
priests (purohit). Prior to fieldwork, my reading of the literature had led me to believe
that Hindu priests exclusively belong to the Bahun caste. In reality, while there is a very
strong association between Bahuns and this function, it is not absolute. All Hindus in
Sammagaon commission the services of Bahun priests except for Dalits. The latter have
their own full-blown priests, who belong to the same caste as themselves, who read sacred
texts just like the Bahun, and who are not simply relatives ‘acting a part’, as suggested by
Bista (2013[1967]:67).7
The priest whose services the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon would hire was a relative
of Ganga’s who lived in a VDC nearby, a man whom Ganga addressed respectfully as
‘brother-in-law’, although this was not their actual relation. The reason for which the Bish-
wakarma have their own, separate priests is simply, as everybody will readily admit, that
Bahun priests refuse to provide their services to Dalits. The Bishwakarma, however, see
having their own priests not as a difference, but rather as a further indication of the sim-
ilarity between the Bahun and themselves. Like the Bahun, the Bishwakarma are their
own priests. Ganga further insisted that Bishwakarma and Bahun priests serve the same
function, conduct the same rituals, and read the same sacred texts when doing so. There
was therefore, according to him, no reason to suggest that having separate priests meant
a difference in ‘culture’.
All of this is not to say that the Bishwakarma are identical to the Bahun. One difference
which upper castes will quickly point out is the fact that the Bishwakarma consume alco-
6. I should note that the goddess Durga / Kali is particularly popular among the Bishwakarma
and I do not know whether this is the case among the Bahun.
7. In a passage concerning funerary rites, a book written by the first indigenous anthropologist
of Nepal states: ‘The occupational and artisan caste people [i.e., Dalits] cannot employ a Brahman
priest for their funeral ceremonies but use instead the sister’s son or daughter’s husband to act
the part. This person does not read from a text, but merely guides the funeral process’ (Bista
2013[1967]:67). I do not knowwhether this was true some sixty years ago, but in Sammagaon and
surrounding area today it is not.
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Figure 4.1: A Bishwakarma purohit perfoming pujā.
hol and meats which are said to be unacceptable for a Bahun. Such interdictions are not
always observed in reality, but they are brought up regularly when one asks about differ-
ences. Still, even the Bahun will admit that this difference does not suﬀice to constitute a
difference in ‘culture’, as per the Nepali terms ‘sanskār-sanskriti’. Such a difference would
require, for example, a separate form of pujā (worship), different festivals, or perhaps, a
different set of sacred texts.
Do such differences in ‘sanskār-sanskriti’ exist between the Bahun and the Bishwakarma?
The answer is perhaps not a straightforward ‘no’, as the Biswhakarma would have it. This
is because there are rituals and practices which the Bahun engage in but the Bishwakarma
do not. The most noticeable example here is the saptāha, a multiple-day reading of sacred
texts which concludes in a symbolic cremation. Another example is the fact that the Bahun
have their own dance, which the Bishwakarma do not. Yet another example is a form of
singing in khas bhāsā (a language fromwhich modern Nepali emerged), which constitutes
a form of worship to tutelary gods, those said to reside in rivers, forests, thulassi (small,
temple-like structures found in front of houses), etc. And another difference still is the
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fact that a small number of Bahun people in Sammagaon and the surrounding area go to
study in Hindu colleges in India and become what locals refer to as pandits.
The Bishwakarma, who do not engage in these practices and do not have their own equiva-
lents, cannot therefore be described as having an entirely identical sanskriti to the Bahun. A
more accurate description would be that those rituals and practices which they do engage
in are not different from those of the Bahun. In other terms, the Bishwakarma’s culture is
perhaps best described as a subset of the Bahun’s.
I must state one point clearly here, lest I be misinterpreted. Under no circumstance would
I describe the Bishwakarma’s ‘culture’, in any analytical sense, as lesser than that of the
Bahun’s. In the final section of this chapter, I will argue that blacksmithing is a practice ex-
clusive to the Bishwakarma which could, under the right circumstances, be seen as highly
prestigious and constitute a ‘culture of their own’. The fact that it does not, I will argue, is
testament to the exclusionary dynamics of identity politics in Nepal. Beforemoving to this
argument, however, I should point out that, in Nepal, there is a diffuse representation that
the Bishwakarma’s culture is lesser because their sanskār-sanskriti is only a subset of that
of the Bahun. This is something which several Bahun people hinted at when I told them
about the Bishwakarma priests, for example, which they would describe as not genuine.
In response to this representation, some Bishwakarma are putting considerable effort into
trying to reduce the gap between them and the Bahun. Ganga, the priest who provided
services to the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon, and another one of their relatives from Sahu
Bajar are key examples. These three men had given up consuming any locally produced
alcohol and stopped smoking, in an effort to appear closer to the Bahun in demeanour.
Theman from Sahu Bajar, his relatives said, had taken to spending long hours alone in one
room, where he would read Hindu texts. Moreover, Ganga was far more of a ‘practising’
Hindu than any of the other Bishwakarma in Sammagaon. He tried to conduct a full-day
pujā in his house everymonth or every othermonth at least and observed shraddha, a ritual
to one’s ancestors, every year.
But, more explicit than any of these indications was the fact that Ganga would tell me,
on occasion, that the Bishwakarma are the real upper-castes. He supported this claim
with a myth of origin according to which, in times immemorial, the Veda had originally
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Figure 4.2: Ganga observing Shraddha
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belonged to the Bishwakarma, but had later been ‘stolen’ by the Bahun. Subaltern myths
of origin of this type have been noted among Indian Dalits. Deliège (1993) has provided
an extensive catalogue and analysis of them, in which he argues that myths similar to
the one Ganga told me are typical of castes attempting to move upwards in the hierarchy:
‘When a low caste wants to improve its position, it usually begins by adopting a newmyth
of origin consistent with its ambition.’ (Deliège 1993:541). He further suggests that they
are incipient signs of a process known as sanskritisation, a concept famously introduced by
Srinivas, whereby one caste or ethnic group adopts upper-caste practices and aesthetics in
order to improve its status (Srinivas 1956; for a reviewof the concept’s role in anthropology,
see also Charsley 1998).8
Though I am wary of pushing this line of analysis too far, the concept of ‘sanskritisation’
does provide a compelling contrast between Ganga’s striving to be more similar to
the Bahun and Ilesh’s attempts to build a distinct Biswhakarma ‘culture’. These two
goals could be viewed, respectively, as desires to sanskritise and to de-sanskritise the
Biswhakarma. One reason I am wary of this line of analysis is simply that Ganga did
also, on occasion, suggest that the Bishwakarma should create a ‘culture of their own’.
Conversely, Ilesh did at times tell me about the importance for the Bishwakarma of
stopping drinking and starting to behave more like the Bahun. Stripped away from the
association with specific individuals, however, the contrast between striving to be like the
Bahun and creating a ‘culture of one’s own’ remains valid. I will return to this topic in
the conclusion of this chapter.
To summarise the argument so far: the importance of acquiring a ‘culture of one’s own’
in Nepal is consistent with the country’s overall political trajectory. It is a way to mark
oneself as different from the upper-caste Bahun, who have historically been dominant both
politically and culturally. This strategy is effective for the janajāti, who can ‘revive’ their
mother tongues, languages, and material culture. The Bishwakarma, however, find them-
selves incapable of following suit, since in most of these regards, they are similar to the
Bahun, the very people from which cultural politics are meant to mark distance.
8. Note that in Nepal, the term ‘sanskritisation’ has also been used alongside ‘hinduisation’ to
refer to the historical, long-term process whereby the janajāti were historically inserted into the
national caste hierarchy and adopted Hindu practices as a consequence (e.g. Jones 1976; Sharma
1978; Allen 1997; Whelpton 2005:35–60).
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There is, however, one activity that is distinctly Biswhakarma. This is blacksmithing. The
Bishwakarma are very heavily associated with this activity in Nepal, so it would seem
reasonable to expect them to claim it as ‘their own culture’. In the following section, I
explain why this does not happen.
Why can’t blacksmithing become the Bishwakarma’s culture?
Everybody in Nepal recognises that the Bishwakarma’s ‘traditional’ occupation is black-
smithing. So strong is this association that people sometimes euphemistically refer to the
Bishwakarma using the expression ‘those who work with iron’. In Sammagaon, this asso-
ciation has endured despite the fact that, in reality, only one Bishwakarma man actually
practices smithing on a daily basis. Additionally, similar observations are true of the two
other Dalit castes present in the area. The Mijar or Sārki are still said to be leather work-
ers, despite the influx of cheap, factory-produced plastic sandals meaning that virtually
none of them work as actual cobblers today. The Darji are still associated with tailoring
and playing music at weddings. They too are losing work due to the availability of factory
produced clothes, although they do have more opportunities to exercise their traditional
craft than the Mijar.
The association between the Bishwakarma and blacksmithing raises the question of why
the Bishwakarma do not claim metalwork as ‘their own culture’. To explain this, let me
turn back to the exchange which I had with Ilesh when I first met him. In that conversa-
tion, he told me something which I had already heard several times during fieldwork, and
which is key to answering the question.
Ilesh explained that while the Bishwakarma do in fact make things at the forge, what they
make does not count as Bishwakarma ‘culture’. He offered the following explanation: ‘If a
Bishwakarma makes a sickle, that sickle is part of the culture of the person he made it for.
It’s not part of Bishwakarma culture.’ He drew a parallel with the Darji. ‘Think of it. If a
Darji makes clothes for a Sunuwar, following the Sunuwar design, he’s made something
which is part of Sunuwar culture, not Darji culture. It’s the same for the Bishwakarama.’
These remarks pose an interesting problem. To the outsider, being artisans or craftspeople
might seem, intuitively, a solid basis to claim that one has a ‘culture of one’s own’, particu-
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larly in the domain of material culture. Yet Ilesh’s words suggests that a phenomenon akin
to cultural dispossession, or perhaps alienation, prevents the Bishwakarma from making
such claims. Without going into detail, Marx famously used the notion of alienation to de-
note, among other phenomena, the separation which capitalism creates between a worker
and the product of their labour (Elster 1986). This type of alienation is primarily economic;
it refers to the fact that the products of a worker’s labour do not belong to the worker them-
selves, but instead, to the personwho employs the worker. What is happening in the case I
am addressing here is not exactly the same. Still, despite the difference, Ilesh’s words sug-
gest an alienation between Dalits and the ‘cultural value’ of the object which they produce,
or, to use a more economistic analogy, an alienation from the ‘symbolic capital’ contained
in the objects made by Dalits.
In the case of the Bishwakarma, this alienation becomes particularly striking when one
thinks about the khukuri, one of the various tools which the Bishwakarma smith forges.
This knife, with its wooden handle and inward curving blade, is an essential tool for ev-
eryday life in rural Nepal. It is amazingly versatile, allowing those who use it well to cut
through bamboo or even tree trunks in only a few swings. It is also used to prepare food.
To chop ingredients, it can be turned upside down and held securely against the ground
with one foot, thus presenting the blade upwards, against which vegetables can be pushed
and sliced eﬀiciently. The khukuri has multiple other uses in everyday life, including sac-
rificing and butchering animals, gathering leaves and fodder for buffaloes, stripping bam-
boo into long, thin slices used to make mats, and many more.
At some level, the Bishwakarma derive pride from the fact that they are the makers of
these tools. When I left the field, as a parting gift, Ganga had his son-in-law, a blacksmith
living in a village a few hours away, make me the finest khukuri I have seen. Unlike the
large, rough tools used in everyday life to cut down trees and butcher animals, this khukuri
is an ornate piece of craftsmanship: its curved blade is partly engraved; carved pieces of
two different metals are cast into the wooden handle; intricate motifs are carved into its
wooden sheath. Ganga presented me this gift ceremoniously on the day of my wedding
in Kathmandu, a few weeks before I left the country. Despite the fact that only a few Bish-
wakarma actually work in forges, Ganga clearly felt pride in offering me such a beautiful
object, and he made a short speech to explain why this gift was befitting for a student of
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the Bishwakarma. Similarly, when my (actual) father came to visit me in the field, he too
was offered a well-crafted khukuri.
Nevertheless, I am forced to acknowledge that Ilesh is right about the fact that what Dalits
make gets appropriated. Virtually nobody inside or outside of Nepal thinks of the khukuri
as a product of Bishwakarmawork. Instead, almost everybodywill explain that the khukuri
is a typicallyNepali knife, talking about it as an object of distinct national character but fail-
ing to attribute it to any specific caste or ethnic group. Moreover, while the khukuri is in
most cases a utility knife, its international claim to fame is as a weapon. As such, it is
always associated with the Nepali military and the Gorkha regiments hired by various
other armies and police forces (British, Indian, Singaporean, etc). It appears on Gorkha
flags and in numerous other symbolic representations of military bravery, but the asso-
ciation with the metalworkers who produce it is totally absent. Thus, the Bishwakarma
are never given any space in the rich symbolism associated with the khukuri. As Ilesh’s
account makes all too clear, none of the prestige of the khukuri ‘flows back’, so to speak, to
them.9
Why this is the case is diﬀicult to assess. At the very least, I suggest, a convincing answer
would have to take into account what it is like to be a blacksmith, the material conditions
in which one conducts such work. Working at the forge is hard labour. In Sammagaon,
I would sometimes pay visits to Kishor, the Bishwakarma person who owned the large
forge in the village. I usually had no other pretext than to watch him work. I marvelled at
how he actioned the large bellows made of goat hide to bring the charcoal to a white-hot
glow. Then, he would place in this furnace some of the metal scraps that lay all around
him, the best of which, he explained, were obtained from the suspensions of old buses.
This was the strongest metal available.
Kishor was a quick and dexterous person, the generous amounts of millet beer he drank
doing nothing to reduce his ability to twist and shape high-quality, sharp tools. But where
I saw dexterity, I suspect that many saw something entirely different. As discussed in
chapter 2, working at the forge, non-Dalits will tell you, is ‘dirty’ work. It makes the skin
9. I discuss the case of the khukuri here because it is the object which most readily shows the
alienation between Dalits and what they make. A good Bishwakarma smith, however, can and
does make a large number of other objects. For a comprehensive catalogue, see Höfer (1976)
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Figure 4.3: Butchering a buffalo with a khukuri.
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Figure 4.4: Making a mala (flower garland) with a khukuri.
Figure 4.5: Kishor, the blacksmith of Samagon.
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‘black’, in a part of the world where being ‘fair’ is universally considered a criterion of
beauty, and where blackness quickly recalls old ideas of ‘impurity’. I would not suggest
that blacksmithing being seen as ‘dirty work’ suﬀices to explain why none of the khukuri’s
prestige flows back to the Bishwakarma. I would argue, however, that this must be part of
a wider explanation.
The exclusionary character of ethnic politics
Having shown why the Bishwakarma claim that they do not have a ‘culture of their own’,
I now turn to some more general remarks on the ethnic and identity politics of Nepal.
Anthropological critiques of ethnic politics abound, especially when such politics are built
around the notion of ‘indigeneity’ (e.g Béteille 1998; Kuper 2003), as is the case in Nepal.
I have little to add to the theoretical and analytical components of these critiques, which
I generally agree with. I do however wish to focus specifically on the ethnic politics of
Nepal, insofar as these politics affect Dalits. In doing so, I will make a similar argument
to that put forth by Folmar (2013).
To make this argument, I will briefly address two studies of ethnic politics in Nepal,
Hangen (2009) and Lecomte-Tilouine (2009a). I consider two distinct yet similar argu-
ments made in these books. The first is that the traditions that are being ‘revived’ in the
context of Nepali ethnic politics are ‘invented’. The second is that ‘ethnic identity’ is a
fluid concept. While these observations are broadly correct, over-emphasising them runs
the risk of painting ethnic politics as more inclusive than they actually are in Nepal.
The ‘invented traditions’ argument
Lecomte-Tilouine (2009a) has written a detailed study of how theMagar ethnic groupwas
historically sanskritised, developing very close ties to Hinduism and the Nepali state, only
to become one of the groupswhichmost strongly demarcated and distanced itself from the
upper-caste, ruling elite during the upheavals of 1990 and onwards. The movement she
describes is in quest of a Magar identity, trying to distinguish itself from Hinduism and
upper-caste elitism through various forms of ethnic revivalism and, in particular, through
a re-writing of history which emphasises how the upper-castes eliminated original Ma-
gar culture. Magar ethnic activists, she tells us, describe the 1854 civil code as a ‘sudden
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imposition of Hindu order’ (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009a:132) leading to the loss of Magar
identity. In response, today, ‘ethnic organisations, particularly the historical research they
undertake, are entrustedwith the task of filling this existential vacuum’ (Lecomte-Tilouine
2009a:143).
Lecomte-Tilouine notes the following about the Magar efforts to re-create their original
culture:
…the Magars form one of the most interesting groups because of their very
deep and old acculturation to the Hill Hindus’ culture. This acculturation is so
old, going back as it does to at least the fifteenth century, that their rejection of
Hinduism and return to an authentic and original culture … is necessarily close
to a pure and simple invention. (2009a:126)
Here, Lecomte-Tilouine is clearly referring to ‘invented traditions’ in the sense put forth by
HobsbawmandRanger (1983). Her point is thatwhile the culturewhichMagar revivalism
promotes is presented by ethnic activists as ‘authentic and original’, it is not truly so. This is
the case because theMagar adoptedmany upper-casteHindu culturalmarkers historically,
to the extent that these superseded any ‘original’ culture which they might have had.
The distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘invented’ traditions drawn by Hobsbawm and
Ranger, which Lecomte-Tilouine uses in this passage, is one which has come under con-
siderable anthropological criticism. Sahlins (1999), for instance, has argued that all tra-
ditions are, ultimately, ‘invented’ and that the distinction therefore does not carry much
analytical weight.
What thismisses, however, is that not everybody is equal in their capacity to invent tradition.
The traditions invented by one group may be perceived by others as more legitimate than
those invented by another, simply because of the wider political context in which such
inventions take place. As Lecomte-Tilouine also notes, Magar revivalism happens in a
context where the
…opposition to the state is obviously translated as a conflict between castes and
tribes, a conflict that is itself reduced to racial opposition between the Aryas
and Mongols (2009a:125).
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As I showed in chapter 1, there are two ways in which people commonly divide society
in the Hills of East Nepal.10 One division follows a ‘caste’-based logic. It is tripartite, dis-
tinguishing the upper-castes, the janajāti / ethnic groups, and Dalits. The second division
follows racial or ethnic lines; it is bipartite, and to follow Lecomte-Tilouine’s terminology,
uses the categories ‘Ārya’ and ‘Mongol’, the latter mapping almost perfectly with the ‘jana-
jāti / ethnic’ category in the tripartite division. The important point which I wish to note
here is that only those belonging to the ‘Mongol’ side of the dichotomy will be taken seri-
ously if they claim to have a ‘culture of their own’. Only they can ‘invent’ a tradition that
others will recognise.
The issue which the Bishwakarma, and Dalits more generally, face is that they fall on the
‘wrong’ side of the dichotomy. Although ‘untouchable’ and ‘low-caste’ according to the
tripartite view, they are Ārya in the bipartite one. As such they are assimilated, on the
‘cultural’ front, to the upper-caste Bahun-Chhetri.
A person vested in the ethnic politics of Nepal might argue that the Dalit truly do not
have a culture of their own, unlike the various janajāti, and that it therefore does not make
sense for them to try to promote their own culture. Ilesh, in such a person’s view, would
be misguided in seeking to find Bishwakarma culture, since there would be nothing there
to find in the first place. Showing that traditions are invented mitigates this view. It shows
that, on the analytical front, cultural politics are no more legitimate when conducted by
the janajāti than by, as Ilesh is attempting, Dalits. What this line of argument misses is the
fact that any attempt by the Dalit to create a ‘culture of their own’, while analytically no
more problematic than ethnic revivalism, will not be received well in Nepal.
The ‘fluid identities’ argument
Hangen’s book entitled The Rise of Ethnic politics in Nepal (2009) is an ethnographic study
of a political organisation called the ‘Mongol National Organization’ (MNO). The book is
thoroughly researched and insightful, but there is one argument it makes that I take issue
with.
Hangen’s study shows how the rise of ethnic politics in Nepal operated at all levels of
10. Naturally, these emic models of society are also, ultimately, ‘invented’, but this has little to no
practical importance since they are recognised by everybody.
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society, including in remote villages similar to Sammagaon. Organisations such as the
MNO, she demonstrates, ‘introduced a new discourse of ethnic equality to village Nepal,
and led people to transform their identities’ (2009:83). Similarly, Hangen states that
many people who supported theMNO… came to think of themselves in a new
way, as Mongols, and reinterpreted, questioned or changed their religion and
other cultural practices. (2009:5–6)
Overall, Hangen argues that ethnic politics have been strongly transformative formembers
of various janajāti, shifting their self-representation to one which is delineated in ‘ethnic’
terms. Hangen’s overall appraisal of this phenomenon is positive; she suggests that ethnic
politics can be unexpectedly favourable for democracy and that they lead to new forms of
positive self-valuation for the janajāti.
Inmaking this argument, Hangen engageswith political scientist DonaldHorowitz (1985).
Horowitz’s view, as per Hangen’s summary, is that for democracy to function well, people
should be able to move fluidly between interest groups and shift their political allegiances
at will. Horowitz argues that ethnic politics present an obstacle to this kind of movement
because the very identities such politics are based on are ascribed at birth.
Arguing against this view and in defence of ethnic politics, Hangen states that
As anthropologists and other social scientists have argued for several decades,
ethnic identities are not primordial or fixed but, rather, are constructed in par-
ticular social contexts. Ethnic identification is a highly fluid process. Power re-
lations structure the formation and definition of ethnic identities, including
relationships between different groups, and the relationships between ethnic
groups and the state. New political contexts in which power relations are al-
tered often bring about efforts to redefine ethnic identities. From this perspec-
tive, the identities that ethnic parties mobilize may be framed as primordial but they are
in fact no more stable than identities that are mobilized through other political parties.
Identities that are marked by primordial symbols may change and thus do not
create the static cleavages and deadlocked political systems that theorists like
Horowitz supposed would emerge from ethnic politics (2009:15–16, emphasis
109
CHAPTER 4. ‘NO CULTURE OF OUR OWN’
added).
I am not competent to engage with the question of what is required for democracy to
function well. Nevertheless, I am struck by Hangen’s description of ethnic identification
as ‘fluid’. I agree with her reminder that the identities mobilised by ethnic organisations
are not actually primordial—this is the same argument as Lecomte-Tilouine makes in the
quotation above. This observation alone, however, does not justify the broader claim that
‘ethnic identification is a highly fluid process’. The fact that ethnic identities are, asHangen
herself suggests, ‘framed as primordial’ is suﬀicient for these identities to be rigid in at least
two senses.
First, ethnic identities are rigid in the sense that individuals cannot freely choose to self-
ascribe to one group over the other (this is, in my understanding, the type of fluidity that
Horowitz sees as necessary for democracy). No Bishwakarma can suddenly declare them-
selves to be, for instance, Sunuwar and expect others to recognise this. A Bishwakarma is
born and remains a Bishwakarma no matter what they do.11 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, ethnic identities in Nepal are rigid because they set specific conditions for
which groups do and do not count as ‘ethnic’. A key condition, I have argued, is to have a
‘culture of one’s own’ in the sense explained earlier.
Nepal’s ethnic politics are, therefore, exclusionary. The more positive self-understandings
that ethnic politics afforded the janajāti do not carry over to Dalits. There is no possibility
for people such as the Bishwakarma to develop positive self-evaluations through ethnic
politics because, quite simply, nobody will agree that the Bishwakarma are ‘ethnic’. As I
have now repeated enough times, the Bishwakarma are seen by others asAryan andHindu,
and in this regard they are seen as ‘identical’ to the upper-caste Bahun-Chhetri, verymuch
the opposite of being ‘ethnic’ or ‘indigenous’.
Conclusion
I had one main goal and two secondary ones in this chapter. The secondary goals were
to address the broad question of Bishwakarma culture and whether this differs from that
of the upper-caste Bahun, and to comment on the effect of ethnic politics for Dalits in
11. See chapter 9 for a case of Dalit people claiming that they are no longer Dalit.
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Nepal. By now, I hope to have fulfilled these two goals. Mymain goal was inscribed in the
broader argument of this thesis; it was to discuss one strategy which some Bishwakarma
are contemplating to ‘escape’ the stigma of lowliness and untouchability. I now wish to
return to this point.
In the previous chapter, I showed how Ganga, my host and adoptive father, dedicated
his life to acquiring a high social status through his employment as a school teacher. The
further remarks about Ganga in this chapter help to understand his strategy inmore detail.
Beyond a quest for dignity, Ganga is arguably attempting to sanskritise the Bishwakarma.
His view is that the Bishwakarma are not truly Dalits, but that they are instead ‘fallen’
Bahuns, as attested by the myth of origin which he related to me.
It is tempting to read Ilesh’s strategy, which is to build a ‘culture of their own’ for the
Bishwakarma, as an alternative to Ganga’s. Though Ganga may say that he despises caste
and untouchability, there is nevertheless a sense in which his strategy, so to speak, ‘plays
by the rules’ of caste. In his attempt to change the way in which people think about him
and his relatives, he is trying to promulgate, arguably, a more Brahmanical image of the
Bishwakarma. Ilesh too is trying to change the public representation of the Bishwakarma,
but he is doing this according to very different criteria. His strategy, so to speak, ‘plays by
the rules of ethnicity’. By searching for ‘Bishwakarma culture’, he is trying to give a less
Brahmanical image of the Bishwakarma, in favour of a more ‘ethnic’ one.
In one conversation which I had with Ilesh much later in my fieldwork, he explicitly told
me that the problem which Nepal is facing today is ‘Brahmanism’ (bahunbād). He ex-
plained that the janajāti and the Dalit should face this problem together, that they should
join forces in fighting it. The fact that both the Dalit and the janajāti drink alcohol was, in
his mind, a strong indication of the similarity between the two, and of the possibility for
them to come together in opposing the Bahun. When I discussed this idea with Ganga,
he dismissed it immediately. He stated that simply drinking alcohol does not mean much.
‘How does drinking make us similar,’ he asked, ‘when the janajāti, just like the Bahun-
Chhetri, continue to keep us outside of their houses?’
To fully understand why both Ganga’s and Ilesh’s strategies fail, we must return one last
time to the two lenses through which Nepalis view society, that is, the tripartite caste lens
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and the bipartite cultural / ethnic / racial lens. I reproduce here the figures form chapter
1 in which these two lenses were discussed.
Upper-caste groups
Janajati-Adivasi
Dalits
Figure 4.6: The ‘caste’ lens
Janajati-Adivasi
Bahun-Chhetri
(Khas - Arya)
Dalit
Figure 4.7: The ‘cultural’ lens.
These two lenses, I argue, create a vicious double-bind for the Bishwakarma and for Dalits
more generally. Ganga tries to emphasise the ‘cultural similarity’ that exists between the
Bahun and the Bishwakarma (figure 4.7). Non-Dalits generally recognise this similarity,
but it does not have the practical, liberating effect which Ganga might aspire to, since the
same people continue to see the Bishwakarma’s difference in terms of caste (figure 4.6).
Ilesh, on the other hand, wants to emphasise the difference that exists between the Bahun-
Chhetri and the rest of society. Hewants to emphasise the upper line in figure 4.6 and feels
that the Bishwakarma should join forces with the janajāti. This however is no more suc-
cessful than Ganga’s strategy, because of the cultural similarity between the Bishwakarma
and the Bahun (figure 4.7). The one feature which could distinguish them, blacksmithing,
is rendered moot through a process in which the Bishwakarma are alienated from the
symbolic prestige of the objects they make.
Ilesh’s strategy, in conclusion, is nomore successful thanGanga’s. The emergence of ethnic
politics in Nepal has certainly allowed many marginalised groups to contest the political
dominance of upper-caste hill Hindus. In this regard, Hangen’s positive appraisal of the
phenomenon is understandable. But, I would argue, this form of politics has contributed
112
CHAPTER 4. ‘NO CULTURE OF OUR OWN’
to further marginalising a group that was even more marginalised to begin with, namely the
Dalits, whowere once ‘just’ low-caste, are nowas low-caste as ever, but additionally culture-
less, at least in the sense of culture currently in vogue in Nepal.
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Force
The two previous chapters discussed strategies by which the Bishwakarma try to change
their public image. The present chapter addresses a different strategy, which consists in
opposing caste-based discrimination through direct, forceful methods.
Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal underwent a civil war, often referred to as the ‘People’s
War’, whose conflicting parties were the Nepali government and Maoist insurgents. The
war entered its most violent phase in 2001, when the government declared a state of emer-
gency and used full military power against the insurgents. Some 14,000 people were killed
during the conflict, the majority by government forces (Lecomte-Tilouine 2013a:10). Hu-
man Rights violations were numerous (Lawoti and Pahari 2009:309–311; OHCHR 2012)
and accountability for these violations generally low (Rawsi and Sharma 2012). Follow-
ing the signing of a peace agreement in 2006, the Maoists joined mainstream party politics
and proceeded to lead three governments. On the whole, the war was transformational
for the country. It was a pivotal episode in the nation’s transition from Hindu monarchy
to a secular, democratic and federal republic.
In addition to the study of these macroscopic political transformations, a substantial body
of research has taken an ethnographic or anthropological approach to the war. The liter-
ature is too vast to review exhaustively here, but I should highlight some important ele-
ments. Lecomte-Tilouine (2013c) has edited a fairly recent collection of anthropological
essays on the topic; I cite several of them in this chapter. Hutt (2004) contains a number
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of chapters by anthropologists. A special issue of Dialectical Anthropology (Shah and
Pettigrew 2009) is also relevant; it compares the Nepali Maoists and the Indian Naxalites.
Pettigrew (2013) has produced a full monograph on life in rural Nepal during the con-
flict. Her analysis focuses mainly on the fear which villagers experienced during the war,
a topic which others have also commented on (Pettigrew and Adhikari 2009; Lecomte-
Tilouine 2009b; Zharkevich 2015:372–373). Anthropologists conducting work in Nepal
during the war itself have commented on the methodological challenges which this posed
(Pettigrew, Shneiderman, and Harper 2004). Some have analysed the symbols used by
members of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army, the Maoists’ armed wing) during the
conflict (Lecomte-Tilouine 2006); others have tried to account for the emergence of polit-
ical consciousness in rural Nepal (Shneiderman 2009), in one case through biographical
methods (Sales 2010). Somewhat relatedly, Fujikura (2003) made an early call to address
new forms of ‘collective imagination’ that were emerging from Maoist activity; an inter-
esting answer is by Zharkevich (2009), who suggests that Nepali Maoism created a ‘new
way of being young’ in Nepal. Finally, a number of contributions, including some of those
already cited, have emerged from fieldwork conducted specifically in the ‘model villages’
which the Maoists established in West Nepal during the war (in addition to those already
mentioned, Lecomte-Tilouine 2013b; Sales 2013; Zharkevich 2015, 2017).
There is, in sum, no dearth of anthropological literature on the topic. My intention here is
not to contribute to the general discussion of Maoist ideology and the war, but rather, to
address one specific topic, namely, the effect which the insurgency had on untouchability.
More precisely, I wish to askwhether the forceful, violentmethodswhich theMaoists used
during the conflict to prevent and eliminate everyday caste-based discrimination were ef-
fective.
There is good reason to address this topic. The ideology of the Maoist insurgents was
complex andmulti-faceted, but one of its central strands was egalitarian, anti-hierarchical,
and infused with ideals of social justice. The Maoists have always professed their com-
mitment to addressing the diﬀiculties which Dalits face in Nepal, on both economic and
social fronts. This explicit commitment was visible even in the very initial stages of the
war; one of the forty demands which the Maoists addressed to the government in their
1996 ultimatum being that
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[d]iscrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be
stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated (forty-point
demand, reproduced in Riaz and Basu 2007:185–189).
Everything I heard in Nepal suggested that no caste-based discrimination was practised
amongmembers of the PLA itself. The extent to which the PLA attempted to ban untouch-
ability outside of its own ranks, however, is not as certain. At the very least, what is clear
is that the intensity of this attempt differed from one part of the country to the next. The
Maoists had varying levels of presence and influence in different parts of Nepal during
the war. Their stronghold was in the western districts of Rolpa in Rukum. In this area,
they established a number of ‘model villages’, and some recent work (Zharkevich 2017)
suggests that there, they effectively put an end to untouchability. In what follows, I will
show that the situation in Sammagaon and the surrounding area was different, and then
proceed to draw a comparison with Zharkevich’s fieldsite.
I should note at the outset that, in this chapter, the ethnographywill not primarily concern
Sammagaon itself. A significant amount of the material will concern Bensitaun, a settle-
ment that borders the lower wards of Sammagaon. The reason for this is simple. During
the war, the Maoists were not strongly implanted in Sammagaon, primarily because of the
relative proximity of an army camp. The situation in Bensitaun was very different. That
area was under full Maoist control during the war and the Maoist party was still very
popular there during my fieldwork.
Fear
I arrived in my fieldsite seven years after the end of the war. The conflict, then, was still
relatively fresh in the memories of the inhabitants of Sammagaon and Bensitaun. Many of
the people whom I came to know recounted episodes that happened during the hostilities.
While it was not my primary concern to collect such accounts during fieldwork, they were
frequent enough that I would be remiss not to give them any space in this dissertation.
A caveat, however, is in order. I will not produce a detailed, chronological account of
how the conflict unfolded in the area. While in the field, I did not try to cross-check the
stories which I was told. Doing so would not only have consumed large swaths of time,
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it would have forced me to behave unethically, as it would have required me to recount
some villagers’ personal narratives to others. In any case, what was most interesting in the
narratives I heard, in view of the focus of my research, was the proposal that Dalits were
indeed treated differently during the war, but that untouchability had ‘come back’ later.
The explanation for this revolved around fear.
In general, the inhabitants of Sammagaon and its surrounding area remember the civil war
as a period during which they experienced sporadic but intense bouts of fear and a more
constant, if less salient, sense of uncertainty. This was the case especially for non-aligned
citizens, people who were neither part of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) nor
soldiers in the Nepali Army. The majority of people were part of this category.
In her monograph on life conditions during the conflict, Pettigrew (2013) describes the
war as a time which saw a ‘deepening of structural violence’ (2013:3), during which
[p]eople experienced increased uncertainty in social relations and deteriora-
tion in the sense of trust. Constant vigilance led to persistent unease. Social
tensions were realized in unpredictable ways, and at times, people both sup-
ported and betrayed each other. This uncertainty heightened fear as villagers
tried to work out who was an ‘insider’ and who an ‘outsider’ (2013:3).
Episodes of intense fear similar to those described by Pettigrew were experienced by the
inhabitants of Sammagaon and the surrounding area. A wartime event which many re-
counted, for example, was the PLA attacking the local police station, dousing it in petrol
and setting it on fire.1 Additionally, several families lost a member, generally a son or
daughter, during the conflict. The consequences of such losses were sometimes still visi-
ble while I was in Nepal; for example, I was once invited to a week-long saptaaha, a reading
of sacred texts, performed for a sonwho had died during the conflict and for whom the ap-
propriate funerary rites had not been held at the time. Yet despite such episodes of open
violence, what was recounted to me most often was the way in which the PLA would,
when it passed through the area, demand to be fed and lodged. HostingMaoists, whether
by choice or coercion, came with the risk of being labelled a collaborator. The Nepali army
did not take well to those thus labelled, and the fear of execution was real. As Ghimire
1. The new police station was only rebuilt after the war.
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explains in his account of the war in the neighbouring district of Khotang, ‘the army—not
the insurgents—were the first to introduce violence and bloodshed’ (2013:125).
The most detailed narrative of this kind of anxiety was given to me by Abinash, a Bahun
man from Dhungagaon, in whose house I spent a little over a week in 2014. I relate Abi-
nash’s story in some detail here, as it communicates not only the anxiety that non-aligned
citizens experienced during the war, but also the dangers which they were exposed to.
Abinash tells me about his own experience of the war. We sit upstairs, directly under the
roof of his house. In a hushed tone of voice, he explains that thewarwasmade particularly
diﬀicult for him and his family because he had relatives on both sides of the conflict. His
brother was part of the Nepali Army, but another relative of his—the commander who fig-
ures later in this chapter—was a leader in the PLA. Because of this kinship tie, the Maoists
regularly came to stay in Abinash’s house. He estimates that they spent at least 200 nights
there. When they came, they would demand food, which was often hard to provide, and
they would ask to be lodged in a hidden place, out of view.
During the War, Abinash says, anybody who provided shelter to the Maoist insurgents
was at risk. Abinash himself never joined the Maoist ranks, but he was forced to help
them because they threatened him and his family. Against the will of all of its inhabitants,
his house became something similar to local headquarters for the Maoists. This did not go
unnoticed by a local ‘informant’ to the government, whose identity Abinash either does
not know or chooses not to reveal to me. Unbeknownst to him, this informant reported
Abinash. As a result, Abinash’s namewas added to the list of people wanted by the district
authorities, and he was called to the District headquarters by the DSP (Deputy Superin-
tendent of Police). Fearing that the situation would be worse if he disobeyed, Abinash
reported to this person, who in turn delivered him to a nearby Army Camp. After spend-
ing a few nights locked up and fearing that he would be executed, Abinash managed to
contact his brother, the soldier in the Nepali Army. His brother was a driver for some
high-placed oﬀicers and he managed to save Abinash by making a plea to his superiors.
The whole experience had been a major source of fear. Staying composed as he told me
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this story, Abinash nonetheless emphasized how terrified he had been. The sense of being
trapped between the two camps, either of which could potentially blame him for collabo-
rating with the other because of his kinship ties, had made him feel helpless.
Abinash narrated the Maoists’ visits to his house, his arrest, and his fear of execution with
extreme precision. While few others gave me accounts with the same level of detail, many
did tell me of episodes not dissimilar to Abinash’s story. Having to host Maoists against
one’s will and fearing repercussions from the Army was a widely recurring theme.
At this point, I feel that I should address a question that the reader might raise. Abinash
is an upper-caste person. The Maoists were dedicated to ending caste-based discrimina-
tion, which in turn they sometimes assimilated to ‘brahmanism’ (bahunbad). It is therefore
plausible that Abinash’s fear, although caused in no small part by the army, was rendered
particularly intense by his upper-caste status. Conversely, it is plausible that Dalits wel-
comed the Maoists much more openly than Abinash, without experiencing fear, because
the Maoists were dedicated to improving their situation. Was this the case?
Pettigrew’s work focuses on non-Dalits, but it nevertheless contains the occasional sugges-
tion that Dalits perceived the Maoists differently to her Tamu informants. She recognises
that the Maoists reached out to Dalits in particular (2013:14) and that their behaviour sub-
verted ‘accepted notions of social relationships’ (2013:57)—among others, caste. In one
rare instance, she reports the words of a Dalit woman who, because of her caste, told her
that she had ‘nothing to lose and so nothing to fear’ (Pettigrew 2013:83). Did Dalits, there-
fore, welcome the insurgents with open arms?
While such an argument rests on seemingly sound inferences, it simply does not resonate
with my own observations. Many of the Bishwakarma in Sammagaon had a lot of neg-
ative points to make about the Maoists. For example, the first time I asked Ganga about
this topic, his answer was direct and dry. He explained that by waging war, the insurgents
had created a major loss for the country, chasing away foreign development agencies and
NGOs. He added that, despite all their promises, the Maoists had done nothing for Dalits
in the area. Undoubtedly, this answer was a politically motivated one, as Ganga was a
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member of the CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist), a party
that has had rivalries with the Maoists.2 Later in my fieldwork, once we knew each other
better, Ganga made some concessions, admitting that the Maoists had in fact got some
things right. While he did not support them wholeheartedly, he did at the very least ad-
mire their dedication to doing away with untouchability. Still, first and foremost, Ganga
expressed fear and anger at having had to host the insurgents.
The other Bishwakarma in Sammagaon, none of whom were as deeply engaged in poli-
tics as Ganga, had mixed views. Many did admire the Maoists’ disregard for caste and
caste-based hierarchies, a point which I will return to below, but nevertheless recalled
experiencing episodes of strong anxiety during the war. In fact, anxiety and fear were
usually the first topic they would mention when I asked them about the conflict. They
mentioned the guns, the violence, army helicopters and people being shot at from the sky,
the Nepali army interrogating them, and a nagging sense that they or their relatives might
die. In view of such recollections, it seems safe to state that the notion of Dalits welcoming
the insurgents with open arms is an exaggeration. It is true that the Maoist combatants
sought to bring about a form of social organisationwhich, had it been realised, would have
represented an extremely positive change for Dalits. Indeed, many of the Bishwakarma
recognise this, often stating that the Maoists had a ‘rāmro bicār’ (good view / opinion).
This admiration, however, was not suﬀicient to dispel fear.
My argument here, insofar as it mitigates a narrative according to which Dalits welcomed
the Maoist insurgents wholeheartedly, is in a similar vein to that of Zharkevich (2015),
who conducted extensive fieldwork in Thabang, the Maoist ‘capital’ during the war and a
place which is often portrayed as the archetypal ‘village of resistance’. She has produced
an insightful critique of the idea that insurgents in the area received unfettered, sponta-
neous and ideologically informed support from non-aligned peasants. Her argument is
that this is a version of history which is, in essence, told by local elites rather than by ‘ordi-
nary’ villagers. This is particularly problematic given that it is precisely about ‘ordinary’
villagers that the history is being told. A number of social scientists, she argues, have
fallen into the trap of uncritically reproducing narratives of enthusiastic support for the
2. The current alliance between the CPN-UML and the main Maoist party was established after
I had left the field.
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Maoists. Their research method is the problem, as it is one which unduly ‘privileges the
view of subaltern elites as a prime source of historical knowledge, and which does not
give suﬀicient attention to the difference between the narratives and perceptions of subal-
tern elites and ’ordinary’ people within the so-called dominated groups’ (2015:355). As
a result, ‘we, as social science researchers, might at times contribute to the creation and
perpetuation of historical narratives which are partial but which become the history of the
place’ (2015:355).
Chini Maya, my adoptive mother in Sammagaon, gave accounts of the war that are par-
ticularly telling of the perspective of ‘ordinary’ people, in the sense used by Zharkevich.
I recorded a conversation which we had one morning, when she spontaneously started
talking about the People’s War. Large chunks of this recording consist in her recalling
how scared she felt. Below are the main themes which she mentioned.3
Disruption of space and loss of resources. Cini Maya explains that the Maoist insurgents came
to her house many times, in groups of roughly twenty people, to ask for food. TheMaoists
would come into the house and enter the hearth without asking questions. She explains
that if someonewho is not amember of one’s thar4 does this, the inhabitants of a housewill
fall sick. The Maoists’ arrival, she adds, put a lot of pressure on her household’s resources.
There was already a shortage of grain at the time. Rice was hard to obtain; the family
was eating maize and millet flour (dhido) instead.5 On one occasion, the Maoists even
organised a bhoj (feast, large communal meal) on her porch and front yard.
Rules and restrictions, being forced to obey, and fear of violent punishment. There is one passage
in the recorded conversation in which Chini Maya lists the punishments she believes the
Maoists inflicted on peoplewho behaved inwayswhich they did not approve of. Here, her
tone and words convey a sense of helplessness. She explains that one had to follow orders
without asking questions. The Maoists would beat those who did not follow their instruc-
tions. Chini Maya specifically remembers that they forbade everybody from preparing
jandh and rakshi (millet alcohol). Violating such rules could lead to various punishments,
3. In the conversation, Chini Maya moves back and forth between topics rapidly, pauses to cook,
uses onomatopoeia, etc. It is easier to present her words in a condensed form than verbatim.
4. One’s patriline, see chapter 1.
5. Rice is perceived as the best, or most luxurious grain. Millet, which can be ground into flour
and cooked as a paste, is seen as a food for poorer people. There are, however, exceptions to this
pattern. Enjoying the taste of millet is also a positive sign; it shows that one is well and truly ‘local’.
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which included cutting off someone’s tongue or ear, breaking a leg, or putting out some-
one’s eyes.
Surprised at the violence of such actions, which Chini Maya seemed to imply were com-
mon, I interrupted her to ask if any of these punishments had been used locally. She
answered that they had not, but that she had heard of them being administered in other
VDCs not too distant. Whether this is true or not is perhaps less important than what this
indicates about the role of word-of-mouth and rumours in building up a collective repre-
sentation of the Maoists as fearsome, even in a locality like Sammagaon, where the Maoists
were only present sporadically.
Fear of being seen as a collaborator. Chini Maya talks in some detail about an episode in
which the army came to her house. While she had hoped that the army would provide
her ‘security’ (surakshā), she quickly began to feel intimidated as the soldiers began ques-
tioning her about her husband and his political activities, his and her sons’ and daughters’
whereabouts, their employment, etc. She felt particularly scared when asked these ques-
tions because, as explained earlier, her husband had indeed started the local branch of the
Communist Party, even if he was not sympathetic to the Maoists.
Fear for one’s kin. When re-listening to the recording, I am struck by the fact that it is pep-
pered with moments where Chini Maya pauses to catch her breath and calm down, using
onomatopoeia to describe her increasing heartbeat. There are moments when her voice
starts to tremble, and once, she explicitly says that recalling this period is making her re-
live some of the fear. She becomes particularly emotional when she talks about her sons
and daughters—most of whom lived with her at the time. She says that she was terrified
that one of them might join the Maoists, by force or of their own accord.
On the whole, Chini Maya’s fear helps to show that for non-aligned Dalits, the war was
not a matter of simply welcoming the insurgents. Nevertheless, it is true that in what the
Bishwakarma told me about the war, there was also a discernible note of admiration. I
turn to this topic now.
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Admiration
Even Cini Maya, who was shocked to see her house and hearth entered by non-kin, said
the following about the Maoists and the way in which they tried to actively oppose caste-
based discrimination:
Chini Maya Dehegli: The houses of the Damāi… and the houses of the Sārki…
Since a long time ago, we Bishwakarma have entered the houses of the Sārki.
The Sārki and the Bishwakarma are similar. And the Damāi… In our culture,
since a long time ago, we have entered the houses of the Damāi, [but] we used
not to eat [there]. It had been like that since a long time ago.
But now, what happened is that a group had a meeting (samuhā bhāsyo). After
gathering in a meeting point (baithak aera), they had a meeting, and by having
this meeting… What did they do? They made food and brought it. And we
sat around the table and ate, in the same place. [So] now, we could not go
elsewhere to eat. Although until now, the Chettri and the Bahun do not let us
into their houses. We also do not let the Damāi in [our own houses].
And it has been like this since the Maoists came. Those Upadhaya Bahun (the
‘highest’ type of Bahun, traditionally), those who were astrologers, those who
did not eat [food prepared byDalits]—they [theMaoists] went into the houses
of those Bahun, cooked at their hearths—cooked at their hearths and gave them
food. If [the Bahun] refused to eat, [the Maoists] would beat them. After
giving the Bahuns food cooked byus the Bishwakarma, by theDamāi, the Sārki,
and after the Bahuns ate [this food], untouchability went away. It disappeared
like that… Although now, they still do not let us in [their houses].
In this excerpt, Cini Maya starts by explaining what the ‘old’ culture is: the Sārki and
the Bishwakarma are ‘similar’; they can enter each other’s houses. The Damāi (Darji) are
lower than both, a status marked by the fact that they cannot enter Sārki or Bishwakarma
houses. None of these groups, who are all Dalits, can enter the upper-caste Bahun’s houses.
The samehierarchy is visible in the circulation of cooked food,which can flow ‘downwards’
between these groups, but not upwards. What Cini Maya is describing here is simply the
123
CHAPTER 5. FORCE
traditional caste hierarchy of Nepal, with its multiple lines of untouchability—between
Dalits and all others as well as between various Dalit groups, in this case, between the
Damāi (Darji) on the one hand and the Sārki and Bishwakarma on the other.6
In line with the ‘gastro-politics’ so important in South Asia (Appadurai 1981), but in what
we might choose to call ‘revolutionary gastro-politics’, the Maoists attempted to disrupt
this hierarchy by forcing people to violate the precepts and rules which sustain it. The
insurgents made people behave in ways antithetic to the avoidances whichmake caste and
untouchability tangible in the first place. The organisation of public bhoj (feasts, meals)
such as the one which Chini Maya evokes, in which Dalits and non-Dalits, Damāi and
Sārki/Bishwakarma had to share food was a method they deployed quite commonly to
combat caste-based discrimination (Adhikari 2014:138).7
To understand the significance of collective feasts, one must know a little more about the
theories of purity and defilement which underlie the traditional conception of untoucha-
bility in Nepal.
In brief, there is an expression which is still heard quite commonly in the area of Samma-
gaon, ‘jāt jancha’. The literal translation of this is ‘caste goes away’. This is an expression
used to describe what can happen when a non-Dalit interacts with a Dalit in ‘inappropri-
ate’ ways, for example, by eating cooked food which the Dalit person had come in contact
with. The expression describes, in colloquial terms, the well-documented idea of ‘ritual
pollution’, i.e. the notion that an upper-caste individual can become polluted through con-
tact with a Dalit, and that the result of this pollution is to lose their upper-caste status,
either temporarily (until the appropriate cleansing ritual is conducted), or permanently.
Despite this belief being described as an ‘old’ and ‘wrong’ belief by many in Sammagaon,
it still has some hold.8
The collective meals organised by the Maoists were an attempt to forcefully counter the
logic of purity and pollution. Such meals are a way of forcing people who ‘rank’ differ-
6. See section ‘Caste in Sammagaon’ in chapter 1.
7. Similar bhoj (feasts) are now held regularly by Dalit activists in Kathmandu, though as far as
I know, participation is always on a voluntary basis.
8. I will return to the question of ‘pollution’ in more detail in chapter 9. There, I will argue that
while the risk of pollution is no longer taken very seriously by most non-Dalits, this is not because
Dalits are no longer seen as inherently impure. Instead, it is because non-Dalits are seen as less
prone to accruing impurity from Dalits.
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ently in the caste hierarchy to mix with each other, with the aim to reduce the difference
between these people. As noted earlier in this thesis, in many parts of the world commen-
sality is a prime way in which people create and maintain links with each other at a deep,
‘relational’ level (e.g. Carsten 1995; Bloch 1999). This is particularly true in South Asia
(Lambert 2000). In Nepal, to share food is to become alike in a deep and meaningful level.
I experienced this personally; my own sharing foodwith Dalits was somethingwhich both
surprisedmany non-Dalits and helpedme build a proximitywith the Bishwakarmawhich
would otherwise have been impossible. Furthermore, to feed someone (khuaunu) inNepal
is an intimate act, and conversely, to refuse food is much more than a simple lack of man-
ners. It is a way to deny another person’s attempt to connect, a way to emphasize one’s
difference and separateness. In Parry’s terms:
The refusal to eat is a repudiation of kinship-outcasting being expressed above
all in a withdrawal from commensality (Parry 1985:614).
Forcing intercaste commensality was one of the main acts for which the Maoists were re-
membered in Sammagaon. The other violation which was systematically recounted to me
is the one which Chini Maya mentions in the last part of the quotation above. It concerns
space. The Bishwakarma and other Dalits told me, often with a note of admiration in their
voice, about the way in which the Maoists would enter anybody’s house, without paying
any attention to rules.
Space is a common battleground for Dalit activists. Often, this materialises as forced
temple-entry movements, which have a long history in India as well as in Nepal (Lawoti
2007; Aahuti 2014:94ff.). There had been no such initiative in Sammagaon, where no tem-
ple was off-limits for Dalits. Still, the Maoist insurgency did come with what we may call
a ‘politics of space’. Adhikari reports in his history of the Maoist revolution in Nepal that
[t]he Maoists actively included Dalits in their campaign to upend traditional
social norms and punish those who clung to them. Egged on by party cadres,
groups of Dalits would forcibly enter the homes of their upper-caste neigh-
bours and touch their sacred objects and cooking utensils (Adhikari 2014: 137–
138).
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I was never told of organised, collective entries of this kind in Sammagaon. Still, what
was mentioned to me time and again was members of the PLA, among whomwere Dalits,
entering upper-caste houses in the village. Seeing the insurgents behave the way they did,
and hearing the stories of how they disregarded caste rules both locally and in other parts
of Nepal had a strong impact on the Bishwakarma.
As noted by others (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009b:396; Adhikari 2014:137–140), deliberately
transgressing rules regulating food and space was one of the many ways in which the
Maoists sought to re-educate the Nepali population, as part of their ‘cultural revolution’.
Food and space are key battlegrounds in the fight against untouchability in Nepal, I have
argued, in part because they are closely tied to the intimate domain of kinship. But per-
haps just as importantly, I would also suggest, it is because they are a battleground whose
rules are understood by everybody. One does not need to know revolutionary ideology
or formal politics, nor does one need formal education to understand the significance of
violating caste rules in this way. Regardless of what different people may think about such
violations, what is certain is that they do not go unnoticed; they are highly salient, and their
meaning is highly accessible.
Somuch cannot be said of current political events in Sammagaon. While in the field, I went
to a large number of meetings organised by NGOs, local authorities, and other organisa-
tions. In such events, it is typical for local neta (leaders) and other thulo manchhe (big /
important people) to address a crowd of villagers who, more often than not, look and act
bored. Speeches are long, usually contain promises of ‘development’ (bikās) that people
are disillusioned about, and their highlight is often the customary free khājā (snack). Only
some events generate substantial excitement, such as the singing contest that one NGO or-
ganised and the women marching through the village on International Women’s Day. But
even these cannot compete with the Maoists’ explicit and public breaches of caste rules.
My sister in the field, Sirjanna, once explained that she and others looked up to the way
in which the Maoists behaved, that they admired their disdain for untouchability, but that
they nevertheless did not try to behave similarly themselves. Perhaps, therefore, what was
most remarkable about theMaoists from the point of viewof non-aligned, ‘ordinary’Dalits
in Sammagaon was that they provided a glimpse of what society might look like without
126
CHAPTER 5. FORCE
untouchability and caste-based discrimination. This is broadly consistent, as we shall see
in the next section, with the account that was given to me by a PLA commander. This man
stated that while the Maoists had not succeeded in eliminating untouchability, they had at
least given Dalits a ‘consciousness’ (chetanā) of their oppression and of its unacceptability.
AMaoist perspective
During the war, the situation in Bensitaun, three hours’ walk away from where I lived in
the field, was very different to the one in Sammagaon itself. Bensitaun did see a sustained
presence ofMaoists during the conflict, and a large number of households in the areawere
still aligned with the main Maoist party (UCPN-M) when I was in the field.
Bensitaun is the place where I met Binod Ghimire, a thirty-five-year-old Bahun man and
ex-commander in the PLA,who had some 130men under his orders during thewar. Binod
had left the cantonmentwhich he, likemany ex-fighters, had been assigned to at the end of
the war. His subsequent search for employment had not, however, proved fruitful. Binod
had joined the Maobadi (Maoists) at the age of fifteen, when he was still a student. After
the war, he returned to school and completed his +2 degree,9 but his hopes of being in-
tegrated into the Nepali Army or of finding a job in the country were dwindling. Binod
compared himself to me, explaining that while I might know how to use computers, his
‘specialisation’ was the khukuri (long knife, in this case, used as a weapon). Finding no
employment in Nepal now, Binod was reluctantly considering moving to Macau, where
he had heard that there were opportunities for security agents and bodyguards.
Binod explained that the Maoists had been engaged in a battle for the improvement of the
country and its society. Theirs had been a just cause: ‘we [theMaoists]were driven by bicār
(thought / ideology / opinion); they [the army’s soldiers] were driven only by money’, he
told me. Yet Binod bemoaned the lack of tangible change after the Maoists had joined
mainstream politics. He wondered whether the fight had been worth it. In this regard, his
words echoed amore general sense of disillusionment and frustration that had spread after
the 2008 Constituent Assembly failed to complete its mission.10 I found it remarkable that
9. A degree obtained after studying two years more than the minimum requirement.
10. This sense of disappointment seems tomirror that whichwas felt after the 1990 popular upris-
ings and which was, according to Pfaff-Czarnecka (2004), one of the reasons the Maoists emerged
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many of the comments which Binod made about the current state of Nepali Maoism were
similar to reflections which I had heard from non-Maoists. In particular, Binod shared
the sense that Nepali leaders, including some of those at the head of the Maoist parties,
had become untrustworthy and self-interested, that they had lost their dedication to the
betterment of society. The only exception he saw to this pattern was Baburam Bhattarai,11
who he believed was still genuinely trying to improve Nepal’s situation, but was being
prevented from doing so by other politicians.
Binod proved an excellent source of information on the Maoists’ relation to Dalits during
the war. In a one-and-a-half-hour interview, I asked him how the Maoists had dealt with
the question of untouchability and caste-based discrimination. I wanted to knowwhether
the Maoists had tried to get rid of these phenomena and if so, whether Binod thought that
they had been successful. He first made his own views on untouchability perfectly clear:
The entire world shifted, in this country, during the People’s Movement. We
[Maoists] understood. […] Ultimately, if I cut myself, blood will come out. If
[a Dalit] cuts himself, blood will also come out. So in the end, why should I
avoid eating food touched by a Dalit?
Commonality of blood is often used as an argument against caste and caste-based discrim-
ination in Nepal. The fact that everybody bleeds and that everybody’s blood is the same
colour are regularly used to bring attention to a single, shared humanity.
In the same breath, Binod added:
Dogs enter [houses]. Bahuns raise dogs inside their houses, inside their rooms.
Oh! The very rich even give the dog a mat or a bed. They raise a dog which is
let inside. And after this, chickens and other animals enter the house. Chick-
ens eat shit; they eat human shit, don’t they? Chickens eat excrement and enter
the hearth. Don’t they enter? Chickens enter, don’t they? Now pigs too have
started to go into Bahun houses—the Bahun have started doing business [rais-
ing pigs] for money. Since a long time now the Bahun have been raising pigs
in the first place.
11. One of the major figures of the Maoist movement and the Prime Minister of Nepal in 2011
and 2013.
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inside their houses. […specific examples of Bahuns raising chickens and pigs in the
area…] And now, it is like this everywhere. But ultimately, a man who cuts
himself and bleeds [like other humans], why would you not let that man in?
This is what we [the Maoists] had understood.
Here, the inclusion of pigs and chickens is particularly significant. Both of these animals
are commonly said to be ‘dirty’ (phohor) in Nepal, a point which Binod alludes to vividly
by mentioning chickens consuming human excrement. Also significant is the fact that
Bahuns adhering to strict, traditional rules of purity are supposed to avoid consuming
chicken and pork, both ‘polluting’ meats. The relaxation of these rules, Binod suggests,
had not extended to Dalits when the Maoists took arms.
Earlier, I alluded to the importance of space as a battleground for Dalits. In chapter 2, I
mentioned thatDalits have unfettered access to public spaces in Sammagaon. What Binod’s
words show so well is why, despite this seeming equality in the public sphere, restricting
access to private space matters. There is much more than just an abstract standard of
‘equal treatment’ at stake here. As long as Dalits are not let into other people’s houses and
hearths, Binod suggests, the message which is being sent to them is that they are lower
and more polluting than excrement-bearing animals.
Binod says that the Maoists had understood the predicament of Dalits. What, then, did
they do about it?
Binod Ghimire: Before the Maoists became weak [Binod has just explained that
theMaoists becameweak in the years that followed the end of the war], this village had
become totally Maoist. There was nobody else. One person per house became
a Maoist whole-timer, in this place.
Ivan Deschenaux: In Bensitaun?
BG: In Bensitaun and [a neighbouring locality]. In this area, more than nine
people died (moreko) during the People’s War. They met their deaths (mrityu
bhaeko). More than nine people from this area became martyrs. People from
the higher area [the higher localities in the VDC] did not becomeMaoists; only
from the lower area, here. There were no Maoists in the higher area. And after
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this blood was shed, this village became Maoist, just like in the West.
Here, untouchability ended at that time… but only out of fear. It was out of
compulsion (kar) and fear (dar). It was not through understanding, in fact.
‘Now the Maoists will come and feed us grass, beat us so that we eat it. So
that we eat it, or rather, so that [Dalits] enter the house. Now the Maoists will
come and beat us if [a Dalit] is outside.’ This was the way that people talked,
before… But now, Dalits sit outside out of their own accord [again]; they sit at
the door and they do not come in.
ID: Right. Please explain this a little to me. At that time, at the time of Maoists
and the war, untouchability had disappeared somewhat because of fear. This
is what you said, right?
BG: Yes. Because of fear of the Maoists, in fact.
ID: But this fear—why were people afraid? Explain this to me a little a little.
When untouchability happened, what did the Maoists do?
BG: If someone did untouchability, this personwould get what we called ‘bhāte
kārbāhī ’. They were beaten with a stick. They were tied up and fed grass. Like
an animal. [We would tell him,] ‘in the end, that man [the Dalit] is the same.
You are also a man. Why are you forcing him to stay outside? You are also
an animal.’ We would tie him here [around the neck] with a dāmlo [a rope for
animals]. And then grass was fed to him. We would tell him to chew it and
make him do so by force.
ID:What is the meaning of that? Why would one feed grass?
BG:Why feed grass? So that [they understand that], in the end, [all] blood is
the same and [all] men are the same. ‘A dog has entered your house! Why are
you dominating the Dalit and chasing him out? You treated him like a Dalit.
You let the dog inside and raise it, [so] why don’t you let the Dalit inside? In
fact, he is also a man, he is also the same. From now onwards, let him inside!’
In any case, nobody will enter another person’s house without a purpose. If a
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person comes with a purpose, then they must be let inside.
This untouchability… this should not be visible from the outside. When we
saw it—when the Maoists saw it—we wanted to eliminate it. Wherever we
went, we Maoists used to say that if somebody does untouchability, we would
punish this person, right? So it is like I said before. Even if it was only to show
[us], they would not practice untouchability, out of fear.
We continued to talk about this topic for a while. Binod listed a number of other punish-
ments which could be inflicted by Maoists upon those who treated Dalits as untouchable.
He confirmed that these punishments were not only hypothetical; they were actually ad-
ministered on occasion, thoughhe could not recall cases of thembeing used in Bensitaun.12
His overall evaluation is that, during the war, the Maoists were quite successful at elim-
inating untouchability. However this did not happen because the Maoists successfully
changed people’s opinions about caste. Rather, it was only the fear of punishment which
compelled non-Dalits.
After the war
The war, thus, was an exceptional period. It was marked by two distinct fears. One was
the fear of being associated with Maoists and arrested or persecuted by the Nepali army.
This fear affected everyone, including non-Maoist Dalits. The second fear affected mostly
non-Dalits: when and where the Maoists were present in suﬀicient numbers, such as in
Bensitaun, they threatened to violently punish non-Dalits who practised untouchability.
By Binod’s account, this threat was suﬀicient to ‘eliminate’ untouchability, even if only
temporarily.
Chini Maya succinctly described what happened after the war.
Ivan Deschenaux: This means that while the Maoists used to come, these
‘small castes’, these Dalits, they used to enter the houses of Bahuns, didn’t they?
Chini Maya Dehegli: They entered. They entered.
12. Binod added that he had been to 35 districts during the war, and that none had quite as strong
a level of caste-based discrimination as Bensitaun. I am not sure what to make of this remark.
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ID: But now, once again, they do not enter.
CMD:Now? They do not enter in the houses that theMaoists had entered [any
more]
Binod, similarly, stated that once the war ended and the Maoists could no longer use force
to impose their norms, many of the practices related to untouchability re-surfaced in Ben-
sitaun. And indeed, today, commensality between Dalits and non-Dalits is avoided and
Dalits never enter non-Dalit houses.
This raises an important question. Why were the Maoists in Bensitaun unable to elim-
inate untouchability in the long run? Part of an answer can be elicited through a com-
parison with the situation in Thabang, described in a recent paper by Zharkevich (2017).
Thabang was the so-called ‘crucible’ of the insurgency and ‘Maoist war capital’ in West
Nepal. Zharkevich’s ethnography shows that, in this location, the war did have the effect
of eliminating untouchability permanently. Even well after the conflict ended, there is no
commensality avoidance and Dalits are let into other peoples’ houses unproblematically.
Given that Thabang was a Maoist model village, Zharkevich considers the possibility that
it was the Maoists’ ideological teaching which effected the change:
The idea of transforming the consciousness of people was key to Maoist
wartime policies. The path to change was envisioned through an uninter-
rupted process of uprooting ‘bad traditions’, achieved through a process of
conscientization: that is, summoning villagers to attend ideological sessions
and implementing distinct policies, most often imposing outright bans. Dur-
ing the war, most areas of social life were regulated by these omnipresent bans:
whether on alcohol-brewing and gambling, on polygamy and early marriages,
on communal religious festivals and lavish celebrations, or on death rites and
shamanic gatherings. Eradicating inter-caste discrimination and encouraging
the consumption of the ‘holy cow’ featured high on the Maoist agenda of the
Cultural Revolution (2017:785).
However, Zharkevich rejects the notion that it was these bans and ideological sessions
alone that explain the elimination of caste-based discrimination. Instead, she argues, the
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exceptional conditions that the war created were key.
In the situation of war, life took precedence over particularities of social di-
visions […] Thus, the move towards laxer norms of inter-caste commensality
did not come as a result of people’s deliberate actions or the Maoist project of
social change alone, but rather as a result of the highly constraining environ-
ment of war, which left people with little choice about what and where to eat
(2017:795).
The war in Thabang led to serious and, on occasion, extreme food scarcity. This prob-
lem was made all the more intense given the requirement to feed Maoist contingents on
a regular basis. At least three important consequences emerged from this situation. First,
Zharkevich tells us, in line with the Hindu notion of apaddharma (rules that apply in times
of crisis), it became permissible for non-Dalits to consume beef. This is significant because
the consumption of beef is usually a strong taboo for upper-caste Hindus and is associ-
ated with ritual pollution. Moreover, the consumption of carrion, including beef carrion,
is associated with some of the lowest Dalit castes. Second, food scarcity led to regular
commensality between Dalits and non-Dalits. Third, the dangers of the war meant that
people were regularly forced to hide in each other’s houses—with little regard for caste
rules. Dalits would hide in non-Dalit houses and vice-versa.
The key point in Zharkevich’s argument is that behaviours originally seen as provisional,
as ways of coping with an exceptional time of ‘crisis’, eventually became routinised and
embodied. In Thabang, intercaste commensality and beef consumption were more than
performative or symbolic, more than actions carried out under duress, under Maoist or-
ders. They were common behaviour, ‘practices’ in the sense implied by Bourdieu (1977),
whom Zharkevich cites to support her argument. Carried out through necessity and with
suﬀicient regularity, intercaste commensality and beef eating eventually led to an actual
transformation of Thabangi habitus.
The Bishwakarma in Sammagaon remembered, first and foremost, the ways in which the
Maoists behavedwith regards to food and space. None of them discussed Maoist ideology
with me in much detail—they tended only to recall that the Maoists said ‘everybody is
the same’ and ‘untouchability should be eliminated’. This provides evidence in support
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for Zharkevich’s suggestion that practice, rather than ideology, is what was salient for
non-aligned, ‘ordinary’ citizens in rural Nepal. In Sammagaon, as my sister Sirjanna sug-
gested, the Maoists were admired for their bold entry into upper-caste houses, but their
presence was too weak for any local Dalit to follow suit. In Bensitaun, where the Maoists
where far more present, the disappearance of caste-based discrimination was conditioned
by fear rather than by a change in people’s deeply ingrained habits. Following this line of
argument, what was missing in Bensitaun was more banal, or perhaps more spontaneous,
violations of the precepts of untouchability.
In summary, I agree with Zharkevich’s suggestion that
[a]rguably, when people were not compelled to break taboos on a routine ba-
sis, the relaxed rules of inter-caste commensality rested simply on the power
of the Maoist gun. New social practices were not internalized to the level of
routinized acts which people performed habitually. In contrast, in Thabang,
people had to practise some of the Maoist dictums in their daily lives. Even if
by doing so they initially followed the imperative of ‘rules that apply in times of
crisis’, in the end their practice has led to a profound process of norm-remaking
and social change (Zharkevich 2017:796).
What cemented change in Thabang is practice in the anthropological sense of ‘theories of
practice’. In Bensitaun, the threat of violence alone got non-Dalits to fall in line, but it was
only effective as long as the threat remained credible. If Binod is right about the fact that
untouchability actually disappeared during the war, this was a disappearance conditioned
by the Maoists’ watchful eyes. What is needed to generate lasting changes such as those
which became cemented in Thabang is repeated, systematic action.
Conclusion
The overall argument in this chapter has been that the war was not successful in getting
rid of caste-based discrimination in Sammagaon and Bensitaun. I have shown that, to the
extent that theMaoists did in fact manage to impose a period duringwhich untouchability
was effectively eliminated in Bensitaun, thiswas only thanks to the threatswhich theymade,
not because of a more deeply rooted change in habits.
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Is this to say that the Maoists made no long-term change for Dalits at all, in the area?
Here, I would like to mitigate such a pessimistic conclusion by returning to the admiration
which Dalits had for the Maoists’ disregard for caste rules. Even if the Maoists did not do
away with untouchability, they provided a powerful and salient example of what a society
without caste-based discrimination might look like.
Binod recognises this, in away. At the end of our interview, he said that even if theMaoists’
vision for society had not been realised, they had at leastmanaged tomake one long-lasting
change. They had, he said, given Dalits a better chetanā—a better consciousness or under-
standing of the injusticeswhich they face.13 Before theMaoists’ intervention, he suggested,
Dalits would not react to discriminatory practices. Although Binod bemoaned the fact that
Dalits were still reluctant to enter other people’s houses, he saw an increasing number of
cases in which Dalits understood that the way in which they are treated is not acceptable.
He named a few such cases, explaining that the present-day Maoists were helping local
Dalits in reporting cases to the police.
Discussing the Indian Prevention of Atrocities act, a piece of legislation that criminalises
extreme forms of violence against Dalits, Shah and Lerche (2018) suggest that
[u]se of the Prevention of Atrocities Act is fraught with problems of implemen-
tation but, in some places, it has helped nurture a climate in which Dalits have
at least something with which to fight back against the caste violence they face
(2018:206).
An (admittedly somewhat unlikely) comparison is possible, here. Like the Indian Preven-
tion of Atrocities Act, the Maoists’ anti-untouchability activities were, arguably, ‘fraught
with problems of implementation’. Still, the ‘something to fight back’ that they have left is
not a piece of legislation, but rather a less defined, albeit not necessarily insignificant, sense
of ethical possibility. They showed that radical change is not necessarily a pipe dream.
Ghimire notes that, in eastern Nepal, the Maoists ‘were never strong enough to establish
an order consistent with their ideology or to turn the district into a showcase for their pro-
13. It is noteworthy that chetanā is the term which Ganga used to describe what people perpetrat-
ing untouchability lack. It is also noteworthy that transforming people’s ‘consciousness’ was one
of the prime aims of the Maoists (Zharkevich 2017:785).
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gramme’ (2013:131), unlike in the west of the country. Instead, in the east, ‘the Maobadi
[Maoist] order was primarily a moral order’ (2013:132). Exactly what Ghimire means by
‘moral order’ is not clear. The quotation is followed by a list of the rules which the Maoists
imposed (prohibiting alcohol consumption, banning gambling, forbidding sexual inter-
course outside of wedlock, etc.), and a little later, by the claim that ‘Maoists proved to
be revolutionaries by imposing the equal treatment of Dalits on a village society that was
totally unprepared for it’ (Ghimire 2013:132-133). Regardless of the exact sense of ‘moral
order’ which Ghimire had in mind, the notion that the Maoists served as an ethical exem-
plar for a society without caste-based discrimination is one which is worth considering.
By showing that it was at least possible to ignore caste rules, to enter houses which one
should not, to get everybody to eat together, the Maoists made an impact and provoked
admiration in most Dalits. They pushed the message that Dalits are like other humans
and gave an example of what acting in line with this proposition could look like. The
Maoists, it seems to me, have helped to expand the space of ethical possibilities in Nepal.
Although untouchability against Dalits has indeed returned, many people, including non-
Dalits, are now at the very least somewhat uncomfortable with it. Dalits and non-Dalits in
Sammagaon often state, in one way or another, that there ought not to be any discrimina-
tion, even if they themselves discriminate. They say that humans are all ‘identical’, that
there is no such thing as caste ‘in reality’.
Hearing similar sentences outside of Thabang, Zharkevich reduces such statements to a
‘theoretical and legal maxim about the equality of people’ which is ‘removed from lived
reality’ (2017:795). This is where I depart from her analysis. In my view, the maxim is
not without significance. It is important not to dismiss the possibility that people who
proclaim it may fail to adhere to it, not because they do not truly believe it, but rather
because they find it diﬀicult to behave accordingly. Why they might find it diﬀicult is the
topic which I will address in the upcoming chapters.
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Contradictions
I havemade several observations so far. First, untouchability hasmostly disappeared from
the public sphere in Sammagon, but it endures in private. Second, Dalits are regularly as-
cribed a cluster of negative properties, chief among which are ignorance and being phys-
ically dirty. Third, the Bishwakarma try to improve their public image through various
strategies, and the Maoist insurgents tried to eliminate untouchability altogether during
the war, but none of these attempts have, ultimately, been fully successful.
This chapter and the next discuss reasons for this lack of success. Here, I bring one major
complication to the ethnographic picture painted so far, namely, the stark differencewhich
exists between implicit and explicit attitudes towards Dalits in my fieldsite.
A discrepancy
There is a discrepancy between how people in Sammagaon say that one ought to behave
and how people do, in fact, behave. To give a sense of this, let me openwith a conversation
which I had with Chini Maya and Sirjana.
This took place, like many conversations, while sipping tea on the porch in front of our
house. It was the month of May; the blazing heat would soon give way to the torrential
rains of the monsoon, when the hard work of plantingmillet would begin, but for the time
being, it was okay to relax and chat away idly. The three of us—Chini Maya, Sirjana, and
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I—had been talking, as we often did, about the way in which the Bishwakarma are treated
by non-Dalits.
Chini Maya told us the story of how she once angrily left a wedding which she had been
invited to. After being served a customary dish of rice and meat, she had been told by
the hosts that she should wash her plate herself. Hearing this, Chini Maya became angry,
threw a fit, and told everybody how indignant she was. She categorically refused to wash
her plate and left immediately. ChiniMaya did not need to explain to us why she had been
so indignant. Both her daughter and I immediately understood that this had happened
because the hosts of thewedding hadwanted to avoid all contact with her jutho—the traces
of saliva that she would have inevitably left on the plate while eating.
By this time in my fieldwork, I had grown accustomed to Chini Maya recounting episodes
such as this. Conceding that there had been considerable positive change in the past
decades when it came to the question of untouchability and the treatment of Dalits in
everyday life, she nevertheless regularly told me that non-Dalits mistreated her and her
kin. She was strongly opposed to this: that she, of all people, had to face such forms of
discrimination despite her husband’s prior employment as a school teacher, a position that,
she felt, warranted high social prestige, only made things worse. To behave in this way, to
treat her as ‘untouchable’, she would tell me, is not something that people should do.
At this point, I decided to ask a provocative question. I gestured towards Sirjana and
asked Chini Maya how she would react if her own daughter were to marry a Darji man.
As explained in chapter 1, the Darji are another Dalit caste, but one which, according to
the traditional model of Nepali society, is ‘lower’ than the Bishwakarma. In fact, not only
are the Darji lower; in the traditional model, the Darji stand in the same relation to the
Bishwakarma as Dalits stand to non-Dalits more generally. Hence, the provocation.
‘Ohno!’ saidChiniMayawith nervous laughter, ‘I’ve told her thismany times: do not bring
back a Sārki or a Dāmai, whatever you do!’—Dāmai is a derogatory but still commonly
used term for the Darji, and the Sārki are the third Dalit caste present in the area.
‘But if she did anyway,’ I asked, ‘would you accept your new son-in-law? Would you let
him into the house?’
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‘No.’
‘What about your grandchildren?’
‘No. I couldn’t accept them either.’
Sirjana, the daughter, had been listening silently so far. She chose this moment to chime
in.
‘That’s it!’ she said, excitedly and looking at me. ‘If this were my house’, she added, ‘I
would let Darji people in’.
Before the conversation turned to another topic, Chini Maya explained, with a touch of
embarrassment in her voice, that the reasonwhy shewould not let the Darji into her house
is that this practice is an ‘old habit’.
What I have just described appears to be a textbook case of what the classic literature on
caste calls ‘replication’, a topic already addressed in chapter 1. But there is more to say
about Chini Maya’s reaction.
Oneway to frame the conversation related abovewould be to say that ChiniMayaperceives
caste and untouchability differently depending on whether she is looking ‘upwards’ (in
which case she is critical) or ‘downwards’ (inwhich case she is accepting). Yet while Chini
Maya is indeed clearly critical of caste-based discrimination when she is on its ‘receiving’
end, it would be a mistake to say that she accepts it when she is on the ‘giving end’. The
reason is that ChiniMaya is in factwell aware that her reaction to the idea that her daughter
might marry a Darji is out of line with what she had just said, less than a minute earlier.
One clue to this is the nervous laughter which she could not stifle when I asked my ques-
tion. Another, more explicit example, is what she said after her daughter had exclaimed
that she would let a Darji into her own house: Chini Maya said that her opposition to a
Darji son-in-law was ‘an old habit’. Yet another indication of Chini Maya’s awareness of
the contradiction in her attitude towards the Darji is something which she had explained
tome earlier that morning (we had been talking about this on and off that day): that while
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she did not like the idea of a Darji coming into her house, what really bothered her was
not so much the Darji person, but rather the fact that ‘others’—and this was a fairly non-
descript ‘other’—would gossip about it. To this she had added that she would let a Darji
into her house if everybody else did too.
I am therefore suggesting that a fruitful way of analysing Chini Maya’s stance on caste
and caste-based discrimination is by separating the ‘normative’ from the ‘actual’. That is,
Chini Maya genuinely feels that caste-based discrimination ought to be eliminated, but
she finds it diﬀicult to bring her own behaviour and reactions to the Darji in line with
this ideal. This is at the heart of the discrepancy which I wish to address in this chapter:
why is it that people who believe caste-based discrimination should be eliminated may
nevertheless find it diﬀicult to behave accordingly?
Before trying to answer this question, I need to make another crucial point. The dis-
crepancy I have just mentioned is not limited to the case of ‘higher’ Dalits discriminat-
ing against ‘lower’ Dalits, but generalises to the case of non-Dalits discriminating against
Dalits. This is because, in Sammagaon, a large number of non-Dalits also say, often spon-
taneously, that they are opposed to caste-based discrimination. And yet, like Chini Maya,
they do not behave in ways that are consistent with their assertion.
An ‘ethic of castelessness’
Recall the very opening of this thesis, the episode in which Ganga said that ‘Dalits used
to be untouchable but are not any more.’ This is but one example of a wider phenomenon
whereby Dalits and non-Dalits regularly aﬀirm that caste does not or should not exist, that
it is not real, and that Dalits should not be treated differently to other people.
Consider for example the following excerpts from an interview that I conducted in Bensi-
taun with an ageing upper-caste Bahun woman called Dana Ghimire. We had been talk-
ing about the differences between the way Dalits were treated in the past and today. More
specifically, the passage quoted below is about whether coming in contact with a Dalit can
lead to an upper-caste person like her losing her caste status by becoming ritually polluted.
As mentioned earlier, the possibility of such a loss is expressed colloquially as ‘jāt jancha’
(‘caste goes away’).
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IvanDeschenaux: I still haven’t quite understood this old custom. I still haven’t
quite understood this thing about caste going away. What is the meaning of
this?
Dana Ghimire: The thing about caste going away?
ID: Yes, what is the meaning of this? Please give an example.
DG: An example? Caste goes away…One couldn’t do things in certainways. If
you touched this or that person, there was this custom, this old custom accord-
ing to which ‘my caste goes away’. Now… In today’s… A long time ago there
was this practice—[one used to say to Dalits: ] ‘Hey! You can’t touch [me].
Hey! Sit over there.’ Through touch, it was said that untouchability (chuvach-
hut)’ [occured]. ‘There, go far away, go over there!’ One also used to put one’s
own children far away. One used to say: ‘It’s not okay to stay here, close to the
fire. You can’t touch this. Don’t touch the rice!’ This was a custom in the old
tradition. But now, caste, rice—I see none of this myself. In today’s customs,
there is no such thing. And this is the example I [want to] give. Before, there
was this old custom. Now, in the new custom, there is no caste, nothing.
Admittedly, this passage is not the clearest explanation of jāt jancha. Others explained to
me the fundamental idea behind this expression, which is that inappropriate contact with
a Dalit could lead to one becoming ‘like a Dalit’ oneself. I will return to this in chapter
9. The reason I reproduce Dana’s explanation here is her insistence that caste and ritual
pollution belong in the past. Most striking is the final sentence, ‘Now, in the new custom,
there is no caste, nothing’.
An ageing widow, Dana proclaimed that she had had a very diﬀicult life. Her husband
had died thirty-five years earlier. In line with Hindu prescriptions, she had never remar-
ried. Having given birth to no son, after her daughters married and left the house, she had
to make do on her own. I had naively suspected that this woman—who had lived by tradi-
tional Hindu prescriptions at a significant personal cost—would also endorse traditional
notions of ritual pollution. I was entirely wrong.
DG:What I now say is this: Where [inside of a person] is this thing called caste
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situated? [Try to] show it to me! To eat or not to eat [at a Dalit’s house], this is
a matter of personal preference, is it not?
ID: Yes.
DG: If you wish to do so, then eat there. If you do not wish to, then don’t. No
one will take any notice. Where is caste? Is it tied by the thread [the sacred
thread upper-castes wear under their clothes]? Where does it hang? I also say
this. This is how it is… Where is it? What caste? There is no such thing! We
are just [physical] things. If you cut us we bleed.
Dana’s words are clear. Far from endorsing the ‘old custom’ in which contact with Dalits
was seen as defiling and could lead to loss of caste status, she explains that there simply
is no such thing as caste to begin with, that caste is not real. This suggestion is one which I
encountered time and again in the field. It is central towhat I call the ‘ethic of castelessness’
which has emerged in Sammagaon and Nepal more generally, in which a notion of shared
humanity takes precedence over divisions by caste. This ethic is commonly expressed in
at least three ways.
1. Blood. Similarly to what some Newar interlocutors told Parish (1996:54ff.), many of
the people whom I talked to attributed great significance to the fact that all humans
have the same kind of blood. There are two ways in which this is usually expressed.
One is by stating that regardless of caste or ethnicity, if a person’s skin is cut, they
will bleed. The other is by attracting attention to the fact that everybody’s blood is
the same colour, red.
2. Non-divine nature of caste. People regularly explained to me that caste is something
that was made by humans (mānavle banaeko) rather than the gods. Although not
always stated explicitly, the implication is that caste is not a ‘cosmological’ or ‘deep’
reality. Some added that castewas created by humans to create divisionswhere none
exist in reality. This statement, it is worth noting, goes explicitly against a widely
known myth of origin in which the origin of caste is divine. In the latter, the four
varna (wide, encompassing caste groups) emerged from four different body parts of
the god Brahma: Brahmans with the head, Kshatriyas with the arms, Vaishyas with
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the thighs, and Shudras with the feet.1 This supposed divine origin of caste was
known to many of my interlocutors in Sammagaon; those who mentioned it usually
dismissed it, occasionally adding that the myth itself had been written by humans.
3. Only two castes. Finally, the ethic of castelessness is expressed through a statement
which many people, including many non-Dalits, make repeatedly: ‘There are only
two castes—men andwomen’. (The term ‘jāt’ is used for ‘caste’ here, so the statement
could equally be rendered as ‘there are only two kinds of people: men and women.’)
Some people say that they learnt this statement in school, while others say that it
was the Maoist insurgents who taught it to them during the 1996–2006 People’s War.
One of the rarementions of this statement in existing literature is in an article on heal-
ing in Hyderabad (Flueckiger 1997). There, the author interprets the sentence as an
expression of women’s unity across Hinduism and Islam.2 In Sammagaon, the gen-
dered aspects of the statement go unquestioned. That men and women are different
kinds of humans is taken for granted. My occasional attempts to suggest that this
might be false, that men and women are the same because they are both ‘human’,
was met either with amusement or mild curiosity, but nobody seemed convinced.
Thus, proclaiming that ‘there are only two castes’ in Sammagaon is a way to oppose
the idea that there are more than two castes; it says that humans are divided only by
sex, not by caste.
Explaining the discrepancy
The remaining sections of this chapter are an attempt to come to termswith the discrepancy
between the ethic of castelessness and the ongoing stigmatisation of Dalits. I propose a
number of explanations.3 These are plausible explanations that I contemplated during
fieldwork and in the process of writing this thesis; I do not attribute them to anyone in
particular.
1. Here I use the Indian terms for the varnas, as these are commonly used when relating the
myth. For Nepali equivalents and differences, see chapter 1.
2. Roberts (2016:82) also mentions an interlocutor, in a slum in Chennai, stating that there are
only two castes, men and women. The author does not dwell on the statement at length.
3. To avoid cumbersome formulations, I will speak of discrimination exercised by non-Dalits
upon Dalits here. All of what I say applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case of ‘higher’ Dalits discrimi-
nating against ‘lower’ ones.
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Berliner has recently made the following call:
For anthropologists, I believe, it is time to bring back ambivalent statements,
contradictory attitudes, incompatible values, and emotional internal clashes
as research objects. It is also essential to outline a typology of different con-
tradictions as well as to explore the cognitive, emotional, and social processes
through which they are rendered possible in human lives. In particular, it is
worth investigating how actors themselves live with and justify their contradic-
tory thoughts and behaviour. (Berliner in Berliner et al. 2016:5–6)
The rest of this chapter can be read as one attempt to respond to this call and, in the process,
develop a better understanding of why caste-based discrimination endures.
Self-interested restraint
The first explanation suggests that the ethic of castelessness is a façade, an idea which non-
Dalits pay lip service to but do not truly believe. When non-Dalits refrain from treating
Dalits as untouchable in public, the explanation suggests, they are exercising deliberate
and conscious control over their actions. They do so either because they are pressured to
or out of self-interest, in order to secure a positive public image. Conversely the reason
untouchability continues to prevail in homes and in the domestic sphere is that, in such
environments, non-Dalits can relax the control that they exercise on their self-presentation;
they can, provocatively speaking, show their ‘true colours’.
An ageing but useful piece of sociological theory comes to mind. In his The Presentation
of the Everyday Life, Goffman (1971[1959]) develops what has come to be known as ‘dra-
maturgy’ or ‘dramaturgical analysis’. He suggests that people act differently according
to the social setting in which they find themselves at any given time. When people face
‘audiences’—which is to say when people interact with others—and especially when they
do so in public settings, they put up a ‘front’. That is, they exercise deliberate control over
their behaviour, suppressing inclinations which they might otherwise have, in order to
project positive images of themselves.
A different but also relevant theoretical framing can be found in Swidler’s ‘tool kit’ ap-
proach to culture (1986). This approach was constructed as an intervention in a debate on
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the causal power of ‘culture’. Here, however, I am only interested in one specific aspect of
the approach, namely, the proposition that culture provides a ‘repertoire’ which individu-
als can draw upon strategically and with flexibility. Particularly relevant is her suggestion
that
[c]ulture provides the materials fromwhich individuals and groups construct
strategies of action. Such cultural resources are diverse, however, and normally
groups and individuals call upon these resources selectively, bringing to bear
different styles and habits of action in different situations (1986:280).
The ethic of castelessness might operate as one element in a wider cultural repertoire,
which non-Dalits only call upon in public, for strategic reasons.
Why would paying lip service to castelessness and refraining from practising untoucha-
bility in public amount to projecting a positive image of oneself? The answer lies in the
specific ideology of modernity that is prevalent in Nepal. As other researchers have noted,
‘it is taken for granted by almost everyone in Nepal that Nepal wants to be modern, what-
ever that means and whatever it might imply’ (Gellner, Hausner, and Letizia 2016:25).
The point to underline here is that modernity is always imagined as devoid of caste-based
discrimination.
Nepali imaginations of modernity have been the topic of a number of studies (see e.g.
Liechty 2003). One of the clearest points to come out of these studies is that modernity is
always tied to ‘development’. For example, Stacey Pigg (1992, 1996) argues that the most
important effects of international development inNepal are notwhat its practitionerswant
when they start their projects. Instead, they are the way in which development is inter-
preted by ordinary Nepali citizens, as ‘bikās’, the Nepali term for development. Bikās itself
is tied to material things: irrigation systems, access to electricity, roads, bridges, schools,
health posts, specific varieties of crops, etc. Because it is tied to things and because such
things are not present equally in different locations, a strong opposition emerges between
placeswhich have bikās and thosewhich do not. At amacroscopic level, Nepal itself is seen
as a country with low bikās, in comparison with others. At a smaller scale, within Nepal it-
self, urban centres and chiefly Kathmandu have bikās, but rural areas such as Sammagaon
do not.
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There are two more points explored by Pigg. One is that, inherent in the ideology of bikās
is a normative project of modernization: bikās should be brought to the places and people
who do not have it. The other is that bikās itself is tied to a form of unitary nationalism.
This nationalism has a normative effect on personhood: the things which make Nepalis
different from each other—for example caste or ethnicity—are to be silenced or muted in
favour of an ideology in which people are Nepali before they are anything else. However,
even as it creates a unitary nationalist identity, the idea of bikās simultaneously propagates
new social divisions between people. This is because the separation between places which
have bikās and places which do not is mapped onto the inhabitants of these places, and this
creates a powerful social dichotomy between people who are ‘developed’ and people who
are not. City-dwelling citizens who go through higher education and get paid jobs are
bikāsi people; illiterate, village-dwelling subsistence farmers are not.
Despite major political changes in Nepal, this last point, the division between ‘developed’
and ‘not-developed’ citizens remains strikingly relevant today. As Pigg explains in her
1996 paper, others have noted subsequently (Skinner and Holland 1996; Skinner, Valsiner,
andHolland 2001; Caddell 2005), and as I observed countless timesmyself, this distinction
continues to be used to categorise people, in particular in relation to their level of formal
education.
This has implications for caste and caste-based discrimination because one aspect of being
‘developed’, according to how development is imagined in Nepal, is precisely to profess
one’s opposition to caste-based discrimination. Pigg linked this to the unitary, and there-
fore casteless, nationalism of the Panchayat political period. While nationalist sentiment is
still strong in the country today, the nation is no longer conceived of in the same way. The
national ideal in Nepal is now resolutely pluralist, as evident, for example, in the fact that
the 2015 Constitution promotes one ‘oﬀicial’ national language but recognises all mother
tongues as ‘languages of the nation’ (Nepal LawCommission 2015:art. 6). The new plural-
ism is also visible, for example, in the first line of the national anthem,which, asmentioned
earlier, states that Nepal is a single garland made of hundreds of different flowers. Yet this
new nationalism, if anything, portrays caste-based discrimination as even more unaccept-
able than it was during its unitary predecessor, whose single model of the Nepali citizen
was in fact modelled on the upper-caste hill population. The new, plural conception of the
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nation places a strong emphasis on inclusivity, and the equal treatment of all the differ-
ent groups which compose the Nepali population. Consequently, today more than ever,
to treat Dalits as untouchable or otherwise defiling is seen as distinctly retrograde, and
antithetic to modernity.
Coming back tomy original point, one reason non-Dalits might say that they oppose caste-
based discrimination even if they do not really mean it is to appear ‘modern’ and ‘devel-
oped’, to avoid falling on the wrong side of the social dichotomy created by the Nepali ide-
ology of development. What happens at home, however, reflects people’s ‘truer’, ‘deeper’
beliefs. In the same line, practising untouchability in public is not only distinctly un-
modern, but oﬀicially reprehensible. Though its implementation is still lacklustre, a legal
framework is progressively being set in place by the Nepali government to punish those
who treat Dalits as untouchable in public, and this framework has been made known to
the Nepali population through a number of campaigns (see figure 6.1).
Is adhering to the ethic of castelessnessmerely a strategicmode of self-presentation? While
this explanation has its strengths, I do not think that, on its own, it is adequate.
Its main shortcoming is that it underestimates how powerful and pervasive the modernist
ideology actually is. Nepalis encounter it almost daily in themedia, at school, inNGOs and
in countless other ways. So pervasive is the ideology that it seems unlikely that Nepalis
would just use it strategically—simply to appear modern—while maintaining a critical
distance from it in their hearts. It is far more plausible that they do, in fact, take its ideals
on board, to an extent at least. And indeed, it is not unusual to get the sense that peo-
ple are being sincere and they genuinely disapprove of caste-based discrimination despite
contributing to it.
In sum, while one can point to strategic reasons why people might state that they are
opposed to caste-based discrimination without really meaning it, this way of proceeding
does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. An alternative approach, to
which I now turn, is to stop doubting the sincerity of the people who state that Dalits
should be treated like everyone else. From this perspective, what needs to be explained is
no longer why people say things they do not really mean, but rather, why they fail to act
in accordance with what they say.
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Figure 6.1: A poster hanging in the centre of Sahu Bajar referring to the “Caste-based
Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act” which became part
of Nepali law in 2011. Next to the photograph of a pair of hands in handcuffs, messages
state that caste-based discrimination and untouchability are now a crime punishable by
emprisonment, and that anybody witnessing such behaviour should report it to the police
or to district authorities.
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Coordination problems
Consider the following examples:
First, from the conversation related at the beginning of this chapter, Chini Maya says that
the reason why she will not let a Darji man into her house is that it is ‘an old habit’. Earlier
that day, she had explained that she would let in a Darji man if others did the same.
Second, my adoptive sister, on another occasion, explains to me that it is in one’s home
village that one faces the strongest level of caste-based discrimination. She says that when
she goes to other villages, she can enter other people’s houses and eat there without too
much diﬀiculty. Her explanation is that what people are really afraid of is not that they
will be contaminated by the presence of a Dalit in their house or by eating food cooked by
a Dalit. What they fear is that if they are seen doing such things, their own kin and friends will
start gossiping about them. When non-Dalits host a Dalit who comes from far away, the kin
and friends will not know that the person is a Dalit, so it is not a problem.
Third, an anecdote fromwhen Iwas conducting a small household survey, accompanied by
a non-Dalitmanwho converted to Christianitymany years ago. In the survey, I ask various
questions, some of which concern intercaste marriage. The non-Dalit man spontaneously
tells me that he would let his daughter marry a Dalit only ‘if Christianity were to win in this
place first’. He explains that it is only under such conditions that his daughter would not
face severe ostracism for such a marriage.
Fourth, I regularly ask young non-Dalits whether they would ever consider marrying a
Dalit. While the answers vary, several say that doing so would not be a problem for them, but
that it would for their parents. Others say that they would avoid such a marriage because of
the ostracism which their parents and kin would submit them to.
Fifth, an excerpt from an interviewwith Ganga. We had been discussing the fact that even
the very few upper castes who will secretly eat food at Ganga’s house, such as a Chhetri
school teacher called Umesh, will nevertheless not let Ganga into their own houses.
Ivan Deschenaux: For example, right, Umesh-sir4 comes here and eats…
4. It is common to add this as a suﬀix to school teachers’ names.
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Ganga Dehegli: …but he does not let us enter his house.
ID: Yes, this. Do you know why this happens?
GD: This is because, if he lets us in, society (samāj, the meaning here could also
be ‘his caste’ rather than ‘society’ at large) will mock him [by saying] ‘He let a
small caste in!’ This is why it’s fine for him to come to my house and eat, but it
is not okay for me to enter his.
What is common in all these examples is a deflection of responsibility. People who effec-
tively reproduce caste-based discrimination do so because of others, not out of their own
volition. It is what ‘others’ might think or do which is the problem. These examples are
not exceptional; this deflection of responsibility for one’s own discriminatory behaviour
against Dalits is very common.
When I first encountered this kind of reasoning, my initial reaction was to assume that
this was just a case of denying one’s responsibility in the maintenance of an undesirable
social phenomenon. I came to think of the issue differently towards the end of my field-
work, when I conducted extensive interviews with Dalit–non-Dalit married couples in
Kathmandu. Suchmarriages, inmanyways, represent the ultimate violation of traditional
caste rules. In these interviews, spouses often explained that they had to break off com-
pletely or almost completely with the kin of the non-Dalit spouse. The non-Dalit spouse
would often be disowned by their relatives. They would lose the support, financial and
otherwise, of their own kin. Thus, the social consequences of marrying a Dalit, for a non-
Dalit, can be high. On hearing such stories, I realised that there may be some truth to
the idea that non-Dalits, in some cases, ‘fall in line’ with caste rules even if they disagree
with them, out of fear of the repercussions which they might face otherwise. Intercaste
marriage is undoubtedly an extreme case, but a similar mechanism might be at play in
others. The fear of one’s kin ‘gossiping’ if one were to eat with a Dalit or let a Dalit into
one’s house may initially seem inconsequential, but it is not so. This is because ijjat, ‘social
prestige’ or ‘honour’, is something which matters to people. The loss of ijjat is feared, and
one of the quickest ways of losing it is precisely gossip and backbiting by one’s own kin.
How might we understand this more formally? It so happens that philosophers have a
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term for situations such as the one which I am describing. They call them ‘coordination
problems’ (for an overview see Chwe 2001). Formally defined, a coordination problem is
a situation in which individuals will behave in a certain way if and only if they have the
assurance that others will behave in the same way.
With this in mind, think back to Chini Maya when she says that she will let in the Darji
if others also do so. Think back also to the Christian non-Dalit who says that he will let
his daughter marry a Dalit only if everybody else becomes Christian in the area. Such
situations fit well under the formal definition of a coordination problem.
Coordination problems are interesting because they offer insights intowhatmight prevent
ethical change. They show why, in some cases, a behaviour that many people individu-
ally believe to be unethical may nevertheless persist. What is missing in a coordination
problem for the behaviour judged unethical to stop occurring is—as the name suggests—
coordination. If a large number of people judge a common behaviour to be unethical, but
will only stop behaving in that way if everybody else does, then what is needed for the
behaviour to be eliminated is a mechanism which ensures that everybody will cease to
behave in that way at the same time.
There is a body of literature which suggests that some historical shifts in ethical norms
are best understood as solutions to coordination problems. For example, one highly-cited
study by Mackie (1996), a political scientist, discusses the end of footbinding in China.
This practice, as Mackie puts it, ‘lasted a thousand years but ended in a single generation’.
This rapid end to the practice leads Mackie to reject the so-called ‘modernization view’,
according to which a shift towards modernist ideology led to the abandonment of foot-
binding. Omitting the details of his argument, his central claim is that, regardless of its
origins, once footbinding was perceived as a requisite for a good marriage, it became a
self-enforcing practice. While both men and women might have preferred a social con-
vention in which footbinding was not required for marriage, individual women were still
submitted to the practice because of the fact that, if any individualwoman did not undergo
footbinding, she would not be married to a ‘good’ husband. It is thus entirely possible to
live in a world where footbinding is the norm, to disagree with this norm, and yet feel
compelled to bind girls’ feet because of the costs in terms of marital opportunities if one
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does not.
What is required to ‘switch’, so to speak, from a situation in which footbinding is the norm
to one in which it is not is coordinated action by many individuals. In his analysis, Mackie
suggests that one key factor in ending footbindingwas the creation of associations inwhich
people pledged not to bind the feet of their daughters and not to allow their sons tomarry a
woman with bound feet. Such associations created alternative marriage markets in which
not binding the feet of one’s daughter did not amount to ruining hermarital prospects. The
success of such associations was key to the subsequent rapid abandonment of footbinding
by the rest of society.
I have suggested that enduring caste-based discrimination in Nepal might be understood
as a coordination problem. To see why, one must take very seriously the claim that non-
Dalits continue to ostracise Dalits because of what others would think about them other-
wise. We would face a genuine coordination problem—and consequently, untouchability
would be nomore than a self-enforcing convention—if the majority of non-Dalits only pre-
vent Dalits from entering their house (for example) because otherswould reprimand them
for doing so. And we would face a genuine coordination problem if the majority of non-
Dalits actually wanted to stop treating Dalits as untouchable, but none of them wanted to
do so alone.
What is compelling about this interpretation is that it provides an explanation of how it
is possible to get ‘stuck’ in a situation where people do something which they otherwise
judge unethical. Beyond this, however, reducing the ongoing stigmatisation of Dalits in
Nepal to a simple matter of coordination is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because,
in the recent history of Nepal, there have been multiple attempts at coordinating an end
to the mistreatment of Dalits, yet none of these have had the effect of rapidly eliminating
the problem in the way that they should have, were we actually just facing a coordination
problem.
Themost remarkable and sustained attempt at coordinating an end to caste-based discrim-
ination came with the ‘cultural revolution’ that the Nepali Maoist insurgents attempted to
conduct in Nepal during the 1996–2006 people’s War, and which I have addressed in chap-
ter 5. During the War, the Maoists organised various events in which they made people
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explicitly violate caste-based avoidances and rules of untouchability. In addition, they
threatened to severely punish people who practised untouchability. The effect of all this
was that untouchability was indeed drastically reduced. Once the war was over, however,
many of the practices which had subsided during the conflict returned. This indicates that
these practices were not merely self-enforcing, but rather, had an external cause.
Here, we have a remarkable difference between the case of footbinding in China and that
of caste-based discrimination inNepal. According toMackie, the Chinese anti-footbinding
associations provided an example of a different way of doing things. Once others saw that
this was in fact a better way, they quickly adopted it. The same is not true of untouchabil-
ity in Nepal: while the Maoists did provide an example of a different way of doing things,
rapid adoption did not follow. We must therefore rule out the ‘coordination problem’ ex-
planation for ongoing discrimination.
Implicit and explicit social ontologies
I have now offered two candidate explanations for the discrepancy between what people
in Sammagaon say about caste-based discrimination—that it should stop—and what they
do—continue to practise it. These two explanations differ in a fundamental way. The first
gives primacy to what people do. It suggests that what really matters is that non-Dalits
continue to discriminate against Dalits; in contrast what non-Dalits say can be dismissed
as a matter of inconsequential lip service paid to an idea of modernity. The second inter-
pretation does the opposite. It considers that what non-Dalits say is what really matters.
Non-Dalits saying they should give up discrimination is the important point, and the fact
that they do not can be explained as a simple lack of coordinated action. Each explanation
also gives primacy to a specific social ontology. If we focus on what people do, we come
to the conclusion that what Nepalis ‘really believe’ is that Dalits are indeed fundamentally
different from other humans (dirty, lowly, etc.). If we focus on what people say, we come
to the conclusion that what Nepalis ‘really believe’ is that Dalits are the same as everybody
else.
Given that neither of these explanations is satisfactory, what is needed is a non-eliminative
account. That is, we need an account which accepts that non-Dalits can be sincere about
their opposition to caste-based discrimination and simultaneously fail to live up to this op-
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position. This must also be an account in which which Nepalis can ‘really believe’ two
contradictory social ontologies simultaneously.
The fact that people hold contradictory beliefs is well-established in anthropology. In fact,
in the article quoted earlier, Berliner argues that contradiction is a quintessential aspect of
the human condition (Berliner et al. 2016). Beyond such general observations, however,
there is much to be learned by analysing how humans hold contradictory beliefs. In the
case of caste-based discrimination in Sammagaon, I will argue the contradictory beliefs are
best understood as resulting from a difference in implicit and explicit mental representa-
tions. Although non-Dalits subscribe to an ‘explicit’ theory of society in which everybody
is equal, they nevertheless maintain an ‘implicit’ view—uponwhich they exercise less con-
scious control—according to which this is not the case. To make this point, a comparison
to racial prejudice is useful.
In the sub-field of psychology concerned with social cognition, a large number of stud-
ies have focused on the topic of race and racial prejudice in the USA. A common claim
in this literature is that, in the American context, racial prejudice has not so much been
eliminated as ‘driven underground’ (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986). This transformation of
prejudice was, in no small measure, effected by historical transformations in the second
half of twentieth century:
The world was still reeling from the events of the Second World War in which
unspeakable atrocities were perpetrated against Jews because they were Jews.
The Holocaust, largely viewed as a crime against humanity, led many Ameri-
cans to seriously question the morality of group-based prejudice. How could
the nation fight against such crimes against humanity while, on its own soil,
entire groups of people were denied rights and opportunities because of their
skin color? Quite simply, theAmerican Creed, although revered in the abstract,
was being violated in practice. (Devine 2005:328)
This general context and the nascent Civil Rights Movement gave rise to a cultural and po-
litical climate in which it became increasingly unacceptable for white Americans to show
open prejudice against black Americans and other minorities. The word ‘open’ in the
previous sentence, is key. Allport’s seminal study of prejudice (1979[1954]) argued that
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norms of equality—the ‘American Creed’—did not suﬀice to eliminate prejudice. Such
norms could, under the right circumstances, make people aware of their own prejudice,
but this awareness alone was not suﬀicient for them to rid themselves of prejudice alto-
gether. ‘Defeated intellectually’, Allport concluded, ‘prejudice lingers emotionally’ (All-
port 1979[1954]:328).
Allport’s separation of the ‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ components of prejudice suggests
an early version of what contemporary cognitive science calls a ‘dual-process’ model of
social cognition. The basic tenet of dual-process models is that human cognition com-
prises two distinct and somewhat independent types of information processing, which
are generally referred to as ‘type-1’ and ‘type-2’. Type-1 processes are more automatic,
rapid, affective, and unconscious, whereas type-2 processes tend to be more controlled,
slow, deliberate, reflective, and conscious. It is often assumed that the two types of infor-
mation processing operate in different parts of the brain, and there is some neuroscientific
evidence for this proposition (Lieberman 2007). A common hypothesis, albeit empirically
hard to verify, is that type-1 processes are evolutionarily prior to type-2 processes. All-
port’s description of ongoing ‘emotional’ prejudice in the face of its ‘intellectual’ rejection
fits the dual-process model. Type-1 processes can continue to sustain prejudice in an in-
dividual even when that individual adopts the explicit, reasoned (type-2) belief that prej-
udice is undesirable. In Allport’s own terms, ‘self-insight [the conscious realisation that
one is prejudiced] … does not automatically cure prejudice’ (Allport 1979[1954]:328).
Thanks in part to the publication of a widely popular book by psychologist and be-
havioural economist Daniel Kahneman (2011), dual-process models have become very
popular in a range of disciplines, especially in the study of social cognition.5 These
models are widely believed to depict human cognitive activity more accurately than those
which do not admit of two distinct types of information processing. This is the case, in
no small measure, because they provide an elegant and somewhat unifying explanation
for a vast array of empirical observations that would be hard to explain otherwise.
Their consequences for anthropology, however, are still sorely under-examined. This
5. In fact, they have become so common and all-encompassing in social psychology that some of
their early proponents have called for caution and increased precision in their application (Evans
and Stanovich 2013). While this call for prudence is important, anthropology arguably needsmore
attention to dual-process models, not less.
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is unfortunate. As Lizardo et al (2016:287) argue, traditional social sciences such as
sociology—and, I add, anthropology—have much to gain from attending to dual-process
models of the mind. A case in point is a well-cited article by Vaisey (2009), a sociologist
who convincingly argues that dual-process theories of human cognition provide a
credible foundation for the ‘theory of practice’ famously put forth by Bourdieu (1977).
In my view, another advantage of attending to dual-process models is that they provide
an empirically grounded, cognitively sound explanation for the difference between what
people say and what they do. They can therefore account for the discrepancy between
the ethic of castelessness and ongoing discrimination in Sammagaon.
Allport’s description of racial and other forms of prejudice inmid-twentieth centuryAmer-
ica is one according to which prejudice subsided in many people’s consciously articulated,
ethical views, but lingered on at a lower, less conscious, affective level. I believe this de-
scription carries over to Sammagaon. Allport did suggest that some individuals could suc-
cessfully rid themselves of prejudice altogether; he also recognised that others remain fully
and openly prejudiced. Most, however, fell somewhere between these two poles. Thus,
white Americans developed what Allport called ‘prejudice with compunction’. They ex-
perienced ‘inner conflict’—a mismatch between the values they explicitly subscribed to
and their more automatic and prejudiced inclinations.6
Allport’s notion of ‘prejudice with compunction’ captures an important aspect of everyday
caste-based discrimination in Sammagaon. Indeed, the situation which I have described
in this chapter is one in which caste-based discrimination is now recognised by a large
number of people, Dalits and non-Dalits, as unethical. People nevertheless continue to
behave in discriminatory ways, even if they know and openly state that they should not.
Chini Maya’s nervous laughter and excuses after saying that she would not tolerate a Darji
son-in-law are a perfect example of prejudice with compunction.
It goes without saying that the historical and political trajectories of the USA and of Nepal
are very different, so we must be wary of pushing too far any comparison between the
two. Nevertheless, with regards specifically to the increasing unacceptability of prejudice
6. The notion of ‘prejudice with compunction’, which Allport had advanced on the basis of only
anecdotal evidence, was later submitted to more rigorous experimental analysis by a number of
researchers (e.g. Devine et al. 1991).
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towards minorities, some parallels can be drawn. Devine, in the passage quoted earlier,
suggests that it is the ‘American Creed’ combined with macroscopic geopolitical changes
that made prejudice unacceptable in the USA in the 1950s. Nepal has undergone rapid
historical transformations in the past decades, which cumulatively have transformed the
‘appropriate’ way of thinking about caste. The 1950s marked the end of the autocratic
Rana regime and a prolonged period of political isolationism. Caste-based discrimina-
tion went from an institution sanctioned by the state to a practice first illegal and, much
more recently, criminalised. The social movements of the 1990s set the stage for the plu-
ralistic understanding of the nation state which is currently predominant. The 1996–2006
‘People’s War’ put an end to the Hindu monarchy. The result of all these macroscopic
transformations was a change in national ideology and a concurrent shift in cultural and
ethical norms. Untouchability and discrimination against Dalits is now quite generally
recognised as unethical and immoral.
Yet this shift in public ethical norms has not led to the end of discrimination. Untouchabil-
ity has not been eliminated, but merely retreated to specific, more private settings. Here
again, a striking parallel can be drawn with Allport’s observations on racial prejudice in
the USA:
One may feel quite free to damn a minority group within his family, club, or
neighborhood gathering, but will inhibit the tendency when a member of that
group is present. (Allport 1979[1954]:332–333)
Allport cites the following passage from a student essay on the topic ‘My ExperienceWith,
and Attitudes Toward, Minority Groups in America’:
Althoughprejudice is unethical, I know I shall always haveprejudices. I believe
in goodwill toward the Negro, but I shall never invite him to my house for
dinner. Yes, I know I’m a hypocrite. (Allport 1979[1954]:327)
The same tension, between proclaiming that prejudice is immoral but nevertheless refusing
to let a member of the discriminated group in one’s house is evident in Sammagaon now. Dana,
the upper-caste woman who so explicitly told me that untouchability was a phenomenon
of the past, later admitted that she had never eaten with a Dalit nor let one into her house.
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Neither she nor others, however, explicitly called themselves ‘hypocrites’.
The similar way in which prejudice operates in two very different historical and cultural
contexts, for two different minorities (black Americans and Nepali Dalits) is noteworthy.
I have suggested that there are some high-level, overarching similarities in the historical
trajectories of the two countries. These similarities partly explain why explicit, public eth-
ical norms shunning discrimination eventually emerged in both contexts after prolonged
histories of systemic oppression, but what explains ongoing discriminatory behaviour af-
ter these norms emerge? What high-level historical convergence might cause similarity at
this microscopic, interpersonal level? One explanation, I suggest, invokes a more obvious
commonality of the USA and Nepal than overarching historical trajectories, namely, the
fact both countries are inhabited by humans, and that all humans share the same cogni-
tive properties. Implicit cognitive biases are one among other factors which make ethical
standards hard to live up to.7
I propose that the ongoing discrimination against Dalits in Nepal is, in no small part, due
to ongoing implicit representations of Dalits. In the next chapter, I will argue that it is
psychological essentialism, a well-documented aspect of human cognition, which makes
people maintain an implicit representation of Dalits specifically as a ‘different kind of hu-
man’. In themeantime, let me offer a different, more general theoretical framing of implicit
representations which encompasses what I have in mind.
I find such a framing in the notion of alief, a concept put forth by philosopher Tamar
Gendler (see esp. 2008a, 2008b). The word ‘alief’ is a neologism; it refers to a mental
state which is analogous to belief, but which is ‘associative, automatic and arational’ and
‘typically also affect-laden and action generating’ (Gendler 2008a:641).
A paradigmatic alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is
representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated—consciously
or nonconsciously—by features of the subject’s internal or ambient environ-
ment. Aliefs may be either occurent or dispositional. (Gendler 2008a:642)
The concept is purposefully wide-ranging, Gendler’s aim being to provide an overarching
concept for all the mental states which are not, or not-quite beliefs, but which neverthe-
7. Note that I say ‘hard’ to live up to, not impossible. Biases can and should be alleviated.
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less cause behaviour. Some of the examples of aliefs which Gendler discusses are quite
different from the implicit social representation which I discuss here. Thus, her basic ex-
amples include a hypothetical movie-goer who screams during a scary scene or a sports
fan shouting at the TV to encourage the players (Gendler 2008b:552–553). Gendler notes
that in such cases, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the movie-goer believes that
they are in danger or that the sports fan believes that shouting at the TV can truly influence
the match. Instead, the representation which pushes them to behave in this way is an alief.
It is a mental state to whose content they would not, upon reflection, ascribe truth-value,
but which they nevertheless have, and they behave as if its content were true. Results from
empirical psychology, in particular experiments conducted by Paul Rozin, form another
class of examples which Gendler suggests can only be accounted for with a notion of alief.
Importantly, uncontrolled biases against social groups are a third category which Gendler
also classes as ‘aliefs’ (2008b:553).
To think of the widespread negative representation of Dalits in Sammagaon as a matter of
alief is useful because of Gendler’s discussion of norm-discordant alief. Gendler suggests
that ‘introducing the notion of alief into our descriptive repertoire provides a useful alter-
native way of answering “why?” questions when confronted with a behavior or tendency
that we seek to explain’ (2008b:555). Both belief and alief can have motivational power. In
many cases, belief and alief are concordant, which is to say they might motivate one and
the same behaviour. When this is the case, no issue arises. However, there are also many
cases in which belief and alief are discordant. When this is the case, the behaviour of an
individual becomes diﬀicult or impossible to explain by referring only to that individual’s
beliefs; instead, one must also refer to that individual’s aliefs.
Gendler notes that the concept of alief is not meant to describe a precise set of neural states.
Its purpose is mainly heuristic:
I am not claiming that alief has a localized substrate, or that it is associated
with distinctive neural firing patterns, or that it can be selectively inhibited, or
whatever other criterion you think is required for something to be included in
our ‘mature science’ of the mind. Rather, I am claiming that it is of explanatory
utility: it helps us make sense of things. (2008b:557)
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This heuristic character makes the concept particularly appropriate for use in anthropo-
logical interpretation. The alief is specific enough that it allows us to re-think how we
describe the causes of certain behaviour (as I am doing here with caste-based discrimi-
nation in Nepal), but not so precise that it necessarily requires methods going beyond
traditional ethnography and participant observation. In this regard, it is not unlike the
oft-used notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1977), but a main advantage which it provides over
this is that it admits, as Gendler notes, both acquired and innate origins, and it is not tied
to a specific theory of enculturation.
My ethnographic observations in Nepal become easy to account for using the notion of
alief. The ethic of castelessness is part of people’s consciously held beliefs. From it emerge
certain norms, in particular that according to which one ought not to treat Dalits as un-
touchable. The reason that people do not behave in line with this is a norm-discordant
alief, a less conscious, less controlled mental state analogous to belief which stands in con-
tradiction with the ethic of castelessness, and according to which Dalits are fundamentally
different.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that there has been an important shift in beliefs about Dal-
its in Sammagaon. Dalits and non-Dalits recognise that there is only one kind of human,
and they state that Dalits should not be treated differently from other people. As noted in
chapter 2, this shift in beliefs has been accompanied by a shift in behaviour. Untouchabil-
ity and open forms of discrimination against Dalits can no longer be observed in public,
whereas—according to the memory of older people in Sammagaon—they used to be ex-
tremely common some three to four decades ago. The simple narrative of change which
this suggests is however complicated by ethnographic observations. First, while almost
nobody in Sammagaon now explicitly agrees with the view that Dalits are ‘impure’ or
‘polluting’, there is nonetheless a cluster of negative assumptions which are readily made
about Dalits, among which a chief representation is that Dalits are ‘dirty’ in the physical
sense. Second, the behaviours associated with untouchability continue to exist in what I
call the ‘domestic sphere’, that is, in people’s private homes.
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I offered a number of explanations for the discrepancy between stated views according to
which Dalits are ‘the same’ as everybody else, and behaviours suggesting the opposite. A
first explanation was that non-Dalits are lying or being hypocritical when they aﬀirm that
Dalits are the same as everybody else. A second explanation was that non-Dalits contin-
uing to discriminate against Dalits is a self enforcing convention, in the sense implied by
coordination problems. Neither of these explanations is satisfactory. In the third and final
section of this chapter, I suggested that non-Dalits simultaneously hold a representation ac-
cording to which Dalits are ‘like everybody else’ and another according to which they are
in fact ‘different’. Turning to literature in cognitive and social psychology, I suggested that
a dual-process model of the human mind and Gendler’s notion of ‘alief’ provide a com-
pelling account of how it is possible for such contradictory representations to be held by
the same individual. This model, in my view, gives a satisfying account of how non-Dalits
can simultaneously believe that Dalits are like everybody else, yet alieve that they are not.
I will return to the question of the implicit / type-1 / alief-level representation of Dalits in
the next chapter, where I will discuss these less-than-conscious representations in relation
to another body of literature, on a phenomenon known as ‘psychological essentialism’.
162
Chapter 7
Essentialism
This chapter presents a core argument of the thesis, which is that the enduring character
of caste-based discrimination in Nepal is, in part, attributable to a universal cognitive bias
known as ‘psychological essentialism’. To illustrate, I openwith an incident that took place
a mere two days after I had landed in Nepal for fieldwork.
‘Like a dog’s tail’
Krishna works at the reception of the guest house in which I stayed, in Kathmandu, when
I initially arrived in Nepal for fieldwork. In his thirties, he is a convivial and engaging
person. He has big aspirations, hoping to open his own guest house and stop depending
on his current employer. Krishna and I had already established a friendly rapport a few
years earlier, duringmyfirst trip toNepal. Upon learning that I wanted toworkwithDalits
this time around, Krishna made several comments. ‘Dalits are human, and I am a human
too,’ he first said, spontaneously. ‘Look,’ he added, ‘I hired many Dalits to build my new
guest house. I even share cigarettes with them!’
Liechty has noted that class is increasingly shaping people’s self-understandings in Nepal,
particularly in urban settings, and that as a result caste is being relegated to the back-
ground (Liechty 2003:63–64). Krishna, himself a Bahun, is a good example of a middle-
class Nepali in Kathmandu who states that he does not care about caste and views Dalits
as normal humans, as people like everybody else.
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With his remark about cigarettes, Krishna aimed to prove that this is his actual view. It is a
well-documented fact that Hindus consider bodily fluids dangerous and polluting. Most
Nepalis strictly avoid coming in contact with someone else’s saliva and especially abhor
the idea of touching it with their own lips or mouth. In this regard, they display a striking
example of Mary Douglas’ observation that ‘we should expect the orifices of the body to
symbolize its specially vulnerable points. Matter issuing from them ismarginal stuff of the
most obvious kind’ (Douglas 1966:150). In fact, Nepalis avoid even indirect contact with
the saliva of other people. For example, cutlery which has been touched by somebody’s
lips is considered jutho (soiled, impure) and must be washed before it can be used by
anybody else. I accidentally violated this rule on one occasion, in Sammagaon, during a
moment of inattention. During a meal, I was given a second serving that I could not finish.
I seized the large lump of rice which had just been placed on my plate and put it back into
the cooking pot. The person serving me food was left speechless for an instant, before I
realised my mistake—a highly insulting one—and apologised profusely. I had used the
hand which I had been eating with to do this. My hand had previously come in contact
with my mouth, and the rice had therefore become jutho the moment that I touched it. By
placing it back into the common pot, I had inadvertently made all of the pot’s contents
jutho. A new batch of rice had to be cooked, and the soiled rice was given to a buffalo.
In order to avoid spreading jutho, when drinking from a shared receptacle, one lifts it an
inch above the lips, tilting one’s head backwards, and pouring the contents from above.
Similar precautions are taken when cigarettes are shared between smokers. One forms
a makeshift pipe with one’s fist to ensure that one’s lips do not touch the cigarette itself.
Krishna never used this technique, so when smoking with a Dalit, his lips would come
into contact with the Dalit’s jutho. Like many younger urban Nepalis, Krishna found the
idea of ritual pollution obsolete. This is what he was communicating to me when saying
that he even shared cigarettes with Dalits.
Given this disregard for ritual pollution, what Krishna said next came as a surprise. ‘You
know, though, Dalits are like a dog’s tail.’ Seeing my confusion, he offered a clarification:
‘Even if you tie a dog’s tail to a stick in order to keep it straight, as soon as you remove
the stick, the tail will curl up again’. Dalits are like this, he explained, because no matter
howmuch you try to help them, they never change. When Krishna had a new guest house
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built in his own village, he employed local Dalits rather than hiring professional builders
from the city. He described this as an act of generosity and said that he had offered alcohol
to the builders, given them advances on salaries, and fulfilled most of their requests. But
despite all of this, he explained, several workers did not complete the tasks which they
had been paid for; they had left the building unfinished.
In this analogy, the stick is either Krishna himself or the good working conditions he of-
fered. Dalits, despite being ‘tied’ to this stick, could not stay ‘straight’. They reverted to
their normal state of dishonesty, leaving the job unfinished. While the conversation I had
with Krishna was mostly in English, he used the Nepali term sidhā, which means ‘straight’
but can also be translated as ‘straightforward’ and ‘honest’. Thus, Krishna was suggest-
ing that Dalits are naturally ‘crooked’—with the same double meaning this term has in
English—and that nothing could be done about it.
Immediately after explaining that everybody is a human and that caste means nothing,
Krishna made what can only be described as a highly essentialising remark—all Dalits are
a certain way, and they remain thus no matter what. This conversation took place on my
second day in Nepal. I did not realise it at the time, but it captured a central tension of
the way in which non-Dalits talk about Dalits. Explicit theories and desires for a society
in which caste is irrelevant co-exist with deeply rooted, if not always openly expressed
representations according to which Dalits are inherently different and lesser.
One might object that there is a significant difference between ‘ritual impurity’ and ‘dis-
honesty’. Krishna was not, strictly speaking, contradicting himself when he said that Dal-
its are not impure but nevertheless dishonest. This is a valid objection. However, it is the
more general tension in Krishna’s words which I want to pick up here, namely, the ten-
sion between his statements that all humans are fundamentally the same and that there is
nevertheless something inherent about Dalits which sets them apart. If I may appropriate
Krishna’s analogy and change its meaning, I would suggest that the real dog’s tail is the
way in which people think about Dalits in Nepal. They say that there is only one kind of
human, they try to keep their views ‘straight’—in line with this statement—but it is all
too common for them to fall back to the view that, after all, there is actually something
inherently negative about Dalits.
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Caste, I argue, is an inherently resilient way of thinking about society. It is this resilience,
in part, which prevents non-Dalits from behaving in line with the professed ideal that
there is only one kind of human. It is also this resilience which becomes a stumbling block
for the strategies described in part I. Naturally, if these statements are to be explanatory,
if they are to do more than simply invoke the generic term ‘resilience’ to re-describe the
ethnographic data presented so far, an external explanation for the resilience itself is re-
quired. This is what the current chapter offers. What I suggest here is that we should view
the resilience of caste as just one specific instance of a more general tendency, observed by
many anthropologists in many different contexts, towards social essentialism. Moreover, I
argue that social essentialism itself has root causes not only in specific histories and forms
of social organisation, but also in the very nature of the humanmind. It is in no small part
attributable to a cognitive bias known as psychological essentialism.
Two kinds of essentialism
One can distinguish at least two major types of essentialism. Central to both is the notion
that entities (objects, artefacts, plants, animals, humans, etc.) have ‘essences’, which is to
say, they have invisible and potentially unknown properties or ‘cores’ which determine
what they are and without which they would be something different. The way in which
the two kinds of essentialism differ is in their relation to this central notion.
Metaphysical essentialism
Metaphysical essentialism is beyond the scope of this thesis. I include a very brief discus-
sion here in order to show the type of claims which I am not concerned with.
Metaphysical essentialism, fundamentally, is the theory that the world is actually made
of entities which have essences. This is a view which a number of philosophers have
adhered to, most famously Aristotle and Leibniz. Present-day analytic philosophers de-
fending metaphysical essentialism generally adopt a ‘modal’ approach (Robertson and
Atkins 2018). This is to say, they draw a distinction between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’
properties, the former being those without which—and here the reason for calling this ap-
proach ‘modal’ becomes clear—an entity would not be what it is. These philosophers fall
into different camps depending on which properties they consider ‘essential’. For exam-
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ple, proponents of ‘sortal’ essentialism suggest that the world is made of mutually exclu-
sive ‘sorts’ and that a given entity cannot simultaneously belong to multiple sorts (Mackie
2006:118ff.). Another common brand of metaphysical essentialism is ‘origin essentialism’,
which stipulates that the essential properties of an entity are those pertaining to its origins
(Mackie 2006: 93ff.).
My personal take onmetaphysical essentialism—andmetaphysicsmore generally—is neo-
Carnapian (Bennett 2009:38): I think that the questions which are raised in this branch of
philosophy are terminological at worst, substantial but unanswerable at best. In other
words, either debates on metaphysical essentialism are about how best to use language,
or they concern states of affairs which we do not have the epistemological tools to answer.
Therefore, none of what is said in this thesis should be taken as a defence of, or attack on
metaphysical essentialism.
My concern is instead with the tendency which humans have to think in essentialist terms.
As it turns out, for certain categories, humans have a strong tendency to act and talk as
if metaphysical essentialism were correct, independently of whether this is actually the
case.1
Social essentialism
As anthropologists working in a number of contexts have noted, humans typically think
that the members of certain social groups share a common, inner ‘substance’ that makes
them what they are. In other words, humans are typically essentialist about certain social
groups. This is particularly true of race, ethnicity, sex, caste, lineages and other corporate
kin groups. The nature of the shared substance might be explicitly identified—in the case
of ethnicity, clans, descent groups, for example, it is often ‘blood’—but it may also remain
unnamed.
A hallmark of this way of thinking is that groups are given a particularly ‘deep’ ontological
status: races, ethnicities, etc. are thought to be more than coincidental collections of indi-
viduals. Members of one such group are thought to be similar in profound ways, and con-
1. A recent proposition is that the study of psychological essentialism can provide some insight
into the truth-value of metaphysical essentialism (Gelman 2019). This is an unusual claim upon
which no consensus has yet been reached.
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versely, to differ from the members of other groups in equally profound ways. One classic
statement of the tendency for humans to think in this way is found in Clifford Geertz’s
description of ‘primordial attachments’:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’—or,
more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed
‘givens’—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,
but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular
religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a
language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood,
speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering,
coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor,
one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection,
practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in
great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very
tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them
that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and
from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all
times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural–some would say
spiritual–aﬀinity than from social interaction. (Geertz 1973a:259–260, emphasis
added)
In the pages following this excerpt, Geertz identifies a wide range of ‘primordial attach-
ments’, namely, ‘assumed blood ties’, ‘race’, ‘language’, ‘region’, ‘religion’, and ‘custom’
(Geertz 1973a:261–263).
Geertz’s essay concerns the formation of new nation states in post-colonial contexts. Con-
sequently, he focuses on the extent to which these attachments may represent an obstacle
to the emergence of civil society, but this aspect of his argument is not relevant here. What
is relevant is his suggestion that people who share primordial attachments—people who
belong to the same corporate kin group, race or religion, who speak the same language or
practise the same customs, etc.—are believed to form an irreducible group, a groupwhose
existence is not merely due to temporary association but is instead sui generis. As per the
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passages emphasised in the quotation above, the argument is that primordial attachments
give rise to social groups which are perceived, by their own members and by others, as
natural.
Social essentialism such as I am concerned with here is a refinement of Geertz’s observa-
tion. Geertz casts a wide net, addressing a large number of ‘attachments’ (race, language,
region, custom, etc.) This makes sense in the context of his argument on state formation,
but a disadvantage is that he tells us nothing as to why these specific attachments are rep-
resented as primordial, nor what it is which they may have in common. Some conceptual
refinement is therefore warranted. When I use the term ‘social essentialism’ here, I am
not concerned with language, region, religion or custom. I apply the term only to those
categories that fall under the umbrella ofwhat Berreman (1972) called ‘birth-ascribed strat-
ification’. That is, I apply the term only to identity categories which are attributed to an
individual at birth, and thought to remain unchanged throughout the course of his life.
It is these categories, more than any other, which are regularly perceived as natural and
having ‘ineffable, at times overpowering coerciveness’.
Belonging to any given caste in Nepal is a consequence of birth alone, and caste certainly
has ‘overpowering coerciveness’ as described by Geertz. Despite the explicit adherence of
many to an ‘ethic of castelessness’ described in the previous chapter, there remains a latent
perception that castes are literal ‘kinds of humans’. The term ‘jāt’ itself, which I have been
translating as ‘caste’ so far, conveys a deeper sense of ‘kindedness’ and even of ‘species’.
But more than this linguistic connotation, the naturalised character of caste is seen in the
fact that it is impossible for any given individual to change which caste he or she belongs
to. There is no fluidity or possibility of movement across the groups picked out by caste.
One’s caste, like one’s ethnicity, is acquired from one’s parents at birth and is a deep and
fundamentally immutable aspect of oneself.
Social essentialism is an overarching term for social ontologies in which there exist differ-
ent kinds of humans and these kinds are thought to be natural or quasi-natural. Analyt-
ically, social essentialism does not necessarily imply that the different kinds of humans
are ranked relatively to each other, nor even that the kinds have different valences. It only
implies that the kinds are different. And yet, where social essentialism is prevalent, such
169
CHAPTER 7. ESSENTIALISM
valences tend to emerge. Anthropologists have long noted the almost universal character
of ethnocentrism—the tendency to attribute higher value to one’s own (essentially con-
strued) group over others. In classic Dumontian analysis, what distinguishes hierarchy
as a principle of social organisation is that—unlike what ethnocentrism would suggest—
there is collective consensus over the ranking of, and valences attributed to distinct groups.
The low recognise themselves as such.
Critiques of the Dumontian approach are well-known (Appadurai 1986), and indeed, the
strategies analysed in the first part of this thesis show that Dalits are far from accepting
the ascription of lowliness. In Nepal like elsewhere, they are trying hard to change their
public image. The ‘ethic of castelessness’ discussed in the previous chapter, however, is
premised on a different type of change. Instead of a modification to the image of Dalits, it
is based on negating the idea that Dalits are a distinct kind of humans to start with. As
such, the ethic of castelessness challenges social essentialism itself.
I will presently argue that it is because essentialist construals of birth-ascribed social cat-
egories come readily to the human mind that the notion that Dalits are a different kind
of human is diﬀicult to un-think. In other words, the essentialisation of Dalits in Nepal en-
dures not only because of specificities in Nepali history—though these certainly play an
important role—but also because it is one specific case of a much more general way in
which humans typically think of group identity, driven by the cognitive bias known as
psychological essentialism.2 Before I can make this argument, however, two caveats are in
order.
The first is as follows: to note the occurrence of social essentialism in a multiplicity of
contexts, and to point to its ongoing character in Nepal, is not equivalent to adopting es-
sentialist analytical categories. I do not propose that the categories of ethnicity, race, and
caste are analytically sound. Similarly, my point is not that Dalits are actually different
from others in any primordial way. All of this should go without saying, but it seems
worth making this point explicitly in light of the common misunderstanding of Geertz’s
primordialism. Eriksen (2001:44) for example, comes close to suggesting that Geertz him-
self viewed ethnicity as ‘primordial’, when it is in fact clear that, in Geertz’s view, it is
2. In this sense, psychological essentialism operates similarly to what Sperber (2001; see also
2002) calls a ‘mind-internal’ factor, helping to stabilise one or the other cultural representation.
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people ‘out there’ who are primordialist. On the analytical front, I am fully in accordance
with Brubaker when he notes that studying essentialised social categories should not lead
to adopting them (Brubaker 2002:166). The alternative he proposes, which I follow here,
is to treat essentialised social categories not as ‘things in the world, but perspectives on the
world—not ontological but epistemological realities’ (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov
2004:45).
The second caveat comes with one criticism that has been addressed against primordialist
approaches to ethnicity by the ‘instrumentalist’ school. This states that social actors do
not, as a matter of fact, think of ethnic groups as static, unchanging, ontologically deep
entities. Instead, the objection goes, ethnicity is subject to a number of strategic and con-
scious manipulations, in line with political interests. Given such malleability, instrumen-
talists argue, the suggestion that humans are primordialist about ethnicity is simply false.
A recent theory of ethnicity emphasising strategic manipulation is Wimmer’s analysis of
‘ethnic boundary making’ (2008, 2013). In Nepal, Hangen (2009) has defended a similar
view in her study of ethnic politics.
Does this objection carry over to caste, in particular as regards Dalits? Some malleabil-
ity must indeed be acknowledged. An example is the old, derogatory word Kāmi being
replaced, in many spheres, by ‘Bishwakarma’. Another example is the emergence of the
term ‘Dalit’ itself, which replaces and changes the connotations of the prior ‘pāni nachalne’.
Nevertheless, we should be weary of over-emphasising this malleability; doing so may be
driven more by wishful thinking than by actual, empirical evidence. Chapter 3 argued
that the Bishwakarma cannot truly adopt ‘sanskritisation’ as a strategy because they are
inescapably perceived as Dalit, no matter how fervently they defend their similarity to
the upper-caste Bahun. Chapter 4 showed that when the Bishwakarma attempt to rede-
fine their image by building a ‘culture of their own’, imitating the strategic ethnic politics
of the janajāti, they once again find themselves incapable of doing so. Thus, for all the
strategic manipulations which ethnic politics may be imbued with in certain contexts, the
instrumentalist criticism does not, ultimately, carry over to the case of caste, at least not
for Dalits in Nepal.
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Psychological essentialism
In most anthropological accounts, social essentialism is explained first and foremost in so-
cial constructionist terms (Hirschfeld 1998; Mahalingam 2007b). Thus, social essentialism
is generally viewed as emerging from specific histories, cultural aspects, power configura-
tions, etc. For example, Stoler (1992; 1995) has discussed the extent to which essentialist
understandings of race were linked to European colonialism and the threat which métis-
sage posed to these understandings. In the Indian context, various authors have noted the
significant role which colonialism played in reinforcing essentialist construals of caste, by
imposing a ‘racial’ reading of it (Cohn 1987; Dirks 1992, 2001). The emergence of essen-
tialist understandings of caste in Nepal, which has never been a European colony, follows
a slightly different trajectory. It is generally accepted that the initial origins of caste in
Nepal are linked to invasions by various Hindu Aryan kings, as early as 600CE (Aahuti
2014:esp. 81–83). A full-blown, extremely essentialist model of caste was later imposed
with the promulgation of the 1854 Muluki Ain (civil code). As Höfer (1976) shows, and
as I have already alluded to, this code was relentless in its systematisation of caste and im-
position of a logic wherein humans are divided into different kinds. Its political purpose
was to spread the power and authority of the then ruling Rana dynasty.
Social essentialism, thus, is intricately tied to power. It is not, however, exclusively so. It is
also tied to psychological essentialism.
A minimal definition of psychological essentialism is: a psychological or cognitive dispo-
sition to perceive and think of entities (objects, artefacts, animals, people, etc.) as having
an internal, invisible core which determines the nature of the entity and at least some of
its observable properties.3 The claim that all humans have such a disposition has it roots
in what is known as the ‘prototype theory’ of concepts (Rosch et al. 1976), but it was first
explicitly formulated by Medin: ‘People act as if things (e.g. objects) have essences or un-
derlying natures that make them the thing that they are’ (1989:1476).
This, he suggested, happens because, while essentialism is ‘bad metaphysics’ (as I have
discussed above), it may be ‘good epistemology’ (1989:1477). In other words, even if an
essentialist description of the world is ultimately (metaphysically) incorrect, it is ‘eﬀicient’
3. For a more detailed, but nevertheless succinct definition, see Gelman (2004: box 1, p405)
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in the sense of ‘eﬀiciency’ implied by the principle of cognitive economy—‘the tendency
for cognitive processes to minimize processing effort and resources’ (entry for ‘Cognitive
Economy’ in Colman 2008). This argument, clearly, is evolutionary: it is because an es-
sentialist epistemology is, broadly speaking, advantageous and adaptive that essentialism
became an inherent property of the human cognitive system.
Barrett (2001) offers some detail as to why essentialism is advantageous in the sense just
discussed. The key lies in its potential for ‘inductive inference’. Essentialism ‘allows one
to exploit the causal structure of the world (of natural kinds, in particular), without neces-
sarily knowing anything about the causes themselves’ (2001:7). There are two parts to this
claim. The first is that the world does, in fact, have a rich ‘causal structure’ and that this
structure explains observable regularities. So, to use an example that is frequent in the lit-
erature on essentialism, the world is such that all tigers share a great number of properties:
they have similar colours, walk and hunt in the same way, are fierce predators, roar in a
particular way, etc. The actual reason that all tigers share such properties is down to many
complex causal relations and chains that make up the world, including, for example, ‘the
executive control of DNA and cellular regulatory machinery’ (2001:13). The second part
of the claim is that these actual causes are hard to know. However, even if they are hard to
know, it is advantageous to be able to rapidly and inductively infer, upon meeting a new
tiger, that this one is likely to display the same properties as other tigers. The key evolu-
tionary claim is that an essentialist mental representation of tigers allows for precisely this
kind of inference. If one construes tigers essentially—if one holds a representation accord-
ing to which tigers are the way that they are because of some invisible, inner tiger-essence
which they share—this is suﬀicient for inductive inference to take place.4
The proposition that humans have evolved an innate essentialist disposition generated con-
siderable amounts of research in the disciplines of cognitive and developmental psychol-
ogy. Gelman’s The Essential Child (2003) is the authoritative volume on this topic. This is
an extensive and astonishingly meticulous presentation of the multiple experiments con-
ducted by developmental psychologists to determine whether young children think in
essentialist terms. The motivation for studying children is the assumption, common in
4. Tigers are just one example. There is an ongoing debate concerning which kinds the evolu-
tionary argument may hold true of. It is generally admitted that it holds true of biological kinds,
and many suggest it applies for natural kinds too.
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developmental psychology, that the younger the age at which a given psychological prop-
erty (in this case, essentialism) can be detected, the more likely it is that this property is
innate rather than acquired. A description of the experimental protocols used by Gelman
and others is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but a good summary of their results is
available in Gelman (2004).5 These results show that
• Young children make category-based inferences consistent with the suggestion that
they hold essentialist representations of natural, biological, and social kinds, in so
far as they are not swayed by an entity’s superficial properties. For example, upon
learning that an object which resembles a leaf is in fact an insect, young children will
ascribe insect-like properties to the object despite its leaf-like appearance (Gelman
and Markman 1986, 1987). Similar effects can be detected in children as young as
one and two years old.
• Children believe that membership in certain categories is fixed at birth and im-
mutable. They believe this to be the case for animals, plants and (importantly for
the subject of this dissertation) social categories. Thus ‘children as young as four
years of age appreciate that the identity of animal and other natural kinds can
persist in the face of massive transformations’ (Gelman 2003:64). This is fully in line
with the suggestion that such categories are construed essentially: the attribution of
an essence is what explains unchanging identity—a tiger is a tiger is a tiger—in the
face of individual transformation (e.g. a tamed tiger, an albino tiger).
• When they are as young as three years old, children are attentive to ‘underlying struc-
tures’. That is, they offer consistent explanations for the properties that members of
a category share, and in doing so they privilege internal, invisible properties.
In the face of such results, Gelman asks whether the essentialism which she and her asso-
ciates observe in very young children is simply learnt through interaction with parents, or
whether it is the result of an innate human disposition. An entire chapter of The Essential
Child is dedicated to this topic. The findings are summarised as follows:
5. I report these results in an extremely condensed formhere, anddonot cite themultiple studies
(bymultiple authors) that provide evidence for these results. Gelman’s paper includes an extensive
list of references.
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We found a mismatch between maternal speech documented in this project
and children’s knowledge as revealed in prior experimental tasks. Although
children have a rich set of beliefs about insides, teleology, and animal origins
… mothers provided almost no corresponding input about these topics. We
found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children (Gelman 2003:175,
emphasis added).
On this basis, Gelman concludes that ‘children are not passive recipients of essentializing:
they construct essentialism largely on their own’ (Gelman 2003: 297).
Although there is now a fairly widespread consensus that humans have an innate disposi-
tion to essentialise, a number of questions are still unresolved. One, for example, concerns
the extent to which humans think along essentialist lines. Some researchers suggest that
essentialism is a domain-general bias, which is to say that it affects all the categories which
humans use. Proponents of this hypothesis often suggest that essentialism is a by-product
of the human capacity for language (Gelman 2003:14–15; Carey 1996). Recently, it has
been suggested that psychological essentialism is even more general, not a feature lim-
ited to categorisation but rather a much deeper property of human cognition, involved
in a much larger class of cognitive abilities (Quillien 2018). At the other end of the spec-
trum, some researchers suggest that psychological essentialism is limited to, or at least
only strongly present in, the way in which humans think about specific categories (e.g.
Atran 1998; Atran, Medin, and Ross 2002). Those who defend such views generally adopt
a ‘modular’ model of the mind, according to which the mind is divided into sub-systems
specialising in the treatment of different types of information. They then attribute essen-
tialism to the way in which one or more of these subsystems function.
The details of these debates, although fascinating, need not concern us here. What matters
is only that much of the research agrees on the fact that humans have an innate disposition
to essentialise not only tigers and natural kinds, but also (at least some) social groups. Some
researchers (e.g. Hirschfeld 1998, 2007; Hirschfeld et al. 2007) suggest that this is due to a
‘folksociological’ module, a cognitive subsystem dedicated solely to the treatment of social
groups. Others defend that essentialism about social groups is, to simplify, a ‘carry-over’
from modules dedicated to processing other categories, e.g. ‘species’ (Gil-White 2001).
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Others still view it as just one manifestation of a much broader tendency towards essen-
tialism (Newman and Knobe 2019). But again, which of these propositions is correct is
immaterial to the argument I am making here. What matters is only the recognition that
psychological essentialism is an innate disposition that affects the way in which humans
think about groups, irrespective of the exact cognitive ‘implementation’ of essentialism.
Many anthropologists are likely to treat the proposition that humans have an innate dis-
position to essentialise social groups with scepticism. They will point to the ethnographic
record to show that humans often have non-essentialist understandings of social categories.
Indeed, there are a number of ethnographically documented places where people do not
essentialise group identity. The Malay fishers studied by Carsten (1995, 1999) are an ex-
ample. These people, who think of kinship and relatedness as processual and malleable,
do not conceive of identity as caused by an immutable ‘blood’ transmitted at birth and
unchangeable over the life course. The Vezo of Madagascar, studied by Astuti (1995b,
1995a) are another example. They have a non-essentialist view of group identity, holding
that one can become and cease to be Vezo depending on one’s behaviour. The Peruvians
studied by Hale (2014, 2015) are yet another example, holding what Hale refers to as a
‘non-essentialist theory of race’.
There are two problems with this objection. First, these ethnographers do not tell us
whether the people whom they study are non-essentialist with regards to other categories
than human group identity. Do Malay fishermen have non-essentialist understanding of
plants, animals, gods, etc.? The observation that some people are non-essentialist when it
comes to group identity does not imply that these people are non-essentialist in general.
Far more serious, however, is the second problem. These ethnographies only show that it
is possible for adults to develop and maintain non-essentialist theories of identity; in other
words, they can be used as evidence to reject the hypothesis that humans are irreversibly
essentialist about group identity. But this is a hypothesis that no reasonable cognitive sci-
entist would formulate in the first place: psychological essentialism is a disposition, not a
rigid constraint.
The Vezo are a case in point. In later work, Astuti, Solomon, and Carey (2004) took the
experimental protocols used to detect essentialism in Euro-American contexts and, after
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adapting them to a new cultural environment, used them with Vezo adults and children.
The results are remarkable: even here, children manifest essentialist understandings of
identity, which they later have to ‘unlearn’ in order to adhere to the ‘adult’, non-essentialist
theory. Because of the setting inwhich itwas conducted, this research provides someof the
most compelling evidence for the innate character of essentialism. This is because, given
that Vezo adults have explicit anti-essentialist theories of human identity, their children
cannot learn from adults the essentialist understandings which they manifest. The best
available explanation is that the children’s essentialism is caused by an innate bias.
There is further evidence for essentialism about social categories among young children
in a variety of contexts. For example, Río and Strasser (2010) find essentialist thinking
about poverty and class among Chilean children. Diesendruck et al. (2013) find it among
American and Israeli children for gender. Most recently, a study by Davoodi et al. (2019)
compares the degree to which five different social categories are essentialised by children
in the USA and Turkey; it finds that in both contexts, gender is the most essentialised,
followed by nationality, then socio-economic status, then religion; finally, the least essen-
tialised category is sports teams. The results in both cultural contexts are strikingly similar.
The essentialism of caste
The vast majority of the research on how psychological essentialism influences the per-
ception of social groups concerns race, ethnicity, and gender. There is precious little on
caste. The main exception here is the work of Mahalingam (Mahalingam 1998, 2007a; Ma-
halingam and Rodriguez 2006). This research, conducted in Tamil Nadu, suggests that
caste is indeed construed in essentialist terms and that upper castes hold more essentialist
understandings than Dalits. This is an interesting if not entirely surprising result because
it shows that the essentialist bias is not insulated from the social context.
In this section, I want to explain in what sense psychological essentialism underpins the
way the category ‘Dalit’ is construed in Nepal. The easiest way to do this is by showing
how well the way people think and talk about Dalits maps onto key properties of psycho-
logical essentialism. These are concisely summarised by Gelman (2003:23), who lists six
properties essentialised concepts, using the concept BIRD as her example.
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• sharp boundaries: Essentialised concepts are not fuzzy. A thing either is a bird or
not; there is no such thing as almost-birds or part-birds.
• stability over transformation: A bird remains a bird throughout its existence; noth-
ing which happens to a bird can transform it into something else. (This is because
the essence of the bird is not subject to transformation.)
• nonobvious properties: Birds share many nonobvious properties with other birds,
including some which are yet to be discovered.
• causal features: It is assumed that the essence of a bird is causally linked to its exter-
nal features, and that the essence is shared by all birds.
• inductive potential: This follows from the previous point. From the observation of
one bird, one can infer properties which are assumed to be true of all birds. This
is because all birds are thought to share the same essence, and that this essence is
causally linked to the induced properties.
• nature vs nurture: Birds are thought to be a natural, ‘real’ category which was dis-
covered, not invented by scientists out of convenience.
Similarly, the category ‘Dalit’ in Nepal has
• sharp boundaries: A person either is or is not a Dalit. In Nepal, there is no such
thing as a person who is of ‘mixed caste’. I askedmany people, many times, whether
there were individuals who are of mixed caste or who belong to more than one caste,
and I was systematically met with a negative response. To an extent, this was true
even in the case of people in intercaste marriages, which the upcoming chapters will
address in detail.
• stability over transformation: ADalit remains a Dalit nomatter what he or she does.
Chapters 3 and 4 have amply demonstrated this.
There is a legitimate question as to whether a non-Dalit can ‘become’ a Dalit. Non-
Dalits talk colloquially of the possibility of their caste ‘going away’ (jāt jancha) and
of becoming a Dalit if they interact in the wrong ways with Dalits. This idea, which
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is declining, will be addressed in more detail in chapter 9.
• nonobvious properties: Dalits were, historically, thought to be ‘polluting’. As
shown in chapter 2 and the anecdote about Krishna with which I opened this
chapter, untouchability does appear to be disappearing from the public sphere.
However, this should not be interpreted as evidence that people have stopped
thinking that there is an underlying, nonobvious property which makes Dalits
lower and inferior. In the past, the notion that Dalits are polluting, dangerous,
and contaminating was constantly asserted publicly, through various practices and
avoidances. Now that these practices are fading away, Dalits are still thought to be
inherently ‘dirty’ and ‘lowly’, but the exact nature of their ‘dirtiness’ and ‘lowliness’
is less specific, less identifiable than in the past. Thus, the invisible property or
essence which make a Dalit what he or she is is in fact becoming increasingly
nonobvious.
• causal features and inductive potential: While there is no explicit discourse about
how the ‘Dalitness’ of a Dalit is connected to the external properties of Dalits—in
fact, there is no such term as ‘Dalit-ness’ in Nepali—what is clear is that the category
‘Dalit’ is invested with very high inductive potential. Upon learning that an individ-
ual is a Dalit, people make a number of assumptions, almost all negative, about that
individual.
• nature vs nurture: The extent to which Dalits are thought to be a ‘natural’ rather
than a human-made category is unclear. The explicit theory today is that there is no
such thing as caste, that ‘there are only two kinds of people: men and women’, and
that caste was made by humans rather than the gods. On the other hand, the word
for ‘caste’ in Nepali is jāt, which literally translates as ‘species’ or ‘kind’. Moreover, in
the ‘traditional’ view, according to which caste does have a divine origin, caste was
seen as something ontologically deep and awaiting discovery, rather than something
manufactured.
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Conclusion
Why should anthropologists take an interest in psychological essentialism? What is lack-
ing in themore habitual social, historical and political explanations for social essentialism?
In my view, one perfectly valid answer to this question is, quite simply, that anthropolo-
gists ought to be interested in the question of the human mind and how it functions, be-
cause they ought to be interested in human universals. Questions pertaining to human
universals were foundational for the discipline (Bloch 2005) and it is arguably on such
questions that anthropology has made its most insightful and important contributions.
There is a concerted effort by a small number anthropologists to push the discipline back
towards the study of universals by inscribing it within the broader field of cognitive sci-
ence (see e.g. Bloch 2013; Astuti and Bloch 2012; Keen 2014; Regnier and Astuti 2015;
Beller and Bender 2015; Crivelli, Jarillo, and Fridlund 2016; Bloch 2017).
Beyond such general considerations, the current dichotomy between, on the one hand, his-
torical and political explanations for social essentialism, and on the other, psychological
ones, is fundamentally limiting. Psychologists run the risk of studying social essentialism
in something of a cultural and historical ‘void’, and therefore of not questioning the so-
cial and political conditions which encourage it. (Indeed, this is the impression one often
gets while reading psychology papers on the topic.) Anthropologists, conversely, run the
risk of interpreting the social essentialism which they regularly observe as solely a matter
of power, inequality, and social organisation. The lack of an integrated approach has im-
portant practical consequences. Social essentialism drives many undesirable phenomena:
racism, ethnic conflict, gender inequality, and, the one which I am concerned with here,
caste-based discrimination. If we make the mistake of thinking that essentialism is purely
cognitive in origin, we run the risk of overlooking the political contexts in which it thrives.
If wemake the mistake of thinking that essentialism is purely social in origin, we are likely
to assume that it can be done away with simply by eliminating the social conditions un-
der which it emerged. Hirschfeld (2012) gives an example of how the latter can happen,
denouncing ‘myths’ on how to reduce racial bias that are common among educators in
the USA. One example of research that does successfully address both the psychological
and social origins of social essentialism is that conducted by Denis Regnier (2012, 2015)
in Madagascar, which shows that the ongoing essentialisation of slave descendants is best
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understood as a combination of psychological essentialism and the specific way in which
abolition was carried out in that country.
Psychological essentialism provides a compelling explanation for the ethnographic phe-
nomena presented in this thesis so far. Hitherto, the narrative has been double. First, I
have argued that the strategies deployed in order to improve the social standing of Dal-
its and to eliminate untouchability ultimately fail because non-Dalits continue to perceive
Dalits as an unchangeable kind of people. This is what I referred to, in the opening section
of this chapter, as the ‘resilience’ of caste. Second, I have argued that this perception stands
in contradiction with an explicit social ontology according to which there is only one kind
of human. In the previous chapter, I argued that this explicit social ontology could not
simply be ignored, that a good interpretation could not reduce it to hypocrisy. Psycholog-
ical essentialism can help explain the resilience of social essentialism in the presence of
an explicitly anti-essentialist social ontology. Specifically, it can help explain why, despite
what people sincerely say about the unity of humankind, Dalits are still represented as a
different kind of people. This is because psychological essentialism delivers the implicit
theory that the world is made up of essentially different people, among which are Dalits.
If I am correct, we must ask what strategies, beyond those discussed in the first part of
this thesis, could effectively reduce the impact of psychological essentialism in Nepal. The
notion of ‘mixing’, we will see, is key. This is the topic to which I turn in the following
chapters.
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Mixing
This chapter and the next two ask whether ‘mixing’ is a viable strategy for Dalits to reduce
caste-based discrimination, and if so, according to which understanding of ‘mixing’ such
a strategy might operate.
Background: is Nepal a ‘mixed’ society?
Early in my fieldwork, during my first break away from Sammagaon, in Kathmandu, I
met with Kanak Dixit, a well-known journalist and public intellectual in Nepal. We sat
together in the pleasant, impeccably maintained interior court of Dhokaima, an upmarket
café in the old Patan. I was struck by how foreign this environment would appear to my
friends in Sammagaon. We spoke aboutmany topics. One remark that stayedwithmewas
Dixit’s description of Nepali society, especially in the Eastern hills where I was conducting
fieldwork, as ‘mixed’. ‘In the hills,’ he said, ‘ethnicities are mixed to the ground level’.
In what sense is this the case?
The people of Sammagaon are certainly not mixed in the mestizo sense, common in Latin
America. That is to say, single individuals do not declare themselves to be of bilaterally
reckoned, mixed descent and, as a result, to be of ‘mixed caste’ or ‘mixed ethnicity’. They
do not think of caste and ethnicity in the way that the people of Northern Peru think of
race. The latter have what Hale (2015) calls a ‘non-essentialist theory of race’. They do
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not separate humans into racial kinds, distinguishing who is ‘black’ and who is ‘white’,
because of the history of interracial mixing which they are the product of. In Sammagaon
and in Nepal more generally, the opposite obtains. Because of caste endogamy, people
always declare themselves to belong to a single jāt or jāti, and have no problem identifying
which one. A Tamang is a Tamang, a Sunuwar a Sunuwar, a Bahun a Bahun. The mixing
which Dixit was alluding to, I believe, is therefore mostly geographical: people of different
castes and ethnicities live in close proximity to each other and interact on a daily basis.
There are some caveats to acknowledge here. Some people in Sammagaon are ‘Khatri’,
which means that they or one of their ancestors are the child of an upper-caste man and a
janajātiwoman. As noted earlier in this thesis, one way in which Hinduism was originally
spread to the remote areas of Nepal was through deliberate hypergamous intermarriage
between the Hindu upper-castes and the (originally) non-Hindu janajāti. The child of
such a couple was assigned the caste of ‘Khatri’.1 Nevertheless, to be Khatri is not to be
of ambiguous descent. If anything, the category works to resolve any ambiguity which the
parent’s union could have otherwise created, since ‘Khatri’ is said to be equivalent in all
ways to ‘Chhetri’.
Second, there are documented cases of individuals and groups of individuals changing
which caste or ethnic group they belong to, of entirely new ethnic identities being cre-
ated, and of certain identities disappearing. There is therefore some sense in which group
identity in Nepal could be called ‘fluid’. Gellner (2012:93–94) lists a number of historical
examples, referring in particular to Levine (1987), whose work is one of the pioneering
contributions on this topic. However, even in these cases, the changes that occur are not
shifts towards an identity understood as ‘mixed’. Any one individual still belongs to one
group and one group only. Additionally, the scope of such changes is quite limited. As
Gellner himself notes, ‘ethnic identities are indeed fluid, when seen over the very long
term; but from the individual’s point of view they are often very far from easily change-
able’ (2012:99). What is more, as far as I know, no such fluidity has ever existed for Dalits.
The closest documented phenomenon I am aware of is that discussed by Folmar (2007)
and BK (2013), whereby Dalits hide their caste when they move to urban environments.
1. The 1854 MA suggests that ‘Khatri’ was historically the child of a Bahun and a Chhetri or a
Chhetri and janajāti, but not of a Bahun and a janajāti (Höfer 2004[1979]:51–55). The remarks here
reflect what I was told in Nepal. This minor discrepancy is not relevant to the topic at hand.
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They tell their landlords, employers and neighbours that they belong to a non-Dalit caste.
However, these ‘politics of anonymity’ (Folmar’s term) are always understood as a matter
of dissimulating one’s true caste identity, never as a claim that one is actually no longer
Dalit.2 The Bishwakarma’s claim to be ‘fallen’ Bahun, as per Ganga’s explanations in chap-
ter 3, could also be interpreted as an attempt to change the caste status of the Bishwakarma,
to make them upper-caste rather than Dalit. This however has not been successful so far,
and it remains to be seen whether any such attempt could be fruitful in the future.
Thus, despite the documented ‘fluidity’ of identity in Nepal, and despite the geographical
sense in which ethnicities are ‘mixed to the ground level’ in Sammagaon, there simply is
no such thing as a ‘mixed caste’ model which individuals can claim to belong to, and any
possibility of long-term caste change has so far been restricted to non-Dalits.
All this is in linewith the conclusions reached in the previous chapter. Dalits are construed
in essentialist terms to a greater degree than any other group. The boundary which sepa-
rates them from others is one which allows no transformation. It is not strictly imperme-
able since, aswe shall see, it is possible for a non-Dalit to become aDalit, but anymovement
in the other direction is impossible.
For the most part, the strategies deployed by the Bishwakarma to improve their social sta-
tus, examined in the first part of this thesis, are attempts to change their public image.
They are attempts to do away with the negative representations associated with the Bish-
wakarma, but not to question whether the category ‘Bishwakarma’ or the category ‘Dalit’
pick out a precise set of people. These strategies, in other terms, do not challenge the es-
sentialist representations of the Bishwakarma as a distinct ‘kind’ of people, they simply
try to change what ‘kind of kind’ they are seen as.
One exception is the collective feasts organised by the Maoists, in which Dalits and non-
Dalits were made to eat together. This type of action is distinctive because it seems to be
based on mixing Dalits and non-Dalits, in an attempt to make people separated by caste
more similar to each other. In this chapter and the next, I further address ‘mixing’ as a
strategy aiming not to change the public image of Dalits, but instead to re-negotiate the
2. Chapter 9 will discuss one attempt by Dalits in Puranogaon to actually transform themselves
into Magars.
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boundary between Dalits and others. I will show that there are twoways in which this can
happen. One is by blurring the boundary, making it diﬀicult to know who falls on which
side. The other is by bringing as many people as possible to the same side of the boundary,
so that its practical relevance becomes reduced.
In discussing this topic, I will pay particular attention to marriage between Dalits and non-
Dalits. I open, however, with a different type of mixing.
Mixing blood
Ilesh Dehegli is the twenty-seven-year-old man who appeared in chapter 4, where I de-
scribed his desire to create a culture which the Bishwakarma could call ‘their own’. In the
later stages ofmy fieldwork, I occasionallymetwith him in Kathmandu. On one such occa-
sion, he invitedme to a blood donation programme that he had organised. Ilesh had spent
several weeks preparing the event. He had made arrangements with the Red Cross, who
provided the necessary medical equipment and sent two volunteer nurses. He had found
a private school in Jorpati, a neighbourhood in the north-eastern outskirts of Kathmandu,
which would host the event. He had personally invited over a hundred people, called the
press and media, told politicians about his programme, and done as much promotion as
possible.
His efforts paid off. On the day of the event, everything went smoothly. When I arrived, I
was greeted by a number of people, all curious about my presence. I shook a few hands
and was instructed to sit and make myself comfortable. I took a quick look around and
registered to take part in the programme. After eating a couple of bananas on the advice
of one of the nurses, I gave blood. Once done, the bag containing my blood was placed,
with all the others, in a large medical container with the inscription ‘Blood Transport’. I
declined an invitation to be fed somewhere away from the school grounds, so that I could
stay on site and observe, had another banana to convince the person inviting me that I
really did not need more food, and settled down to take in what was happening.
It was a sunny, pleasant day, so it workedwell to be outside, in front of the school building.
A steady flow of people was coming in, donating their blood, chatting with others for a
while and leaving with one of the colourful certificates Ilesh and other members of the
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organising committee were signing and distributing. I claimed my own (figure 8.1). It
read, in English,
Letter of Appreciation
With the slogan ‘Campaign of Blood Donation for Social Collaboration’ on the
occasion of the international day for the elimination of racial discriminations
21st March the BACSD Center has organised Blood Donation Program. We
would like to provide certificate of applause You Mr/Miss [Ivan Deschenaux,
filled in by hand] to participate the program volunteering donated blood.
[signatures of the Chairman, ProgramDirector, ProgramCoordinator, and one
‘Guest’]
If you need blood contact us with this certificate.
In the upper left corner was the logo of the BACSDC, a globe centred on the African conti-
nent, onwhichNepal barely figured and fromwhich theAmericasweremissing, drowned
under a vast Atlantic cum Pacific ocean. The globe was encircled in the arms of a green-
brown silhouette, at the bottom of which white, cut-out buildings symbolised Hinduism,
Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. I was not quite sure what any of this had to do with
the Bishwakarma, but it certainly had the flair of Nepal’s development-driven sense of
modernity.
Altogether, more than 100 people must have taken part in the event. Ilesh was satisfied
with the attendance. I was surprised that no presentation, speech, or explanation was
given during the programme, since it is customary to do so at this type of event. Ilesh
explained that he had decided against it because people might feel too weak to listen after
giving blood. I was aware that the programme had deep meaning for Ilesh and worried
about this lack of communication, but Ilesh said he was confident that he had successfully
communicated his message. He had given an oﬀicial statement to the press as well as to
several politicians, one of whom had made a quick appearance at the programme.
I interviewed Ilesh on the day of the event, asking him to explain what the blood donation
meant. The account which follows is compiled from my notes and this interview.
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Figure 8.1: Blood donation certificate
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Figure 8.2: Ilesh’s blood donation programme
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The programme was organised to coincide with the United Nations’ International Day for
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which translates to Nepali as ‘International Day
[for] the Eradication of Colour Discrimination’ (antarrashtriya ranga ved unamulan divas).
Ilesh explained that though other countries suffer from racism, the equivalent in Nepal
is caste-based discrimination (jātiya bhedbhav). Hence many Dalit organisations hold a
programme on this day.
Other organisations had put together various activities. Many had organised feasts in
which people of all castes ate together. Ilesh said that these are too common. He wanted
to demarcate himself by doing something different. He wanted to take things one step
further. One organisation had prepared debates at the Hotel Himalaya, a well-known
luxury establishment, to discuss the government’s declaration that the country was now
oﬀicially ‘free from untouchability’ (cuvvachhut ko mukta). Ilesh’s tone and body language
indicated that he did not think much of this option.
The first explanation he offered me for choosing blood donation was as follows:
Ilesh Dehegli:3 This is a revolution. It is a revolution. Because after taking out
my blood, it is put into somebody else. It is put there. After it has been put
there, I have been mixed with that person, haven’t I? We want to make our rela-
tionship too much mutual [very mutual],4 through blood. That’s the purpose.
Ivan Deschenaux: So, if I have understood correctly, the meaning of this pro-
gramme is that the blood of Dalits and non-Dalits should be mixed?
Ilesh Dehegli: Yes. We must take it out. One can take out Dalit blood and
give it to a non-Dalit; one can take out non-Dalit blood and give it to a Dalit.
This means we must all have cordial relations. And this, this is a movement. It
is a protest. After extracting our blood and giving it to others, liberation from
untouchability will ensue. Our first priority is to make this elimination [of un-
touchability] happen.
Ilesh’s primary purpose, therefore, is to blur the boundary that exists between Dalits and
3. Italics originally spoken in English, in this and following excerpts
4. This is a common use of the superlative in Nepali English.
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non-Dalits bymixing with them in a deep, physiological way. The mixing of blood is done
in the same spirit as the mixing that is achieved through commensality, but as Ilesh noted,
it goes one step further because blood is much more obviously linked to the body than
food:
Ivan Deschenaux: What is the main message today?
IleshDehegli: Themainmessage is this. On the International Day for the Elim-
ination of Racial Discrimination, we performed a blood donation (raktadān).
Through this blood donation, by giving blood, we seek to free the country from
untouchability—to do so practically. We have tried to do this practically. What
others do is try to prevent it tomorrow, prevent it legally, on paper only. But to-
day, we do this practically. ‘Let’s give them food, let’s enter their houses.’—This
is only entering, only eating. We tried to add a relation of the body.
Beyond the desire to eliminate untouchability through tangible, ‘practical’ action, a sec-
ondary aim of the blood donation programme was to show that the difference between
Dalits and non-Dalits is not real in the first place.
Ivan Deschenaux: With regard to untouchability, why is blood important?
Ilesh Dehegli: […] Can a man survive without blood? Without blood, can he
survive? He can’t.
Ivan Deschenaux: He can’t.
Ilesh Dehegli: If he cannot, that means that this is the most important thing
to save. If this life-saving matter is made acceptable, we can all be one in the
world. This is our main idea. Let’s imagine we take out all the blood from my
body. Do I survive? I don’t, do I? Nobody can survive [without blood]. But
even more important than this is the fact that we are all one. People in Nepal,
they say that no matter who gets cut, the same blood will come out. They say
that humans are all the same. By extracting blood, we want to show that we
are indeed the same. It is not only something we say, it is something that we
do and show.
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Blood, as others have noted, is a particularly potent semiotic device (Carsten 2013). In
Ilesh’s programme, it fills several roles. First, through transfusion, it has the potential to
foster physiological, bodily mixing between Dalits and non-Dalits. It can create a shared
substance where there was none earlier, in a way that food alone is too weak to effect.
Second, it reinforces the view that all humans are one. In the medical context of the pro-
gramme, blood has a third role, not stated explicitly by Ilesh, but present nevertheless. It
turns on its head the usual assumption made about bodily fluids and pollution in Nepal.
Blood, as Ilesh describes it, is a vital, life-sustaining substance. It is a necessity, diamet-
rically opposed to jutho, the polluting bodily excretions that one should avoid at all cost.
It is also worth noting that this conception is diametrically opposed to the usual view of
menstrual blood, also traditionally seen as a highly polluting substance.
Ilesh’s programme was one of my most explicit encounters with ‘mixing’ as a strategy
to reduce untouchability. Nevertheless, as he was explaining the significance of his pro-
gramme, at the back of my mind were the remarks which he had made when I first met
him, about creating an association aiming specifically to promote Bishwakarma culture. I
wondered how the goal of mixing everybody’s blood and demonstrating the unity of hu-
mankind might square with the identity-focused politics which Ilesh had told me about
when I first met him. We talked about this in the second half of the interview. Ilesh was
first extremely clear about the fact that, while his association only admitted Bishwakarma
people on its board, it was fully opposed to intra-Dalit untouchability, of the sort which
exists between, for example, the Bishwakarma and the Darji. This phenomenon, he ex-
plained in clear terms, needs to be eliminated just as much as the untouchability that ex-
ists between non-Dalits and Dalits. Ilesh presented the decision to start a Bishwakarma
association rather than one focusing on Dalits in general as a matter of practicality. The
Bishwakarma, he said, ‘know each other’. They are ‘close’ to each other. It is easier, he
explained, to work with people who are of the same caste as oneself.
IleshDehegli: To do anyworkwell, the better one knows each other, the closer
one is to another, the easier it is. Isn’t that the case? It’s easy. For example, if
we have to work together, if I was a fully new person [to you], you can’t take me
this time. There is no time for this and that, for whatever may happen. If we
know each other, then it’s fine. Then it’s easy to work. That’s it. For example, if
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you are my brother-in-law, or this person or that one—if we belong to the same
jāti, then it’s fine (milchha). It will be easier to work, and our rise will be easier.
Ivan Deschenaux: In your opinion, is it not possible to work with friends from
other Dalit jāti?
Ilesh Dehegli: It is a little diﬀicult. Caste conflict happens. In the Jagaran
[JagaranMedia Centre, aDalit associationwhich Ileshwas previously involved
with], this is what happened.
Ivan Deschenaux: Please explain this to me. This is new to me.
Ilesh Dehegli: This happens because casteism (jātibad) between jāti takes
place. [It’s a matter of] brotherhood relation. Blood is thicker than water. Blood is
thicker than water.
At this point, I expressed my surprise. I pointed out that, in twenty-five minutes of inter-
view, we had gone from the importance of mixing bloods and showing that everybody is
fundamentally the same to the statement that ‘blood is thicker than water’. I asked Ilesh
why he had just used this expression at a programmewhich he had himself organised and
in which the unity of human blood was being made salient. To this, Ilesh replied that my
understanding of the idiom ‘blood is thicker than water’ was wrong, repeating that it is
important to mix the bloods but that it also is easier to fight caste-based discrimination
with members of one’s own jāti than with others.
My intent here is not to pick on Ilesh for using the somewhat unfortunate expression ‘blood
is thicker than water’. Having interacted with him on several occasions, I have no doubt
about his sincere desire to get rid of all forms of caste-based discrimination. And while
I am not able to assess his suggestion that inter-Dalit conflict causes problems in other
associations, this is certainly possible. Nevertheless, there remains a noticeable contrast
between his intent to promote a Bishwakarma culture modelled on the ethnic politics of
Nepal (as reported in chapter 4), his creating an association whose board only admits
Bishwakarmamembers, andhis desire to foster ‘mixing’ until the boundaries between castes
are no longer identifiable.
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My take on this is that Dalit activists such as Ilesh are trapped in a series of diﬀicult co-
nundrums. Should they deny the importance or even the very existence of caste by stating
that all humans are the same? Or should they create and promote a positive image of
the group which they belong to, following the janajāti model of ethnic politics? If they
choose the latter, should they attempt to forge a pan-Dalit identity despite existing divi-
sions and relations of untouchability between the different Dalit castes? Or should they
promote their own, specific caste, at the risk of ignoring or even reproducing the prob-
lem of inter-Dalit discrimination? The problem for Dalit activists is the sheer complexity
of the situation which they wish to change. In the face of such complexity, it is perhaps
unsurprising that Ilesh’s attitude is a composite of all these possibilities.
And given such complexity, it would be too easy to blame Dalit activists in Nepal for in-
consistency. My view is that the history of Dalit oppression alone warrants attempting
every strategy, at the risk of inconsistencies. In any case, it is not my aim to produce a
formal critique of Ilesh’s activism here. What I wish to do instead is to highlight ‘mixing’
as a counter-current to identity politics, one which works against the impact of psycholog-
ical essentialism and might therefore effectively combat the representation of Dalits as a
‘different kind’ of human. Instead of doing away with the stigma attached to Dalits, the
ultimate goal of mixing is, according to Ilesh’s description, to do away with the very social
category ‘Dalit’ and to insist on the unity of humans. There is, in this sense, a trace of the
mestizoway of thinking about race in Ilesh’s attempt to make relations between castes ‘too
much mutual’.
Intercaste marriage
I am convinced that the real remedy is intermarriage. Fusion of blood can alone
create the feeling of being kith and kin, and unless this feeling of kinship, of
being kindred, becomes paramount, the separatist feeling—the feeling of being
aliens—created by caste will not vanish. […] The real remedy for breaking
caste is intermarriage. Nothing else will serve as the solvent of caste.
— B.R. Ambedkar, ‘Annihilation of Caste’
This quote fromAmbedkar’s (2014[1936]:285) famous undelivered speech is followed by a
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caveat: if intercaste marriage were the method through which caste might, in principle, be
eliminated once and for all, a major problem was that such marriages were extremely rare
in India in his time. What was required to make intermarriage more frequent? Ambed-
kar’s views are well-known. He argued that it is Hinduism itself which makes intermar-
riage repulsive to Hindus, and therefore that the only way for caste to be well and truly
‘annihilated’ was to move away from Hinduism.
What struck me when I first encountered the quotation reproduced above is how akin it
is to certain statements which I heard in Nepal, some eighty years after it was written. Al-
though intermarriage, particularly between Dalits and others, is a fringe phenomenon in
the country, there are nevertheless people who think that such marriages have the poten-
tial to reduce caste-based discrimination. It was only after returning from fieldwork that
I realised that this suggestion is but the latest incarnation of an older, if radical, idea. In
addition to Ambedkar’s quotation above, one could mention the Self-Respect Movement,
which was started in South India by Periyar E. V. Ramasamy in 1925 and which champi-
oned, among others, the slogan ‘caste will be destroyed through intermarriage’ (Hodges
2005:261).
In certain spheres in Nepal, the idea of marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits carries
remarkably positive connotations; it is viewed either as a sign that society is advancing
‘out of’ caste and untouchability, or as a phenomenon that carries the potential to effect
such an advancement.
A particularly striking example of this way of thinking is apparent in the so-called ‘incen-
tive’ or ‘grant’ of NPR 100,000 (roughly USD 1,000) offered by the Ministry of Finance to
newly-wedDalit–non-Dalit couples. The grant was first introduced in 2009, and according
to the most reliable sources I could find, is still available today, although the procedures to
claim it have changed somewhat since its introduction. Couple’s eligibility rests on a few
criteria, in addition to the obvious requirement that one of the spouses be Dalit and the
other not. Such criteria include specifications concerning the ages of the newly-weds, the
requirement that a familymember from both the husband’s and the wife’s family testify to
the authenticity of the marriage, due registration of the marriage with the civil authorities,
and depositing the claim to the incentive within thirty days of this registration.
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What this amount represents for Nepali citizens depends on their social class, income
status, and place of residence. NPR 100,000 represents between three and five monthly
salaries of a teacher in a governmental primary school. It is about double what a labour
migrantmight earn in the Gulf on amonthly basis. For people who do not have formal em-
ployment, however, this amount is even more considerable. In Sammagaon, daily wages
for non-specialised agricultural work in another person’s fields are NPR 200 for men and
NPR 150 for women and children.
It is diﬀicult to obtain reliable data on how many couples have successfully claimed this
money since the introduction of the provision. Part of the diﬀiculty rests in the fact that, ini-
tially, district-level authorities were responsible for the distribution of the incentive. Some
people told me that the only way to obtain accurate statistics would be to contact the au-
thorities of each of the 75 districts independently. This suggestion might not be accurate,
however, since under the updated process, district authorities have to report to the Min-
istry of Finance exactly how many eligible couples have claimed the money on a year-by-
year basis. Setting aside the diﬀiculty of obtaining accurate information, it seems safe to as-
sume that the proportion of eligible couples who successfully claimed the incentive is low.
One study found that, in the districts of Banke, Parbat and Danusha, only 18.7 per cent
of 123 interviewed Dalit–non-Dalit couples had been awarded the money (Biswakarma
2013). Most of the Dalit–non-Dalit couples whom I met in rural and even urban parts of
Nepal were either unaware of the provision or, more often, had heard of it but suspected
that applying was a waste of time. They feared that there were too many administrative
hoops to jump through, too many bribes to pay, too many trips to take to distant govern-
ment oﬀices, too many conditions to fulfil, and little hope of actually receiving the money
in the end.
Setting problems of implementation to one side, the mere existence of a national financial
incentive for marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits is significant. It constitutes a strik-
ing illustration of the way in which ‘oﬀicial’, state-sanctioned discourses frame caste and
untouchability in Nepal, namely as backward and undesirable. In this regard, the incen-
tive is but one among several legal measures deployed in an attempt to curb caste-based
discrimination, a better-known example being the 2011 ‘Caste-based Discrimination and
Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act’, which made practices of untouchability
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an offence punishable by imprisonment.
Nevertheless, there is something which sets the incentive for intercaste marriage apart
from other policies. By promoting themixing of caste groups, the incentive seems to aim for
something more than the simple prevention or punishment of caste-based discrimination.
In this regard, it is different from the 2011 Act. The latter does contain a clause stating
that no onemay prevent another person from entering an intercaste marriage (article 4.11,
National Dalit Commission 2011), yet the formulation only concerns people’s individual
liberties, rather than encouraging intercastemarriage. There is no suggestion that bringing
about intercaste marriages is a goal of the Act. The incentive, on the other hand, seems
closer to Ilesh’s desire to foster ‘practical’ mixing.
Could the Ministry of Finance’s incentive really be seen as a provision aimed at increasing
the number of intercaste marriages in Nepal? Ratna BK, my (excellent) research assistant
in Kathmandu, secured me an interview with Abeer BK, a highly-positioned politician
who had been involved in the creation of this policy. Abeer explained that there were
several factors which had motivated the establishment of the policy. One was that Dalit–
non-Dalit couples are typically shunned by their relatives and have to flee to the city and
live without any support from their families. Because of this, they need financial help.
Another, more strategic motivation was to give the CPN-UML party, under whose gov-
ernment the policy was initiated, a better public image. But it was the third motivation, by
far the one we spent the most time discussing, which struck me most:
Abeer BK: Now, we are Dalits, and we are convinced that lower castes and
upper castes are the same, right? Now, how to support this? If a couplemarries
intercaste, something must be done to abolish the caste system, right? […] In
the case of intercaste marriage, by giving support to Dalits, Dalits’ and non-
Dalits’ socialisation takes place. Inclusion takes place. Because of this, by giving
this money, we provide support.
In this description, the incentive is framed as a means of ‘abolishing the caste system’ (jāt-
pat hataunu), as an instrumentwhich can create ‘inclusion’ and ‘socialisation’.5 Howmight
5. It is noteworthy that ‘inclusion’ here is being used very differently from the ‘inclusion’ which
was central to the writing of the country’s 2015 constitution. The former is about making people
closer and more similar to each other, while the latter was more about giving legal recognition to
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intercaste marriage effect such changes?
Ivan Deschenaux: My question is, why do you think that intercaste marriage
is a way to fight caste-based discrimination?
A BK: Right. How can this be? I explained it before, didn’t I? To sit together
and drink tea, to sit together and eat food, these things are only a matter of
mentality (bhavana). They are a matter of mentality, inconsequential things
(kehi hundaina bhanne kura). But after getting married? Well, marriage is a day-
to-daymatter. […] I said it before: it is a matter of blood, right? Suppose a child
is born. Now society changes quite wholly, right? As a consequence, this thing
called untouchability does not happen. When people agree, when they agree
with each other, when their heart is satisfied, it is possible tomarry. This cannot
be stopped by caste.
In the first part of this answer, Abeer makes remarks which are strikingly similar to what
Ilesh said about commensality. Like him, he suggests that the sharing of food and drink
between Dalits and non-Dalits is insignificant. Such acts are inconsequential; they have
no tangible effect. I should note that, after living in Sammagon for over a year, I found
these remarks perplexing, since the fact that Dalits and others can share food and drink is
not a given there. I suspect that one reason Dalit activists and politicians say this is that
they have grown accustomed to social spheres in which commensality is common.6 Still,
as I will show in the next chapter, even in Sammagaon, where commensality is rare, there
is a sense in which Abeer and Ilesh are right that commensality has no consequence. In
the meantime, suﬀice it to note that sharing food is, at the very least, inconsequential in
comparison to intercaste marriage.
Clues as to why intercaste marriage is so significant come in the second part of Abeer’s
answer. As in Ambedkar’s quotation above, and in a way that recalls Ilesh’s programme,
marriage is a matter of ‘blood’. It involves a biological kind of mixing much more remark-
the multiplicity of ethnic and caste groups who live in Nepal.
6. Cameron (2010) offers a different take on what separates Dalit activists and Dalits living in
rural Nepal. In her view, when the former focus on identity politics, they overlook the exploita-
tive, traditional system of economic exchange which the latter live in and the forms of resistance
and agency which rural Dalits develop within this system. This suggestion does not ring true of
Sammagaon where, as I have stated earlier, the Bishwakarma do not take part in any traditional
exchange system.
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able than what occurs through simple acts of commensality. It involves the mixing—or
‘fusion’ to use Ambedkar’s term—which takes place through sex and procreation. It can
change the partners engaging in sex themselves, and further holds the potential, when
these partners are of different castes, to create new kinds of humans that are not quite as
rigidly Dalit or non-Dalit as their parents. A suggestion made by Bloch comes to mind:
In fact, in all cases, kinship created through birth is believed to be less ne-
gotiable and therefore less potentially innovative than the unification coming
from food and sex. These are therefore often seen as tools in the hands of actors
bywhich they can affect change, or tune the unnegotiable aspect of parenthood
and siblinghood (Bloch 1999:139).
Abeer BK’s understanding of mixing, however, was different to Ilesh’s in one significant
regard. His view was not infused with the same notion that everybody’s blood is ‘equal’
and that caste therefore does not in fact exist. His was not a view aimed simply at cre-
ating a ‘feeling of being kith and kin’. Instead, he thought of intercaste marriage as a
method through which Dalit-ness could be spread to non-Dalits. Later in the interview, he
explained that according to ‘social practice’, any non-Dalit marrying a Dalit automatically
becomes aDalit themselves (this idea is indeed common, andwill be described inmore de-
tail in the next chapter). Accordingly, Abeer BK stated that intercaste marriage between
Dalits and non-Dalits is important because, with a suﬀicient number of intercaste mar-
riages, everybody would eventually become Dalit. He offered some evidence that this would
eventually happen by citing population statistics. The total population of upper-castes in
Nepal had supposedly significantly diminished over the past decades, and this, according
to him, had been caused by intermarriage.
Abeer BK’s view of mixing through intermarriage is therefore one in which Dalits can use
their defiling character strategically. It is close, in this regard, to a view defended by the
social theorist Ashis Nandy, who argues that the potential to pollute can be weaponised:
[Nandy] further argues that […] Dalits have traditionally controlled the savar-
nas through their power to pollute. The Dalits, as untouchables, can thus act as
poisoned weapons to produce a crisis for the twice-born in the Indian context
(Guru 2009:8).
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Whether or not Abeer BK’s explanations are an accurate description of the motivations
behind the policy—it is likely that the various people involved in the creation of the policy
had a variety of goals in mind—Abeer BK’s significant position in Nepal’s national poli-
tics when the policy came out and his role in its creation makes his account worth taking
seriously.
Another time intercaste marriage was promoted in Nepal was during the People’s War, in
the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. I found it diﬀicult to gather precise information
on this topic, as the ex-Maoist combatants to whom I had access in Puranogaon did not
say much on the topic. The best direct source of information I had was a Bishwakarma
woman whom I met in Kathmandu, Mukta BK, who had herself been part of the cultural
wing of the PLA and who had married a Magar (janajāti) man who had been a platoon
commander in the PLA. Details of this woman’s experience of intercaste marriage are re-
ported in the next section, but here is how she described the political intent of the Maoists
when promoting intercaste marriage:
Mukta BK:What it was—at the time, this is how it was. Intercaste marriages—
there was a kind of [policy] among Maoists that such marriages should be
encouraged. It was said that [caste-based discrimination] must be erased, that
encouragement must be given to intercaste marriages. It was said that discrim-
ination must be made to disappear by doing this.
There are few academic sources on the topic of intercaste marriage amongMaoists during
the war, and my own data is insuﬀicient to re-construct the reasoning behind the Maoists’
promotion of such marriages. It is possible that this reasoning was analogous to either
Ilesh’s orAbeer’s, but it is also possible that other understandings of the effects of intercaste
marriage were at play that I am simply unaware of. What can be asserted with confidence,
however, is that regardless of the exact reasoning behind it, the promotion of intercaste
marriagewas a strategy that opposed identity politics. Gayer (2013, 2014), whohas studied
the management of sexual relations among members of the PLA, notes the following.
TheMaoist leadership has been encouraging partyworkers andPLAfighters to
contract love marriages—and, in particular, intercaste love marriages—within
themovement’s ranks. For somewomen cadres of PLA, this policy is one of the
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major achievements of the Maobadis [Maoists] and one sign—among others—
of their greater maturity than their Naxalite ‘cousins’ (2013:347–348).
Gayer’s own focus is on the Maoists’ ‘scientific management’ of sexual desire in the PLA,
which was constructed in opposition to Nepal’s hitherto ‘feudal’ marital practices. Gayer
critically examines whether this scientific management was as feminist as its proponents
claimed. Because intercaste marriage is not his primary concern, he does not explain the
Maoists’ own justification for promoting it, at least not beyond a general association of
endogamy with the feudal practices which the Maoists were seeking to eliminate. He
does, however, show that ethnic activists, engaged in identity politics, were very critical of
the Maoists’ promotion of intercaste marriage.
Where these [Maoist policies] faced more resistance was in their attempt to
challenge rules of endogamy through the promotion of intercaste/interethnic
marriage. The policy did not go down well with all party cadres and faced
overt opposition from some ethnic leaders who rallied the Maoists during the
course of the war. This is the case, in particular, of Gopal Khambu, a Rai ethnic
leaderwho saw in the promotion of intercastemarriage a conspiracy to deprive
the Dalits and the janajātis of their most promising women (2013:355).
This passage is followed by a long quotation from Gopal Khambu himself, in which he
describes intercaste marriage as ‘an inter-caste relationship that is emerging as a serious
threat to the identity, existence, and nature of Asian Mongolian tribes’ (Khambu, cited in
Gayer 2013:355). It is thus safe to say that the Maoists’ promotion of intercaste marriage
was predicated on an opposition to identity politics, or at the very least, that it was per-
ceived as such. For janajāti activists, it came as a threat, because it risked diluting ethnicity.
How it was perceived by Dalits and Dalit activists I cannot say, but insofar as diluting the
Dalit identity carries the potential to blur the boundary between Dalits and others, my
guess is that it might have been welcomed, at the very least, with an ambivalence similar
to that of Ilesh.
So far, we have seen the hope that mixing and intercaste marriage can reduce caste-based
discrimination being formulated by prominent Indian political figures (Ambedkar, Pari-
yar), by a Nepali politician (Abeer BK), by a present-day activist in Nepal (Ilesh), and by
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Maoists during the People’sWar. Lest this evidence be over-interpreted, I should acknowl-
edge here that mixing remains a fringe strategy. By and large, identity-based activism is
more common inNepal, including for Dalits. Amore exhaustive typology of the strategies
followed by Dalits in Nepal figures in a conference paper recently delivered by Adhikari
andGellner (2018), which shows that the focus on identity does in fact predominate. Here,
I focus on mixing, despite it being fringe, for two reasons. First because it is at risk of be-
ing overlooked, and second, because the strategy is predicated on a social ontology that is
opposed to the one which psychological essentialism implicitly delivers, and this makes it
quite unique.
Interviews with Dalit–non-Dalit intercaste couples
The discussion so far has revolved entirely aroundwhat activists and political figures imag-
ine might happen if intermarriage between Dalits and non-Dalits became more frequent.
What can be said about couples who are actually in this type of marriage?
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I began interviewing mixed-caste couples. My initial
plan was to interview forty couples, twenty Dalit–non-Dalit and twenty non-Dalit–non-
Dalit (but intercaste nevertheless). My plans were cut short by the earthquake which hit
Nepal in April 2015, such that I onlymanaged to interview fifteen Dalit–non-Dalit couples
and five non-Dalit–non-Dalit couples. Because I interviewedmost spouses separately, this
represents thirty-three separate interviews, most of which are one to two hours in length.
The interviews comprised a fairly structured section in which I asked spouses how they
met, how they came to the decision to marry intercaste, how their marriage had been re-
ceived by their kin and society more generally, whether they thought that they or their
spouse had changed caste or ethnicity as a result of the marriage, and what caste or eth-
nicity they believed their children belonged to or would belong to. The interviews also
included a second section dedicated to a more free-flowing discussion.
These interviews do not allow me to describe intercaste marriage in generic terms, or to
present an underlying ‘script’ for intercaste marriage in the way that, for example, Quinn
(2005) does for marriage in the USA. There are two reasons for this. First, the total number
of interviews is too low to allow for methodologically sound generalisation. Second, the
202
CHAPTER 8. MIXING
couples I interviewed are extremely diverse. Even among Dalit–non-Dalit couples, the
spouses belong to a number of different Dalit castes and non-Dalit castes. Some of the
couples live in rural areas; others in Kathmandu. Some couples are hypergamous, others
hypogamous.7 Some are poor and struggle to get by, while others are part of amiddle-class,
urban, political elite. Some have registered their marriage with civil authorities, others
have not. Some are old and have lived together for decades; others are young, and so on.
In the free-flowing part of the interviews, it became clear that all of these factors played
a role in determining the way in which the spouses perceived their own marriage, the
reasons why theymarried intercaste, whether this marriage was ‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’ by
the spouses’ relatives and friends, etc.
Nevertheless, in conjunctionwith the frequent conversations I hadwith other people about
intercaste marriage, these interviews helped me gain a clearer understanding of whether
intercaste marriage is indeed believed to ‘mix’ castes, whether it can change the caste of
one spouse, and whether it can lead to the birth of ‘mixed’ babies. I discuss these ques-
tions more formally in the next chapter. In the final sections of this chapter, I give short
summaries of a few interviews to showcase the diversity just mentioned. Space does not
permit a more exhaustive account.
Chitra Darji and Chandni Maya Shrestha
Chitra Darji (Dalit) and his wife ChandniMaya Shrestha (Newar, janajāti) live in the VDC
of Puranogaon. Both of them are teachers in a local school. On my first trip to their house
with Ram Prasad, we only found Chandni Maya at home; her husband was out for a polit-
ical programme. Chandni Maya agreed to talk with us about her marriage, but during the
interview, she stayed mostly silent. While I was disappointed that she had not said much,
her reaction was understandable. After all, I had come from nowhere and started asking
personal questions about her marriage.
Several weeks later, I met Chitra, who answeredmy questions enthusiastically and in great
detail. He explained that he and Chandni had been classmates since grade 2. Chitra said
that they married at the age of seventeen, when they were both in grade 9. They had
gradually fallen in love, first treating each other ‘like siblings’, an expression used in Nepal
7. Though the majority are hypogamous, see next chapter for an explanation
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to indicate a non-romantic, non-sexual relation between a man and woman. Eventually,
however, the relation took on a romantic character, after Chitra had written love letters to
Chandni and persuaded her.8
Chitra spoke of his marriage to a non-Dalit in a markedly political way. While he is now
a member of the Nepali Congress, the political party which is the most distant from the
Maoists, during the war, he explained, he had been in perfect agreement with the Maoists’
opinions. It was thanks to the Maoists, he added, that he and his wife had not faced pub-
lic recriminations when they had married each other. Their marriage had taken place
during the People’s War. Had the Maoists not been present in the area, Chitra said, he
and Chandni would have had to hide or leave the area altogether. Society would not have
tolerated their marriage.9
Chitra said that he had decided by the age of thirteen or fourteen that he would not worry
about marrying a woman of his own caste, but rather try to marry for love (prem), regard-
less of this person’s caste. More generally, he believed that intercaste marriages such as
his own had the potential to change society.
Ivan Deschenaux: What you said about this is very helpful for me. You said
that, in your opinion, society must be mixed through intercaste marriage,
didn’t you?
Chitra Darji: Yes, yes.
ID: Explain this a little, please.
CD: After having an intercaste marriage, after there is mixing, what happens
is this. First, the old culture is destroyed. Right? The second thing is that, after
an intercaste marriage, you see, after an intercaste marriage there is a cross.
And children born from this cross are very talented. They are of a better breed
(unnat jāt).
He explained that he had tried to convince as many of his friends as possible to marry
8. On the importance of love letters in fostering love marriage in Nepal, see Ahearn (2001)
9. Because Chitra and Chandni live close to Bensitaun, this remark confirmed the observation
reported in chapter 5, according to which the Maoists had created an environment in which dis-
crimination against Dalits was indeed greatly reduced.
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intercaste, but thatmany of themwere reluctant because ofwhat their parentswould think.
Chitra himself had not experienced diﬀiculties with his own parents, who had accepted
their new daughter-in-law from the start. Relations with his in-laws, however, had not
been quite so easy. For the first four or five years after his marriage, he and his wife did
not have contact with her family, but eventually they came to accept that their daughter
had married a Dalit, and even invited him to their house. This is extremely rare, and
when I asked Chitra about it, he speculated that it was because there were only women
left in his wife’s immediate family, her father having died and she having no brother. Why
women would be more accepting of intercaste marriage than men is a topic which he did
not comment on, and I do not have a speculative answer to offer.
Of all the people in Dalit–non-Dalit marriages whom I talked to, Chitra made the most en-
thusiastic comments about themixed character of hismarriage. He explained this through
the following comparison:
ID: And this, right, this mixing of castes—you said this can lead to children
with talent didn’t you? Please explain this to me too. I did not know this.
CD: It’s about children’s mind (dimāg), you see. How to put it? We raise an-
imals here, don’t we? Now, it is said that if only the same old male goat and
female goat are put together, then [the offspring] will spoil, won’t it?
ID: Yes.
CD: Yes. Now, in this way, after an intercaste marriage, I hope that children
with fine minds (pātalo dimāg) and superior thoughts (ucca bicār) will be born.
In sum, the way in which Chitra speaks of his own marriage seems in perfect accordance
with the idealised ‘mixing’ imagined by Ilesh. His marriage was concluded after he and
his wife had been in a long relationship and grown to love each other; it was accepted
immediately by his own family and eventually even by his in-laws, and from this marriage,
he hopes, mixed and better babies will be born and the old culture destroyed.
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AMaoist marriage
Mukta BK (Dalit) is the woman quoted earlier, in the passage describing the Maoists’ pro-
motion of intercaste marriage. I interviewed her in Kathmandu with my assistant Ratna.
Aged 32, Mukta had married eleven years earlier and was now studying for a Bachelor’s
degree. She explained that she grew up in a VDC in West Nepal where caste-based dis-
crimination was very strong. When she was in grade 10, she joined the Maoist insurgency,
as a member of the PLA’s ‘cultural wing’, where she took part in programmes aimed at
disseminating the Maoist ideology among Nepal’s population. This is when she met her
future husband, a Magar (non-Dalit) man called Uttam, who was a platoon commander
in the PLA.
The marriage itself was encouraged by leaders in the Maoist movement. Indeed, the first
step towards it happenedwhen a PLA combatant with amuch higher rankmet Uttam and
Mukta separately and asked them whether they felt any attraction for each other. At the
time, Mukta answered that she had not given much consideration to Uttam. The senior
combatant, however, encouragedUttam to pursueMukta. He did, and they eventually fell
in love. Mukta was not sure why their senior colleague had done this, but she speculated
that it was because of the Maoists’ policy of promoting intercaste marriage.
Although Mukta developed an attraction for Uttam, she was initially apprehensive about
the idea of marrying him. She was not worried about his personal reaction, because she
felt that caste did not matter at all to comrades in the PLA. Rather, what made her ap-
prehensive was the potential reaction of Uttam’s relatives. She explained that she was, at
first, scared that they would mistreat her because of her caste, were she ever to live with or
close to them. After a while, she andUttamwere stationed in different parts of the country.
This being the time during which the Maoists were underground, she and Uttam could
not meet regularly, but they exchanged love letters. Eventually, Mukta agreed to marry
Uttam. Her apprehensions about her future in-lawswere put to rest when they themselves
wrote her a letter telling her that she had nothing to fear. Eventually, the marriage itself
was celebrated following the wartime marriage rituals which the Maoists had created. It
was oﬀiciated by a commander of the PLA, in the presence of several fighters and the in-
habitants of some sixty Magar houses, approximately one year after she and Uttam had
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initially met.
Did this woman feel that marriages such as hers could have an effect on caste and caste-
based discrimination, as theMaoist leaders suggested? During the interview, Ratna asked
her whether she had married intercaste because she felt that this could combat caste dis-
crimination. Himself a fervent supporter of the Maoists, Ratna added that he had wanted
such a marriage, but that he ‘had not been successful in the end’. Mukta answered that,
despite the explanations given by the Maoist leaders, her main motivation had been quite
apolitical: she had married her husband because, quite simply, she had fallen in love with
him.
Mukta was, however, one of the very few people in an intercaste marriage I met who said
that her (future) children would be of ‘mixed-caste’. They would be, she said, ‘part Magar
and part Bishwakarma’. Like Chitra, she also said that children born to intercaste couples,
in particular those between a janajāti person and aDalit or between a janajāti and an upper-
caste person, have higher ‘talent’ than others.
In the two examples just described, Dalits marry a non-Dalit after falling in lovewith them.
They think carefully about the marriage and choose to enter it only after careful, reflective
evaluation. In both of these cases, too, the marriage is thought of as a union that can
produce ‘mixed’ babies, as a result of which caste-based discrimination can be diminished.
These two cases, however, were exceptions. The next case which I describe is much more
representative of what I encountered in the rural area of Sammagaon.
Varun Bahadur Sārki and Bina Basnet
In extreme cases, non-Dalits who marry a Dalit view their matrimony as a case of extreme
misfortune. I found such cases mostly in rural areas, amongwomen born to non-Dalit par-
ents who eloped with Dalit men. The most striking discovery for me was that several non-
Dalit women entered such marriages without knowing that their husband was Dalit. Prior
to getting married, the husband had either lied about his identity or ‘omitted’ to mention
that he was a Dalit. Women in such situations sometimes explained that they came from
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poor families, and that it was because of the pressure which their family placed on them
to marry someone they did not like that they had chosen to elope, without realising that
the person they were eloping with was a Dalit.
Varun Bahadur Sārki (Dalit), aman in his early sixties, would come toGanga’s house every
now and then to work and drink jandh. Early in my fieldwork, I helped him rebuild part of
a wall supporting a terraced field which had collapsed during the previous monsoon, but
this and a few other sporadic conversations—he is a quiet character—formed the extent of
our interaction. It was only in the last months of my fieldwork that Sirjana, my ‘sister’ in
Sammagaon, alerted me to the fact that he was in an intercaste marriage, having married
a Chhetri woman called Bina.
When I interviewed Varun Bahadur about his marriage, he did not say anything remark-
able. He simply stated that his intercaste marriage had created no issue for him at all. His
relatives had accepted the fact that his wife was Chhetri. The impression he left me with
was that this was really nothing worth talking about.
The interviewwith hiswife, Bina, was quite different. Followingmy invitation, she came to
the interview looking tired and dejected, dressed in muddy work clothes. At least twenty
years my senior, this woman was clearly uncomfortable when I interviewed her. We sat
in my room with the door closed in order to ensure that we had complete privacy. Most
of her answers were limited to a few words. She struggled with my foreign accent and I
struggled with her colloquial Nepali. As I trudged through my questions, I tried to en-
courage her to talk about her marriage, but she gave me little information, certainly no
extensive description or narrative. Bina kept scratching herself nervously. A few minutes
into the interview, she scratched so hard that she drew blood; a few drops trickled down
her arm. I offered to interrupt the interview several times, but she insisted on continuing.
After the interview, I felt frustrated. It took me a while to realise that, in fact, Bina’s reluc-
tance to answer my questions was in itself revealing. It was only when I re-listened to the
recording that I noticed how central the topic of ‘shame’ had been in most of her answers,
and that the main thing she said about her marriage was how much shame it made her
feel.
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Bina explained that, at the timewhen she gotmarried, she hadnot known that her husband
was a Dalit. Discovering the caste of her husband after the fact had clearly been traumatic.
The following excerpt describes how, after the marriage, she only met her mother once.
Bina Basnet: With my mother too, one year later… or… how much later… My
mother and I met in the month of phus [December–January] or the month of
magh [January–February]. Since then we have not met. I didn’t go to meet her
out of shame (lāj), you know?
Ivan Deschenaux: Out of shame?
BB: Yes.
[…]
BB:And mother and father, [incomprehensible] when I was small—it was dif-
ficult, you know? My mother was still alive; my mother was still alive… To
meet her was really diﬀicult for me. Just looking at my mother’s face, I felt
ashamed.
ID:Why?
BB: I, a daughter of a Chhetri, unknowingly eloped with a Sārki. After this,
how could I meet my mother again?
ID: Oh? This is the reason?
BB: Yes. I felt shame. What’s to be done?
For a long time, before I started actually searching for and interviewing people in intercaste
marriages, I had assumed that all intercastemarriages would follow a basic script in which
romantic love diverts couples away from endogamy. My assumption had been that when
people violate the rules of endogamy in Nepal, they do so knowingly and deliberately. I
was, in a sense, operating with a simplistic, dichotomous model in which endogamy is
‘traditional’ and exogamy is ‘modern’. Bina’s case is a striking illustration of how wrong
my assumption was.
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Many of the other non-Dalit womenmarried to a Dalit menwhom I talked with expressed
varying levels of diﬀiculty with their natal relatives, although Bina Basnet struckme as the
most resigned of them all. She told me that everybody in Sammagaon treated her like a
Dalit now because of her marriage, but unlike some of the other people I spoke with, she
offered no suggestion that this situation was abnormal or unacceptable. In fact, when I
asked her why she thought all of this had happened to her, she answered
BB:Who knows? I didn’t do anything…. To die.
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Two models of caste transmission
In the previous chapter, I presented data collected through interviews with people in
Dalit–non-Dalit marriages. I showed that spouses in such marriages have no single way
of thinking about their union, and that it is consequently hard to produce valid generali-
sations.
In this chapter, I offer instead a formalisation of what is at stake in ‘mixing’. The aim is to
gain a clearer view of whether mixing might in fact constitute an effective strategy for the
alleviation of caste-based discrimination, and of the hurdles which those employing this
strategy might face.
Malleable persons and rigid castes: a classic anthropological de-
bate
Thirty years ago, in an essay on how Brahmins in Benares understand birth, death, and
the human body, Parry (1989) outlined his views on one of the classic debates in the study
of caste. Broadly speaking, the debate concerned the extent to which persons in what
was then referred to as ‘caste society’ are thought to be entities subject to change. The
question at the core of this debate was whether South Asians think that humans are made
of a malleable and changing substance or whether they are thought to have immutable,
permanent cores.
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One school emphasised the rigidity of the caste system and the unchanging nature of peo-
ple born into castes. As is well known, Dumont (1980[1966]) in particular emphasised
hierarchy as a single, overarching principle in South Asia. According to this principle,
people are born into a certain rank in a hierarchy based on purity and pollution. In this
view, ‘castes are regarded as units of equivalence composed of people of the same general
kind’ (Parry 1989: 494, emphasis mine). In other words, the rank at which one is born
determines one’s nature, once and for all, and those who are born at the same rank belong
to the same kind.
On the other hand, works such as those of Mariott (1976) and the Chicago Indianists em-
phasised the importance of a ‘protean’ conception of the person in Hindu South Asia. The
term ‘protean’ refers to a person who is inherently malleable, in whom nothing is perma-
nent. These studies focused on the monist character of what they called ‘Hindu thought’.
Monist conceptions are opposed to dualist ones; they hold that there is no separation be-
tween mind and body. Any change in the body is a change in the mind and, consequently,
a change in the self. According to this view, in South Asia, ‘persons are seen as having
a transformable bio-moral substance which is continually modified by the transactions
in which they engage’ (Parry 1989:494). To simplify, South Asians view humans as con-
stantly changing, as they alternately accrue and rid themselves of ritual impurity.
An unformulated questionwhich lay at the heart of this debate is the extent towhich South
Asians hold essentialist construals of human identity. The first camp implicitly argued that
South Asians are highly essentialist because they view humans as fixed, rigid things that
are determined by their caste and by an inherent degree of purity or impurity. The second
camp argued that South Asians are radically non-essentialist because they view persons
as made of eminently malleable and transformable stuff.
Parry himself argued that both notions are simultaneously present, and called upon at
various times; they function as ideologies that are used strategically and contextually. He
further claimed that the understanding of humans as changing not only coexists with a
rigid understanding of caste, but in fact helps sustain it. Change, for those who are at the
top of the hierarchy, is dangerous. It contains an inherent potential for ‘disintegration’,
‘degeneration’ and ‘chaos’ (Parry 1989:513–514), and it is to avoid the actualisation of this
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potential that strict caste-based rules emerge and are enforced. Thanks to these rules, the
‘rigid’ view of caste becomes prevalent. To simplify, it is because of the risk of pollution
that caste is so rigid.
The debate just mentioned takes on new significance in light of the previous chapter’s
discussion of mixing as a strategy for the alleviation of caste-based discrimination. As we
saw, in one conception mixing is seen as a way to blur the boundary that separates Dalits
from everybody else, a way to create a sense of ‘kith and kin’ between individuals, and
perhaps even a way to produce mixed kinds of persons that are of neither one caste nor
the other. The other conception of mixing exploits the fact that non-Dalits are vulnerable
to pollution. The aim in this case is to bring everybody into the same, Dalit caste, thereby
making caste distinctions irrelevant.
A protean understanding of persons—according to which humans are subject to change—
seems to be a pre-condition for both of these strategies. It is only if mixing does indeed
have the power to change what caste people belong to that it makes sense as a strategy
to fight discrimination. In one case, people change and become ‘less determinate’; in the
other, people change and becomeDalit. In addition, there is the case of intercastemarriage
and the further question of whether people of different castes could give birth to babies
who are ‘mixed’.
It is with the aim to address these topics that I ask, in what follows, whether the people of
Sammagaon think that people can change which caste they belong to, and whether they
can give birth to babies who are not of the same caste as themselves.
Models of caste transmission
In this section, I describe twomodels of how caste can be ‘transmitted’ from one individual
to another. Before doing so, I should note that these models were not described to me
explicitly. Instead, they are the result of my asking numerous questions and applying
inferential reasoning to the answers I was given. Thus, these models are abstractions from
the ways in which people in Sammagaon think and talk about caste.
I wish to make this clear because readers might take issue with my use of the term ‘trans-
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mission’ to describe how caste can, in specific circumstances, be passed on from one indi-
vidual to another. People in Sammagaon do not use a Nepali equivalent to ‘transmission’,
i.e. this is not an emic category. People in Sammagaon do however speak as if, under
certain circumstances, the caste of one individual can determine or even change that of an-
other, although they do not give detailed explanations of how this transformation occurs.
‘Transmission’ is the term I use to describe this possibility.
There is a strand of cognitive anthropology that addresses mental ‘models’ (alternatively,
‘scripts’ or ‘schema’) (e.g. D’Andrade 1995; Strauss and Quinn 1997: esp. chapter 3; Bloch
2013:esp. chapter 7). These are forms of knowledge or mental states which are, to var-
ious degrees, implicit, non-linguistic, action-oriented and which dispose individuals to
process new information in specific ways. The ‘models’ of caste transmission discussed
here are a type of cultural knowledge which is not usually verbalised, but nevertheless
not quite the implicit and unconscious dispositions which the literature on scripts and
schemas describes. Rather, they are part of very basic cultural knowledge, which is taken
as self-evident and not worth expressing but nevertheless informs fundamental aspects of
life.
The vertical model: descent
There are two ways in which one can become a member of a particular caste or ethnic
group in Nepal.
The first is through descent. I call this the ‘vertical’ model of caste transmission because
this term describes how it looks on a kinship diagram. To the people of Sammagaon, ver-
tical transmission is the most obvious way in which caste can be transmitted from one
individual to another. It concerns the caste of parents and that of their newborn babies,
and is a fact of life so obvious that most people found it very strange, absurd even, that I
asked about it.
In this model, when two parents of the same caste have children, these children inherit
their parents’ caste. Later, when the children grow up, they will marry a partner of the
same caste, and when they in turn have children, the cycle will repeat. This is endogamy
and descent at their most basic. Vertical descent is also the key principle sustaining a
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Figure 9.1: Vertical transmission of caste
static and essentialist view of personhood, as opposed to a protean one. The caste of any
individual is determined at birth, and if the vertical model applies, people’s caste status
will never change.
Being the norm, vertical transmission is the ethnographic baseline against which all devi-
ating cases must be compared.
The horizontal model: defilement
The other major way in which caste can be transmitted from one individual to another in
Nepal is through defilement. To stay in line with the question of how this spreads on a
kinship diagram, I call this ‘horizontal transmission’.
There is an idiom in Nepali which readily captures the horizontal model of caste transmis-
sion. It is the short phrase ‘jāt jancha’. The literal translation of this sentence is ‘caste goes
(away)’, but it could equally be rendered as ‘caste is lost’. What the idiom refers to is the
loss of a person’s high-caste status and their demotion to a lower caste. The central idea of
‘jāt jancha’ is that, given the wrong type of behaviour, an upper-caste person may become
a person of lower caste. The behaviour which can trigger this is precisely that which is
prohibited by traditional rules of untouchability, e.g. commensality.
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Figure 9.2: Horizontal transmission of caste
Defilement or horizontal transmission is the key principle behind the protean conception
of personhood. It is only because of the possibility of defilement that upper-caste persons
can, potentially, change which caste they belong to.
Disappearing horizontal transmission
In chapter 2, we encountered older Dalits saying that untouchability has diminished over
recent decades. Older upper-caste people make assertions which are consistent with this
suggestion. According to them, in the past, caste was much more fragile for those at the
top.
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I set off to interview older Bahun people in Puranogaon,
the village next to Sammagaon. I was struck by the fact that most of them described be-
ing high-caste in the past as something which required a lot more effort than today. They
told me about rules they were taught as children which their younger relatives were not
even aware of but which, until some thirty to thirty-five years ago, were observed quite
strictly. These rules were, for the most part, tied to the preservation of purity and cleanli-
ness. They included prescriptions on the number of times one had to wash, the necessity
of changing clothes before a meal, the number of times one was to conduct pujā, etc. They
also included, consistent with what the Bishwakarma had told me, much more rigid rules
regarding interactions with Dalits. Just how much such rules were in fact applied a few
decades ago is, of course, something which cannot be verified empirically, but the consen-
sus was that they were observed to a much greater extent. Furthermore, those who did
violate those rules could effectively lose their caste.
The clearest description of this possibility came from Narendra and Sabita Ghimire, the
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parents of Ram Prasad, a Bahunman from Puranogaon whom I have known since my first
trip to Nepal in 2010 and at whose house I would stay for a few nights every time I made
the trip between Sammagaon and Kathmandu. In an interviewwith Narendra and Sabita,
we had been talking about the fact that Bahuns should not eat food cooked by a Sārki when
the topic of losing one’s caste came up.1
Ivan Deschenaux: Explain this to me a little. I know that there is this practice.
But its meaning—why it is not okay to eat [food cooked by a Sārki]—I have not
quite understood themeaning of this yet. If youwere to eat something touched
by a Dalit, what would happen to you?
Narendra Ghimire (husband): [laughs heartily at the provocative nature of
my question]
Sabita Ghimire (wife): In earlier times, everybody would shame you: ‘He ate
something touched by such and such! His caste has gone away!’ It was like
this. Yes. ‘His caste has gone away! He ate something touched by that one. We
must separate his water now. We cannot eat what he touches.’ Society (samāj)
would say these things.
ID: Explain this practice of ‘caste going away’ a little, please. Is this an old
practice? Is it still practised today? What is this practice?
SG: ‘Caste goes away’, this means, from now on, to sit separately from others,
not to take part in society, to sit and eat alone, to be told ‘We won’t touch you!’
and ‘You are a personwhose caste has gone away.’ This is themeaning of ‘caste
goes away’. Not to be allowed to sit with one’s brothers.
NG: Right. If I ate food touched by a Dalit, right, now all my brothers would
say, ‘You ate [food] touched by a Dalit. Don’t come here with us! We won’t
drink water touched by you.’
At this point in the interview, I tried to ask whether the loss of caste one could incur in this
1. In this transcription, I have translated Narendra and Subita’s words in the past tense, because
I believe this most closely reflects their intent. In reality, they shifted inconsistently between the
present tense and the past as they spoke.
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way was permanent. Until then, my impression had been that a specific purification ritual
could be undertaken, which consisted in cleansing oneself with water that had come into
contact with gold. Narendra and Subita did not immediately understandmy question, but
their son, Ram Prasad, came to my help.
Ram Prasad Ghimire (son): If one only ate [with a Dalit] once, would [losing
one’s caste] happen for one’s entire life?
SG: It would go for one’s whole life.
ID: It would go for life?
SG: Yes. It would be gone.
RPG: One would not be able to become a Bahun [again]?
NG: After eating once, caste would indeed have gone for life.
ID: Really?
NG: Really.
[…]
ID: Until now, what I had heard is that there is such a thing as the sun pāni
(gold water) ritual. Please explain this. What is this ritual?
NG: Sun pānimeans, this is a little…
SG:…it’s to purify a place.
NG: Very good things can purify, can’t they? After touching things [with this
water], they would become good again.
SG: But such a person could not be purified with sun pāni. He who eats what
a Sārki has touched, sun pāni does not purify him. He is gone. Gone. If I ate
what had been touched by a Sārki, I’d be gone. From this point, no matter how
much gold water or salt water I used, I’d be gone.2
2. This is a word play. ‘Gold’ (sun) and ‘salt’ (nun) only differ by one letter in Nepali. The
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Iwas quite taken aback by the insistence that commensality alone could lead to permanent
and irreversible defilement. None of what I had seen suggested that this was remotely pos-
sible today. The glances Ram Prasad was giving made me think that he too was surprised.
I encouraged him to express his views.
RPG: But my impression, right, is that earlier practices are changing in all
things. In very early times, maybe caste used to go forever. But after this, in an
intermediate time, Brahmins could call a priest. They could call a priest, right,
and the priest would read [sacred texts], the Brahmin would give [the priest]
some money, he would received tika, and after this, he could re-gain his own
caste.
ID: Is there such a possibility?
SG: No, no, there is not [laughing].
NG:Now—now, if a Sārki came and entered our house then what our custom
is, is to do what we call Rudri.
ID: Right. Rudri pujā, right?
NG:Yes. Wewould doRudri pujā. And then do theworkwith thewater [Rudri
pujā requires water, but this is not sun pāni] and make [the house] pure again,
with this water, make it auspicious.
ID: Right. If a Dalit comes in, your caste does not go away, but youmust purify
the house.
NG: Yes. This is the way that one purifies it.
Permanent defilement of the type described by Sabita and Narendra no longer happens.
Much the opposite, members of the upper castes can act almost however theywishwithout
their high-caste status being at risk. The behaviour of Ram Prasad and his wife Rasika
themselves is testament to this fact. Like many Nepalis, they talk of their disapproval
of caste-based discrimination, but unlike others, they seem not to be ambivalent about it.
sentence could be stylised as ‘gold water is no more useful than salt water’.
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Their actions in daily life are, as far as I could tell, quite consistent with this disapproval.
They let Dalits into their house, proudly point out that they share meals with them, and
otherwise violate the traditional rules of untouchability. They teach their eleven-year-old
son that they will let him choose any wife, including a Dalit, as long as she is an ‘educated’
person. Their two daughters, they say, will be taught the same thing once they are old
enough to understand.
Both Ram and Rasika attribute their liberal attitude towards caste to their ‘education’ (shik-
shā) and Ram in particular likes to say that his role as a teacher is to give a good example to
students. In openly violating caste rules, they are fairly exceptional. Most of their relatives
will say that they do not care about caste, but only very few will behave consistently with
the assertion. For example, Ram’s father never lets Dalits into his own house. For a week
following the earthquake on 24 April 2015, I was stuck in Bensitaun with Ratna BK, my re-
search assistant fromKathmandu, a Dalit. Many of the buildings had collapsed or become
uninhabitable, so villagers were sleeping and eating together in the school building which
had remained standing, nearby. Ram’s father, even during this time of crisis, discreetly
avoided eating with me and Ratna because of Ratna’s caste, as Ram later pointed out to
me.
Yet, despite Ram and Rasika’s exceptional behaviour, they do not feel that they are putting
themselves at risk by violating traditional caste rules. As Ram explained to me one after-
noon, before the People’s War, if a Bahun ate with a Dalit or let a Dalit into his house, this
Bahun’s reputation and status would immediately be at stake. The relatives of the Bahun,
Ram added, would start treating them as if they were a Dalit. This is consistent with what
his mother and father had said in the interview. Ram explained that before the war, he
never used to eat with Dalits in his own village for fear of such reprisals; he would only do
so occasionally, in other places, when he was far away from home. But now, he said, he
can eat with Dalits openly. His older kin still disapprove of his doing so, but he says that
they cannot stop him any more. And despite this, he has never been treated like a Dalit.
A later passage of the interview with Ram’s parents confirms these claims.
NG: For example we—now, in this age—what do Bahuns do? Bahuns also eat
food touched by a Sārki, don’t they? The Sārki also eat. They eat as equals,
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right? But of a Dalit only a Dalit can come (Dalit ko Dalit hunchha), of a Bahun
only a Bahun, of a Chhetri only a Chhetri. Right? A Kāmi can only be a Kāmi
or Kamini [feminine form]. Nobody’s caste can change (Kunai pani usko jāt ta
pharak pardaina).
ID: Right. I want to ask this question. Your sons, do they eat things touched
by Dalit?
NG: Now…. Now, in this age, they eat [such food].
SG: But my sons are Bahun!
ID: They are Bahun. But do they eat or not?
NG: They eat.
SG: They eat, but they are Bahun.
NG: They are Bahun despite eating [brief laugh].
ID: Right. Please explain this to me
SG: [laughs]
ID:What did you tell me earlier? Only ten minutes earlier, what you told me,
what you explained tome—inmy understanding—is that if a Bahun eats some-
thing touched by a Sārki, his caste goes away for life.
NG: Yes, it goes.
SG: Yes! It goes.
ID: But now, what did you just say? It’s not like this. [You said that] your sons,
although they eat, their caste does not go away. Explain this to me, please.
NG: Yes. It has not gone.
SG: Yes.
NG: Right. In the present age, it is not like this.
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ID: Right.
NG: It was like that only before. That was in an earlier age. In the present age,
now, it is like this.
SG:Now, my son, he goes wherever [he wants]. Even if the son of a Sārki goes
there too. I eat what I have seen my son cook. My son has not become a Sārki,
in today’s age.
ID: But, in an earlier age…
SG:…he would have. Yes. That was in the past.
NG: Our relatives would have said, ‘your son has eaten what a Sārki touched!’
They would have shamed us. Right? But now nobody says this. ‘Your son has
eaten something touched by a Sārki and come back here, look!’—Nobody says
this to me.
SG: It is not only my son! Nowadays everybody does this!
NG: It is not only my son! Other people’s sons also eat [food with Dalits]!
ID: I only mentioned your son as an example.
NG and SG: [Both laugh.]
ID: But now, anybody can eat food cooked by anybody else, and their caste will
stay?
NG: Yes. It stays.
What this passage confirms is that defilement, the horizontal transmission of caste, is dis-
appearing. Ram’s status as a Bahun is not threatened by his actions. He is without any
question Bahun and will stay Bahun no matter what he eats, no matter with whom.
Recall the dismissive remarks which both Abeer BK and Ilesh made about using commen-
sality as a strategy for Dalit activism. Abeer said that eating together was ‘just a matter
of mentality’. Ilesh found that organising feasts between Dalits and non-Dalits was ‘too
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common’ and explained that his blood donation programme, in contrast, was radical be-
cause it made people mix their bodies rather than just their food. The material presented
in this chapter allows us to better understand these remarks. Even though many upper-
caste people still avoid sharing foodwithDalits, doing so is no longer seen as a strong form
of mixing, or at least no longer as the type of mixing that can affect people’s caste status.
In Bensitaun, the few Bahuns who do share food with Dalits no longer become polluted;
their caste does not ‘go away’ in any significant, practical sense.
What are the implications of this for mixing as a strategy to alleviate caste-based discrimi-
nation?
On the one hand, that defilement is disappearing is to be celebrated. That ideas of pollu-
tion are dwindling away among the upper castes confirms, as argued in chapter 2, that
fully-fledged untouchability is mostly a phenomenon of the past. Insofar as caste-based
avoidances are a form of discrimination, the fact that people regard them as no longer
necessary represents a reduction of discrimination.
On the other hand, we must not lose sight of what replaces defilement and pollution. If
people such as Ram no longer fear interacting with Dalits, this is not because caste as a
whole has disappeared. It is not because, as in the mestizo case studied by Hale (2015),
everybody is now so completely ‘mixed up’ that it is impossible to divide people into dif-
ferent kinds. It is rather that the protean, malleable understanding of persons is being
abandoned. The vertical transmission of caste, however, remains unaffected: ‘Of a Dalit
only a Dalit can come. Of a Bahun, only a Bahun. Of a Chhetri, only a Chhetri.’ A fully
enthusiastic evaluation would be warranted if ritual pollution had been the only way in
which Dalits are stigmatised, but as chapter 2 argued, this is not the case. That a Bahun
such as Ram can now feel confident that he will remain a Bahun no matter what might
indeedmean that untouchability is disappearing, but it means precious little with regards
to all the other stigmas that afflict Dalits. The protean understanding of persons is not
necessary for other stigmas to persist. Vertical transmission is enough to keep caste quite
‘rigid’.
Unlike commensality, intercaste marriage does have the potential to disrupt the vertical
model of caste transmission, and it must therefore be addressed separately.
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Mixing in intercaste marriage
I now turn to the case of intercaste marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits (or between
Dalit castes separated by untouchability, but I apply the usual terminological simplifica-
tion here). Intercastemarriages that cross traditional lines of untouchability are interesting
for two reasons. First, they bring the vertical and horizontal models of caste transmission
into direct and fairly explicit conflict with each other. Second, they are the only instances I
am aware of in which people risk actually losing their caste permanently. Non-Dalits who
marry Dalits are still regularly, although not systematically, repudiated by and excluded
from their family, forced to live with their Dalit spouse and to become a Dalit themselves.
At least three hypothetical outcomes can obtain for spouses in a Dalit–non-Dalit marriage.
Outcome 1: status quo (figure 9.3). Neither spouse changes caste as the result of the
marriage. In this case, only vertical transmission takes place, and both of the spouses
continue to belong to different castes after the marriage .
Figure 9.3: Status Quo.
Outcome 2: horizontal transmission of the Dalit caste through defilement (figure 9.4).
In this case the non-Dalit spouse, whether it is the man or the woman, becomes a Dalit
because of the marriage.
Outcome 3: horizontal transmission of caste consistent with the thar name (figure 9.5).
In this case, thewife takes the caste of her husband. In a hypogamousmarriage, a non-Dalit
wife would become a Dalit when marrying a Dalit husband. In a hypergamous marriage,
a Dalit wife would cease to be a Dalit when marrying a non-Dalit husband. This last pos-
sibility has not been mentioned so far, but there are two reasons I introduce it here. First,
this possibility is consistent with what happens with thar names. The thar, as explained in
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Figure 9.4: Defilement.
chapter 1, functions like a surname. It is strictly exogamous and, for the woman, changes
at marriage. For example, when a Bishwakarma woman of the Dehegli thar marries a
Bishwakarma man of another thar, she is quite literally ‘given’ to her in-laws during the
wedding’s central ritual of khanyādān (gift of a virgin). She is then included into their
kul (lineage) and becomes a member of their thar. Full wedding rituals are almost never
carried out for Dalit–non-Dalit marriages. Nevertheless, when a Dalit woman marries a
non-Dalit man, according to social practice, she should take on a non-Dalit thar. Given the
association between thar and caste, this should imply taking on his caste too.
The second reason I introduce this possibility here is that it is consistent with Nepali law,
especially as regards the names which figure on identity documents. There is no single
rule in Nepal as to which ‘surname’ is inscribed on one’s documents. In some cases, this
might be one’s thar, but in others, it might be one’s caste name. In the case of an intercaste
marriage, a wife is legally eligible to change her name to her husband’s, if she chooses to
do so. A Dalit woman marrying a non-Dalit is therefore eligible to change her name to a
non-Dalit one.
Figure 9.5: Thar-like transmission.
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When it comes to the caste of the children born from intercaste marriages, only outcome
1 may potentially lead to the birth of ‘mixed’ children. Indeed, in outcomes 2 and 3, after
one spouse has changed caste, the marriage ‘collapses’ to the more usual type of vertical
transmission shown in figure 9.1. But even in outcome 1, the birth of a ‘mixed’ child is
not guaranteed. A condition for it to occur is for kinship to be reckoned, to some extent,
bilaterally (figure 9.6). A purely patrilineal understanding of caste transmission can lead,
even in the case of intercaste marriage, to a child who is not mixed (figure 9.7).
Figure 9.6: Bilateral transmission.
Figure 9.7: Patrilineal transmission.
While in the field, I asked many people about these various possibilities. People would
often be hesitant and explain that such marriages are rare, but I would then tell them that
I only wanted to know what they thoughtwould happen.
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Outcome 1, according to which intercaste marriage does not lead to a change of caste, is
the least frequent answer I received. Only a few stated that people in such marriages
could retain their caste aﬀiliation. An exception is women in hypogamous Dalit–non-Dalit
marriages. When interviewingwomen in suchmarriages, I always asked, ‘In your opinion,
what is your caste now?’ In many cases, the woman would initially, spontaneously tell
me that she belongs to the caste of her parents. However, when I would further ask, ‘So
you have stayed [pre-marital caste] despite having married [caste of husband]?’ some
interviewees changed theirmind, stating that no, after all, they had probably becomeDalit,
like their husbands.
Moreover, even people who agreed that outcome 1 was possible would disagree that such
marriages would lead to the birth of a mixed child (figure 9.6). They said that the caste
of a child comes from his father, no matter what (figure 9.7), and would regularly refer
to the names that would be written on the child’s identity documents as evidence for this
fact.
It wasmore frequent for people to say that one spouse does change caste in Dalit–non-Dalit
intercaste marriages. Whether this happens through defilement (outcome 2) or through
change of name (outcome 3) is not, however, clear. Indeed, in the case of a hypogamous
marriage, these two possibilities lead to the same result. When a non-Dalit womanmarries
a Dalit man and becomes a Dalit, this could be the result of her husband’s lower caste
‘defiling’ her, or it could be because she is adopting her husband’s thar name and caste.
While the underlying justificationmight seemvery different in these two cases, thismatters
very little in practice: after marrying a Dalit man, a woman becomes a Dalit.
Thus, to adequately distinguish between outcomes 2 and 3, one should ideally study hy-
pergamousDalit–non-Dalit marriage. This however presents amajormethodological chal-
lenge, as such marriages are extremely rare. The only hypergamous Dalit–non-Dalit cou-
ples I could find lived in Kathmandu: none had remained in their villages of origin.
This rarity can be attributed to patrilocality. In a hypogamous marriage, a Dalit man
‘brings back’ a non-Dalit woman to his house. The relatives of the Dalit husband might
disapprove of his choice because, as the next chapter will show, it makes it impossible to
have a wedding which respects the customs of ‘arranged marriage’ (magi vivāha). Addi-
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tionally, there may be some minor ways in which the wife will remain an outsider. For
example, according to tradition, she should not take part in shraddha rituals, a form of an-
cestor worship.3 On the whole, however, people say that such marriages do not pose a
fundamental challenge.
The wife is usually the person who suffers the most in a hypogamous Dalit–non-Dalit
marriage, as she becomes a Dalit in the process. It will become extremely hard, if not
outright impossible, for her to return to hermaiti, her birth relatives, even for simple visits.
Like her in-laws, her maiti will consider that she has become a Dalit as a result of the
marriage. If they do not fully disown her, they will generally refuse to let her back into
their house and break off most ties with her. Several women in hypogamous marriages
with Dalits broke into tears when I asked them about their relationships with their maiti.
The fact that thewife faces such diﬀiculties, however, is something thatmany people either
would not point out to me or dismiss as secondary. Most agreed that Dalit–non-Dalit
hypogamousmarriages are ‘easier’ than their hypergamous counterpart. Kinship is almost
always thought of ‘from the point of view of the man’ in Nepal.4
It is much more diﬀicult, if not outright impossible, for the family of the husband to ac-
cept the new bride in a hypergamous marriage. Indeed, in such marriages, a non-Dalit
husband is effectively trying to introduce a Dalit woman into a non-Dalit house, to get
her to cook for non-Dalits, and to introduce her into a non-Dalit kul. In other terms, hy-
pergamous Dalit–non-Dalit marriages implicitly contain an attempt to violate the rules of
untouchability in every significant way (space, food, kinship). Everybody says that such
marriages are much more diﬀicult to ‘accept’. For this to occur would require the wife to
be ‘promoted’ to a non-Dalit caste (outcome 3). In the southern plains of Nepal, there
are some documented cases of such ‘promotion’ taking place (Biswakarma 2018), but I
did not encounter anything analogous in the area of Sammagaon. What the majority of
people say would happen in a hypergamous Dalit–non-Dalit marriage is that the husband
will be considered to have become a Dalit through defilement (outcome 2) and will be
disowned by his family.
3. This is the case in all intercaste marriages, including those between two non-Dalits.
4. An exception is a study of intercaste marriage by Kansakar and Ghimire (2008). While the
authors domention that hypogamousmarriageswill bemore readily ‘accepted’ than hypergamous
ones, they include some passages discussing the experience of the wife.
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On the whole, people seem less certain about what happens in Dalit–non-Dalit intercaste
marriages than they are about other forms of interaction between Dalits and non-Dalits.
This is not surprising, as such marriages remain far rarer than other kinds of contact be-
tween Dalits and non-Dalits. The general consensus, however, is that such marriages
effect actual, life-long loss of caste of the kind which commensality, for example, can
no longer generate. These marriages contain the potential for defilement which food no
longer carries. Outcome 1, in which both spouses keep their caste despite marriage is the
one which most closely resembles what happens with commensality today—but almost
nobody agrees with it. Outcome 3, in which the transformation is due not to defilement
but more simply to a change of name, can hardly ever be said to take place with certitude.
In fact, the rarity of hypergamous Dalit–non-Dalit marriages is not coincidental. It is, in
and of itself, an indication of ongoing defilement. It is precisely because it is not easily
feasible for the wife to become non-Dalit in such a marriage, and because it is possible for
the husband to become one, that they are avoided.
I will return to the implications of ongoing defilement in intercaste marriage in the con-
clusion of this chapter. Before doing so, I will present a particularly striking case which I
encountered in Puranogaon, which further complicates the picture. This case was an at-
tempt to re-negotiate the consequences of a hypergamous Dalit–non-Dalit marriage that
happened five generations ago.
Re-negotiating a five-generation-old intercaste marriage
I am sitting in Puranogaon with Ram and two men called Govinda and Ishat, who are
related to each other. Ram has been telling me about these two people for a long time,
insisting that I should meet them and that their story will interest me. Govinda and Ishat
agreed to be interviewed several months ago, but they simply did not show up the first
two times we were supposed to meet. They are known as the best house builders in the
area and have been working hard on the construction of a new school. I am relieved that
they are finally present today.
After introducing ourselves, one of them hands me a couple of battered, folded sheets of
paper. On these are various kinship diagrams showing nine generations of Govinda and
Ihsat’s patriline. These diagrams, they say, show that they are not really Dalits, despite
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what everybody says.
Figure 9.8: Govinda and Ishat’s patriline
By everybody’s reckoning in Puranogaon, Govinda and Ishat are, and always have been
Sārki. They and their relatives live in the VDC’s Sārki tol. They have always been treated
as Dalits. They are not let into upper-caste houses; others avoid the food which they or
their wives prepare. But in reality, Govinda and Ishat explain, they are Magar (a janajāti
group). A piece of family history, passed down from one generation to the next, proves
this. Five generations before Govinda’s—seven before Ishat’s—one of their direct patrilin-
eal ancestors was in a hypergamous intercaste marriage. It is because of this marriage that
the patriline became Dalit, and this piece of information has never been forgotten by the
family members.
The ancestor in question, Lakshman, was not born a Sārki. He was, like his father Goite,
a Magar. Goite lived in a different village, in the same district but quite far away from
Puranogaon. Govinda and Ishat explained that a Sārki woman from this village ‘became
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Figure 9.9: Interviewee’s lineage, annotated
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pregnant’ with Lakshman’s child. Consequently, Lakshman was stripped of his Magar
status and demoted to Sārki. He left his village in shame and came to live with his Sārki
wife in Puranogaon. From this time onward, Lakshman’s descendants, which include
some twelve households in Puranogaon, were all considered Sārki; they all lived as Sārki
and married other Sārki people. Govinda’s father belonged to the generation for which
identity documents became common; his identity card had ‘Sārki’ as a surname, as does
Govinda’s.
What happened to Lakshman, in other terms, was a textbook case of ‘jāt jancha’, of defile-
ment because of his sexual contact with, and subsequent marriage to a Dalit woman.
While the fact that Lakshman and his descendants had become Sārki seemed irrevocable,
the story of their Magar origins was passed down from one generation to the next. For
a long time, they could not do anything with this knowledge, but then Govinda’s uncle,
Anarudra, moved to Kathmandu. He did well for himself, became richer than his relatives
in Puranogaon and, Govinda implied, became quite a resourceful man. He started to con-
duct research into his family’s origins to ascertain itsMagar origins. Govinda and Ishat did
not know the details of how Anarudra had conducted this research, and I could not meet
Anarudra personally, but it mainly consisted in establishing their ancestry as far back as
possible. The result was the genealogy on the paper which they had handed me earlier.
Eventually, Anarudra and Govinda secured a meeting with the descendants of Goite’s
other sons, i.e. with the descendants of Lakshman’s brothers. Since none of these brothers
had married Dalit women, they and their descendants had remained Magar. They lived
in the same village as Lakshman had before coming to Puranogaon, and the fact that they
were Magar was completely uncontested.
At the meeting, the descendants of Lakshman’s brothers fully acknowledged the family’s
history. Govinda and Anarudra said that they had been welcomed back as long-lost rela-
tives. To confirm their full re-integration in the Magar clan which their ancestor had been
demoted from, they were invited to take part in Magar festivals and celebrations. Their
re-integration, according to Govinda, was complete and indisputable. Ishat and Govinda,
when I asked them what caste they belonged to, asserted very confidently that they were
‘purā Magar’ (completely, fully Magar).
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I met Govinda and Ishat only after all these events had taken place, so I could not observe
them myself. The next step for them, which they had begun to conduct procedures for,
was to phase out the name ‘Sārki’ from their identity documents. They were, however,
meeting considerable resistance in their attempt. Govinda felt that it would be impossible
for him to have the name removed from his own documents, but hoped that his younger
relatives who did not have identity cards yet might be successful.
I find this case remarkable because of what it says about vertical and horizontal transmis-
sion of caste. Here, we have people pushing for a retroactive cancellation of defilement, in
favour of a descent-only, purely patrilineal understanding of caste and caste identity. This
is best shown from the point of view of Govinda himself (an analogous argument could
be made for Ishat, with two added generations in the diagrams below).
Figure 9.10 illustrates the way in which Govinda’s patriline has looked to most people, for
many generations. Through intercaste marriage with a Sārki woman, Govinda’s ancestor
lost his Magar caste and became Dalit. All of his descendants, ipso facto, were also Dalit,
including Govinda. In contrast, figure 9.11 illustrates the claims that Govinda and his
relatives are making now, which is that they have remained Magar despite their ancestors
intercastemarriage. An additional observation is that, in order to argue this, Govindamust
also implicitly accept that all his male ancestors, who married Sārki women, must also
have remainedMagar despite these marriages. Thus, in figure 9.10, we have one intercaste
marriagewhose consequence is to change the caste of all descendants. In contrast, in figure
9.11, we have intercaste marriages at each generation, none of which have any effect on the
transmission of caste from father to son.
How have people reacted to Govinda and Ishat’s striking claim? Most of the inhabitants
of Puranogaon are simply unaware of Govinda’s family history, and even those who are,
for the most part, continue to view them as they always have, that is, as Dalits. There
are however some significant consequences to the claims which Govinda and Ishat are
making. One of these concerns their own children, who attend the school in which Ram
Prasad teaches. On the school register, these children’s second name is the Magar thar
which Govinda and his relatives claim they belong to. On the evening after I had fin-
ished interviewing Govinda and Ishat, Ram explained tome that some scholarshipmoney
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Figure 9.10: Govinda’s patriline if horizontal transmission applies
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Figure 9.11: Govinda’s patriline if only vertical transmission applies
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had recently been given to the school, with the explicit instructions to distribute it among
Dalit families only. The school committee faced a dilemma when this happened. Should
Govinda and his relatives’ children receive any of the scholarship money? A teachers’
meetingwas called to debate the question, and in the end itwas decided thatmoney should
be given to them because, despite their new name, they had lived and faced the kinds of
discrimination that were common for Dalits. The teachers felt that it was therefore unjust
to deprive them of this help. Govinda and Ishat agreed with this decision, arguing that
while they were truly and fully Magar, they were treated by others like Dalits, so they
might as well benefit from one of the very few positive things that comes with the status.
Conclusion
I opened this chapter with a classic debate. One camp defended that South Asians have
a rigid understanding of personhood, according to which people are born into one caste
and remain aﬀiliated to it no matter what, while the other camp suggested that persons
in Hindu South Asia are thought to be protean, eminently changing and malleable. Parry
offered a rejoinder, suggesting that the protean conception sustains the rigidity of caste.
In this chapter, I started by showing that the protean conception of persons is rapidly losing
ground in Nepal today. Ram Prasad’s parents and other older Bahuns describe the past as
a time when this conception was common, and commensality alone could lead to losing
one’s caste for life. Today, upper-caste people such as Ram Prasad no longer fear that this
could happen. The implications of this for mixing as a strategy are not self-evident.
Parry argues that the ‘static ideology’ of caste serves to protect against the risk of defile-
ment. I add that it is only if non-Dalits risk losing their caste that the static ideology of
caste can be threatened through mixing. In one sense, these two propositions are consis-
tent. They are both based on the notion that change in caste aﬀiliation is threatening for
those at the top. On the other hand, their implications differ, given the disappearance
of the protean understanding of persons. If, as Parry suggests, the protean conception of
personhood is a factor maintaining the ‘static ideology’ of caste, the disappearance of this
conception should lead to this ideology becoming less static. There is one sense in which
this is true, namely, that upper-caste people such as Ram Prasad no longer think that they
236
CHAPTER 9. TWOMODELS OF CASTE TRANSMISSION
need to maintain as rigid a separation fromDalits as they used to. However, there is also a
sense in which the ‘static ideology’ of caste is becoming stronger. There is no evidence that
upper castes and Dalits are thought to be ‘the same kind of people’ merely because they
interact more. Thus, the fact that interaction with Dalits is now possible without the upper
castes being affected and transformed is a sign of caste becoming, in a different sense,more
static and more essentialised.
One interpretation of the protean conception being abandoned is that mixing has already
begun, and that with it, caste-based discrimination is dwindling. While there is some,
limited validity to this assessment, I caution against its enthusiastic overtones. A different
but equally valid way of interpreting the data presented in the first part of this chapter
is that the inherent threat that mixing represents for upper castes is being ‘dealt with’ or
‘countered’ by denying the notion that mixing has any effect to start with. The denial that
there is a risk in commensality may not be the result of successful mixing so much as a
way of protecting the status of those at the top of the social hierarchy. In this sense, Ilesh
and Abeer BK are quite right to say that commensality is insignificant, ‘just a matter of
mentality’.
Intercaste marriage is different to commensality because it can potentially threaten the
rigidity of descent itself. One way in which it might do this is by producing children of
mixed caste. This, however, requires two things: that spouses in intercaste marriages re-
mainmembers of different castes after they have married, and that descent, to some extent
at least, be traced bilaterally. This chapter has argued that, in the way in which most peo-
ple reflect about caste, neither of these conditions is met. Instead, one of the spouses in
Dalit–non-Dalit marriages is usually thought to change the caste to which they belong. As
a result, parents who were of different castes to begin with are in fact thought to belong
to the same caste by the time they have children, and so there is no ambiguity around the
child’s caste.
Most people in Sammagaon say that the spouse who changes caste in an intercaste mar-
riage is the non-Dalit, that this spouse becomes Dalit. This is consistent with Abeer BK’s
view of mixing, in which intercaste marriage can transform non-Dalits into Dalits through
defilement. Is, therefore, the most promising understanding of mixing the one which
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‘weaponises’ the defiling character of Dalits? While I do not feel that it is my role to an-
swer this question, I note that even in the case of intercaste marriage, an incipient denial
of the possibility of defilement is observable. The case of the people recognised as Sārki
but claiming to be Magar presented in the last part of this chapter is a striking example of
such a denial being made retroactively.
In the last instance, however, I shy away from concluding that mixing is simply unsuccess-
ful. Dalit–non-Dalit intercaste marriages are still extremely rare in Nepal, and thematerial
presented in this chapter is based, mostly, on the way in which people currently say that
such marriages would play out. Insofar as intercaste marriage might be seen as a strategy
for the alleviation of caste-based discrimination, it has not had—so to speak—a fair chance
yet. The material presented in this chapter does not suggest that mixing is inevitably inef-
fective. What it does reveal, however, are some of the ‘hurdles’ which mixing would face
if it became a more prominent strategy.
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Love marriage and endogamy
Having described some issues concerning intercaste marriage in the previous chapter, I
now turn my attention to the marital aspirations of young people. As existing literature
has noted (Ahearn 2001; Levine 2007), love marriages are progressively superseding ar-
ranged marriages in Nepal. This leads me to formulate a question about endogamy. Caste
endogamy is a rigid condition for an arranged marriage. There is, however, no a priori rea-
son to assume that this is also true of love marriages. In Sammagaon, multiple castes and
ethnic groups live in close proximity; their children go to school, play sports, and hang
out together. Young people, as I have shown previously, say that they ‘do not care’ about
caste. In this situation, one might expect that mixed-caste and mixed-ethnicity couples
would form regularly. This would certainly obtain if partners chose each other at random,
without any regard for each other’s caste. And yet the opposite happens. Love marriages
are almost always caste endogamous. Why is this the case? Why do people not fall in love
‘randomly’? In other terms, what drives endogamy in a context where love marriages are
the new ideal?
I present the cases of three young women who share a number of similarities. All three
are Bishwakarma. All three have done well in school, continuing to study after passing
their School Leaving Certificate (SLC). All three share aspirations reaching beyond the
rural lifestyle of Sammagaon and, most importantly for this chapter, all three want a love
marriage.1 Yet each of these young women is also a respectful daughter who wishes to
1. I should say ‘want or wanted a love marriage’, since one of them married while I was in the
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please her parents. As such, each of them has, at some point and to some degree, felt torn
between the desire to choose her own spouse and the duty to defer to her parents’ authority
by settling for an arranged marriage. This chapter is an examination of how these three
women solve this dilemma, and how endogamy emerges from this solution.
In one sense, it would be possible to reduce this entire chapter to one or two sentences. At
its core, the argument is simply that, despite love marriages gaining popularity in Nepal,
the social norm of endogamy remains strong and exerts itself upon those who marry for
love. Yet to only state this would be unsatisfactory, because the simple invocation of norms
is, arguably, not explanatory (Sznycer 2019:5 (box 1)). Without invoking norms, there is
still a simple explanation for why, among the Biswhakarma and Dalits more generally,
young women do not aspire to marry non-Dalits. This is because they fear that, were they
to do so, they would face recriminations from their in-laws.
What I want to do in what follows is to describe another, unanticipated reason caste en-
dogamy endures in a context where love marriage is becoming prominent. My argument
is not that the processwhich I identify is themost important, but that it is worth addressing
anyway.
Courtship and thinking about getting married
I focus on women here because the way in which they negotiate these aspirations is more
complex and subtle than men’s. After presenting the data on women, I will give a brief
account of a young man’s love marriage to illustrate this point.
Preeti – courtship and choice
Preeti Dehegli, the daughter of my immediate neighbour, was nineteen years old when I
arrived in Sammagaon. While her lifestyle does not differ substantially from that of other
young women in the village, her character makes her stand out. Preeti is outspoken. She
rarely displays the shy, discreet attitude which is expected from unmarried young women.
She enjoys talking about love and relationships, and the stories she tells reveal the complex
nexus of values and desires which young Nepalis experience as they approach the age of
field. This chapter will show how she did marry the man she chose.
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marriage.
Most of the time, Preeti can be found working in or around the house. She cooks for her
mother and two younger brothers. Her father left to work in the Gulf many years ago;
he sends money regularly but only comes home once every two years for the festivals of
Dasain and Tihar.2 Preeti is an assiduous worker. She cultivates the family fields, collects
firewood, cuts down and carries vast loads of leaves to feed the family’s two buffaloes.
When there are no tasks that require her immediate attention, she relaxes, hangs out with
friends, or watches TV. Yet even as Preeti participates in the rural, agricultural lifestyle of
Sammagaon, her aspirations lie far beyond this world.
As a child, Preeti attended the local schools. She performed relatively well in her studies,
especially in comparison to her fifteen-year-old brother Kundanwho, their relatives agree,
is better suited to manual labour. This observation comes with a mix of disappointment
and pride. Nobody expects Kundan, who most likely will not pass his final exams, to ob-
tain a paid job (jāgir). But on the flip side, unlike Preeti, he seems to genuinely enjoy the
daily tasks which he performs. His hatred for homework is compensated by his enthusi-
asm for digging the earth, butchering animals, building buffalo shelters, mats, and ladders
out of bamboo, and so on. Preeti, in contrast, diligent though she may be about her chores,
takes little enjoyment in them. After passing her SLC, she completed the ‘+2’ degree in ed-
ucation offered at the largest school in Sammagaon. While I was in the field, Preeti applied
to study at the nursing school in the district headquarters andwas extremely disappointed
when she was turned down. She complained that her life was now reduced to ‘caring for
cattle’ (bastu palne), a common Nepali metonym for agriculture. But the school’s refusal
only strengthened her resolve to resume studying as soon as possible. She felt that she had
been lazy, and the severe boredom which afflicted her now was a good lesson, she said;
it taught her that she needed to study harder before attempting other entrance exams. A
fewmonths before I left Nepal, Preeti was one of the handful of students who enrolled in a
Bachelor’s programme that was tentatively being offered in one of Sammagaon’s schools.
Preeti was happy that she was making progress again, but was also aware that the degree
she might obtain from the programme, the first of its kind in the area, would not hold as
much value as one from an urban school. She had already spent a lot of time studying in
2. The two major festivals celebrated by most Nepalis.
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Sammagaon, she said, and would have preferred to live in a new place.
Preeti’s anxieties about the Bachelor’s programme were understandable. It was being of-
fered in a new annex to the largest school in Sammagaon, which seemed to be suffering
from the same problems as so many of the ‘grand vision’ development projects in the area.
There was in fact a new, three-story cement edifice standing next to the existing school,
dwarfing the older mud and stone buildings. But this building had never been finished.
Open sacks of cement lay everywhere; the building had no doors, no window panes, no
roof. It was in fact a deserted building site, abandoned during the late stages of construc-
tion.3 More importantly, also missing were the actual teachers who were supposed to
teach the new programme, and as if that was not enough, the president of the new school
committee had resigned and nobody had taken his place. It is not surprising that Preeti,
with her educational aspirations, was sceptical that this programme would lead her any-
where.
The sense that Preeti aspires to a different lifestyle further transpires in her physical ap-
pearance. Although not universal, there is an aesthetic preference among middle-aged
and older people in the area for women who are moti (‘plump’). I once asked Preeti for
her opinion on the topic. She shuddered, telling me that her own tastes are very differ-
ent, that she wants to stay thin. On another occasion, I remarked that only older women
seem to wear large gold ornaments such as the mundri (a large golden nose-piece). Preeti
explained that such ornaments are reserved for married women, but hastily added that
she would never wear one herself. She further stated that she would not wear red as a
married woman, despite this being the norm. In saying this, she was demarcating herself
from the ‘traditional’ outfit, ornaments and appearance associated with married women
in rural Nepal.
It is of course possible that Preeti will not maintain her distaste for the traditional aesthetic
markers of a married woman. It is also possible that Preeti’s own mother, when she was
young, used to make similar statements. Still, these possibilities do not undermine the
point I am making here, which is that, as she approaches the age at which she is expected
3. The story of this failure is too long to tell here; it involves the Indian Embassy, Maoists, and a
dishonest contractor. The result of the failure is that the entire district was put on the blacklist of
the Indian Embassy, who would not donate funds for any other project in the area until this one
was completed.
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to marry, Preeti has both aspirations to an urban and professional lifestyle very different
fromwhat shemight expect if shemarried locally, and amarked disdain for those external
markers traditionally associated with marriage.
One day early in my fieldwork, I took a trip to Bensitaun with Preeti. We were going to
stock up on various items (lentils, sugar, dried noodles, etc.) for our respective house-
holds. I quickly found out that Preeti had additional, secret plans. A few weeks earlier
her cellphone had broken and she had sent it to Kathmandu for repair. The phone was
being brought back that day by a male friend of hers. As chance would have it, the bus
was especially late that day, so Preeti and I spent several hours waiting for the friend and
the phone at one of the local tea shops in Bensitaun. After many hours had passed and
the bus still had not arrived, I decided we should walk back.
Climbing back home was hard work. We took a break after an hour and decided to give
Preeti’s friend one last chance to join us. A while later, two panting young men caught
up with us, one of whom handed Preeti her phone. After this, Preeti and this young man
walked together, several metres behind me and the other young man, deep in a conversa-
tion that was clearly private. From afar, none of this would have seemed suspicious. So
far as I could tell, we looked like a group of people walking back to the village, two mem-
bers hanging somewhat lazily behind. Yet, as some of the conversation which I overheard
indicated, and as Preeti later confirmed to me, the young man was trying to convince her
to elope with him.
Preeti turned down this suitor, as she had others. Prior to this, her parents had already
received three formal requests to marry her, but she had declined them all. She wanted to
choose her husband herself, and she had a clear vision of what a suitable spouse would be
like. Yet, despite this insistence on choosing her husband herself, Preeti also felt pulled by
the cultural appropriateness of arranged marriage. Consider the following excerpt from
an interview that I recorded with her at the end of my fieldwork:
PreetiDehegli: Usually in our society, only arrangedmarriages (māgera vivāha)
happen, right? Parents don’t accept things which have to do with love and
affection (maya, premko kuraharu). That’s why [only arranged marriages hap-
pen].
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ID: Is this true? Is it also like this in our generation?
PD: Yes, it is.
ID: It is?
PD: It is. Parents… Fromwhat kind of house the boy is… For a girl to like a boy
isn’t enough. All the [boy’s] behaviours must be understood. [This is what]
parents say, isn’t it? This is why [it is still true in our generation].
ID: Right. So take you, for example. Your marriage hasn’t happened yet. Later,
when you get married, in what way will you do it?
PD: Hmmm. Who knows? I don’t know. It’ll be an arranged marriage (māgi
vivāha), maybe.
ID: An arranged marriage? But how would you personally like to do it?
PD: I would personally prefer a love marriage.
In this passage, Preeti seems torn between her own preferences and those of her parents.
What she said next, however, reveals that the dilemma is in fact a false one.
ID: So you want a love marriage. Right. But can it be an arranged one anyway
[at the same time]?
PD: That can be done.
ID: Explain this to me.
PD: This—this is how it is done. At home, you tell your mother and father,
‘There is this person. He has shown me a lot of affection [maya gareko]’.
And after this, you call people from this boy’s house—from this person
who has shown you affection—to your own house, to introduce [the boy] to
your mother and father. After that, if your mother and father say that it’s
okay—well, then it’s done, isn’t it?
ID: And if this…
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PD: If this doesn’t happen, then it’s time to elope (bhāgne, lit. ‘disappear’).
It seems, then, that it is possible to have a marriage which satisfies both young people’s
desire to choose their spouse and the formal requirements for an arranged marriage, but
that this possibility is contingent on one’s parents’ cooperation.
At this point, some linguistic clarification is in order. The usual translation for ‘māgi vivāha’
is ‘arrangedmarriage’. Perhaps naively, I initially assumed that this categorywasmutually
exclusive with that of maya prithi vivāha or ‘love marriage’ (the Nepali and English terms
are used interchangeably). But talkingwith Preeti aswell as others, I slowly came to under-
stand that the literal translation of māgi vivāha, ‘marriage by asking’, better captures what
is central to the concept, namely the requirement that the groom’s family obtain formal
consent from the bride’s parents. Additionally, emically, to have a ‘love marriage’ primar-
ily means choosing one’s spouse. Such choices are regularly motivated by romantic love
(piar or prem), but this is not, strictly speaking, necessary. People who enter companionate
alliances, as is increasingly the case in Kathmandu (taking into account each other’s social
status, income, aspirations, etc.), will be said to be in a ‘lovemarriage’ as long as theywere
the ones to choose whom they married rather than their parents and elder relatives. Thus,
māgi vivāha, whether one chooses to translate this term as ‘arranged marriage’ or not, is in
fact opposed to elopement, to bhāgnu (lit. ‘running away’). It is not necessarily incompati-
ble with ‘love marriage’, as it is possible to chose one’s spouse and obtain parental consent.
When I asked, a friend from Kathmandu who speaks fluent English confirmed that this is
the correct understanding. He explained that in the case where two people fall in love and
thenmake the necessary arrangements for thewoman’s parents to consent to themarriage,
as his own brother had done, one can say that the marriage was ‘first love, then arranged’,
or even more simply ‘both’. Additionally, Whelpton makes a brief note of this possibility
in his history of Nepal:
Especially from the 1980s onwards, however, the line between the two [ar-
ranged and love marriage] began to blur as parents might formally ‘arrange’
a marriage between a couple who had in fact selected each other (2005: 158).
Here is also a good place to note that the categories which I am discussing are vernacu-
lar. They differ from those presented in classic Hindu scripture, which lists eight separate
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forms of marriage (Pandey 1969:159–170). Among these is Gāndharva vivāha, which ap-
pears similar to ‘love marriage’ as the term is used in Nepal:
In this form, it were not the parents of the girl who settled the marriage, but
the bride and the bridegroom arranged it among themselves out of sensual
inclination. (1969:162)
Hindu texts take various stances on Gāndharva vivāha. Some portray it as a deliberate, con-
tractual union, whereas others view it as an illegitimate form of marriage resulting from
sexual union alone. Be this as it may, I never heard the concept being used in Sammagaon.
The categories in common use are, to recapitulate, māgi vivāha (marriage by asking / ar-
ranged marriage), maya prithi vivāha (love marriage) and bhāgnu / poila janu (elopement).
Sirjana – a good daughter with a plan
Sirjana Dehegli wasmy sister in the field, Ganga andChiniMaya’s daughter. Aged twenty-
four, Sirjana is taller and stronger than Preeti. She has inherited the sharp angular features
and broad smile of her father, and her muscular build reveals how hard-working she is.
Often, coming home late in the afternoon, covered in earth, Sirjana dropped the leaves
or corn she was carrying, took an instant to rinse the dirt off herself, and immediately
proceeded to domestic tasks—chopping firewood, rekindling the fire, cooking, etc.
Sirjana is well within the age for getting married; many in Sammagaon would say that she
should do so soon, before it is too late and men lose interest. But if she were to marry, her
parents would be left on their own, and they would find themselves incapable of running
the house without her. As Chini Maya, her mother, regularly complains, her daughters-in-
law should be around to help. If they were, she says, Sirjana could leave the household:
but both of her daughters-in-law live in the city, far away. Ganga, Sirjana’s father, is well
aware that he and his wife would not be able to perform all the necessary work without
the help of their daughter. When I asked him what was going to happen in the future,
once Sirjana left the house, he answered that he would have to sell everything he owns in
Sammagaon, house and land, and go to live in Kathmandu. There, if he could afford it, he
would build a big house for himself and his relatives. There was a clear twinge of sadness
in Ganga’s voice as he said this, which is unsurprising given how deeply embedded in
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Sammagaon are he and his wife.
As the person preventing, or at least delaying, this rupture, Sirjana is proving a good and
virtuous daughter who almost never complains. Only once in the whole year and a half
that I spent living in her house did I hear her do so demonstratively. This happened when
she had been planning a trip to Kathmandu to see her new-born nephew, but the day
before she was supposed to leave her parents told her that she could not go because there
was too much work at home.
On the other hand, Sirjana also regularly told me how desperate she was to find paid
employment with an NGO, especially given that this is what she had trained for in Kath-
mandu. After completing her+2degree in Sammagaon, Sirjana spent a year andhalf in the
capital, where she attended a career development school known as the ‘Kathmandu Train-
ing Centre’. The centre advertised itself as a good choice for students who had finished
their schooling but were unsure how to find employment. It trained people to become so-
cial mobilisers. When I helped Sirjana compose her CV, she was adamant about listing all
the competences which she had acquired at the centre. These were very much up-to-date
with current trends in development jargon, and included ‘conflict management’, ‘food se-
curity’, ‘traﬀicking and violence against women’, ‘problems and needs analysis’, ‘PRA’, etc.
Thus, like Preeti, Sirjana aspired to a life beyond Sammagaon.
Again like Preeti, Sirjana is caught in a dilemma. Just after finishing the programme at
the Kathmandu Training Centre, she held a short-term position as a social mobiliser in a
district half-way between Kathmandu and her home. There, she met a man with whom
she has been in a relationship ever since. Like her, he is Bishwakarma, and, in line with her
aspirations, he has been a development worker for several years. Sirjana plans to marry
him as soon as she finds employment herself. She talks with him on the phone at night,
texts him and, when she can get internet access on her cellphone, exchanges photographs
on Facebook. The relationship is a secret of which her father is unaware, and which I had
to be careful not to reveal.
At first, it may seem that Sirjana’s situation is quite different from that of Preeti. She faces
a dilemma between taking care of her parents at home or finding a job and marrying.
Nonetheless, the question of arranged and love marriage arises for Sirjana too. Despite
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knowing that Sirjana’smarriagewouldmean losing themost ableworker in the household,
Chini Maya would regularly tell me that she really wants her daughter to marry, and that
she is worried that she will become too old for men to be interested in her. Eventually,
Sirjana too will face the question of whether to have a love marriage or one arranged by
her parents. Thinking about this issue, she intends to solve it in the same way as Preeti by
having an ‘arranged marriage’ with the person of her choice:
ID:- Who will decide who you marry?
Sirjana Dehegli: - Thulo manche [lit. ‘big man’, her father in this case] will
decide that, right?
ID: - And will you be able to choose too?
SD: Yes.
In addition to confirming the possibility of having an arranged love marriage, Sirjana is
however aware that this possibility is constrained by one important factor. She knows that
her and her future husband’s families will only agree to perform the rituals for a māgi
vivāha, and more generally only recognise the marriage, if the groom and bride are of the
same caste.
ID: So the question is this. If one does not have an arrangedmarriage, there are
some boys of one’s own caste, but there are more boys of other castes. There
are more Sunuwar, and Tamang boys than Bishwakarma boys…
SD:…and Bahun-Chhetri.
ID: ..and Bahun Chhetri. There are many more. But you fell in love with a
Bishwakarma.
SD: I did.
ID: How did this happen? Did you pay attention to his caste before falling in
love? Or how did it happen?
SD:No, to pay attention to caste… It’s not exactly this. But I didwant tomarry a
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person of my own caste, because if one marries another caste… [brief descrip-
tion of a local case of intercaste marriage]. If you marry another caste what
happens is this: bymarrying someone higher than our caste, his familywill not
accept [me], right? They will take him out of his family background [i.e. disown
him]. And then, if one marries somebody from a lower caste, so for example if
I married a Damāi, well, my mother and father would not accept this Damāi.
With Preeti and Sirjana’s case, I have tried to show that young women in rural Nepal have
clear marital aspirations. They engage in moments of courtship, refuse proposals which
are made to them, choose spouses who will suit their professional aspirations.4 That
young women have some liberty in making these choices is perhaps unsurprising. Two
decades ago, Ahearn (2001) had already noted an increased freedom in spouse choice
among young Gurungs in Nepal. She argued that with the spread of literacy, the emer-
gence of love letters fostered new forms of courtship that place romantic love at centre
stage. In Sammagaon, younger people have stopped writing each other love letters. They
told me that this had been popular in earlier times, but that the letters have now been re-
placed by the more convenient and more discreet use of SMS or, when possible, Facebook.
A central claim which I am making here is that even if romance does indeed play an in-
creasingly important role in how young people choose their future spouses, these young
people nevertheless exercise careful control over whom they choose to marry. In particu-
lar, as Sirjana’s words suggest, they ensure that it is somebody of the same caste as them-
selves. For the Bishwakarma and Dalits more generally, this is in no small part due to fear
of mistreatment by hypothetical non-Dalit in-laws. But beyond this, I argue that another
motivation for choosing a spouse of one’s own caste is the ability to ‘pass off’ one’s love
marriage as an arranged one. We have seen that both both Preeti and Sirjana intend to do
precisely this, to have a marriage that is ‘first love, then arranged’. In the next section I
present the story of a third young woman, Basanti, who got married in precisely this way
while I was in the field.
4. This is not true of all young women in Nepal, of course, and I did observe cases of marriages
in which, as far as I knew, parents had been in full control. People generally agreed that these were
increasingly rare.
249
CHAPTER 10. LOVE MARRIAGE AND ENDOGAMY
Basanti – arranged love marriage
Basanti Kalikote is in her mid-twenties. She and her family are Bishwakarma, but belong
to a different thar than the Dehegli (i.e. they are not part of the same patriline as the other
Bishwakarma of Sammagaon). She is the daughter of a blacksmith, shop owner, joker
and convivial drinker whom everybody calls by his nickname ‘Kishor’. Basanti herself is
constantly smiling and friendly. She seamlessly switches between two sets of behaviours
expected from her in different contexts. At home, she behaves like a well-raised daughter,
bringing food to her father and other men at meal times, waiting patiently for them to
finish eating and serving generous second helpings before she starts her own meal. But
in public, Basanti assumes her NGO-worker role, speaking authoritatively to crowds of
villagers, including men senior to her. As noted in chapter 6, to have formal employment,
especially in the development sector, confers status and generates envy in rural Nepal.
Basanti spends most of her days outside, taking part in meetings in multiple VDCs in
the area, discussing development, explaining credit policies and goals to villagers, taking
trips to the district headquarters for more meetings, writing reports, organising training
programmes, etc. As a result, she is strongly involved in public life. In several ways, she
has achieved some of Sirjana’s aspirations.
Basanti, I assumed, would want to chose her own husband. She was steeped in Nepal’s
distinctive representation of ‘modernity’, which sees arranged marriage as a phenomenon
of the past, a practice that is distinctly un-modern. Moreover, a lovemarriage wouldmean
Basanti could choose a spouse whowould not take issue with her work and independence.
I was therefore taken aback when two young men arrived from a distant VDC to ask for
Basanti in marriage. One of them was called Kumar; he was here to ask Kishor to give
Basanti in marriage to his younger brother. What I found so striking was that everything
about the demand rigorously followed the traditions required for māgi vivāha, as the fol-
lowing account, a shortened version of my fieldnotes, shows.
Ganga acts as the lāmi, the person who knows the families of both parties and facilitates
meetings and discussions. In the afternoon after the arrival of the two young men, he
phones Kishor and tells him to prepare to welcome guests. In the evening, the two young
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men, Ganga, and I walked to Kishor’s house. The walk is an unusually silent affair, almost
ceremonious. Ganga enters Kishor’s house first and we follow a few instants later. We
sit in one of the rooms; there is some idle talk, and then the conversation quickly turns to
the topic of weddings. Not Basanti’s possible wedding, just weddings which the various
people present have attended lately.
Mid-way through the conversation, Kishor’s wife arrives. She discreetly asks me to follow
her outside and asks about the purpose of our visit. I tell her what I know, that we are
here to ‘request a girl’ (kheti māgne), the terms which everybody else has been using so
far. We go back in. After an hour of small talk, Kishor’s wife calls everybody up for the
evening meal. Ganga announces, using a common Nepali idiom, that there is one ‘small,
sweet’ (chotho-mitho) matter to discuss before the meal, and asks for Basanti to be brought
into the room. By now, Kishor has understoodwhat is happening. He asks the youngmen
two simple questions: ‘So, it’s your younger brother we’re talking about?’ and ‘What work
does he do?’ The answers are brief: ‘Yes’, and ‘Social work’.
The meal is eaten in silence. Basanti is in the room; she serves us food without saying a
word. She is more solemn than usual, perhaps nervous. Once we have finished eating,
the conversation starts again. Ganga formally announces that the purpose of the visit is to
ask Basanti in marriage. Later, he adds that both Basanti and Kishor’s potential son-in-law
want the marriage to happen, stating that ‘it is their desire’ (uniharuko ichha chha).
The conversation goes on for about twenty minutes. Kishor wants to make sure that the
potential son-in-law is a good match for his daughter. He worries most centrally about
the young man’s employment. His interlocutors reassure him, stating that he works in
the development sector, like Basanti. Kishor asks Basanti to comment on the possible mar-
riage, but she stays resolutely silent. Ganga makes a few passing comments on the fact
that marriage traditions are changing. He reminds everybody how in the past one would
sometimes go through hours of conversation only to face a refusal in the end. I think he is
trying to encourage Kishor, who still looks uncertain. In the end, Kishor announces that
he wants to meet his potential son-in-law before giving his final decision.
A few weeks later the potential son-in-law arrives in Sammagaon, and the decision to pro-
ceed with the marriage is finalised. All the requirements for a māgi vivāha are followed. A
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formal request is made to Kishor, with appropriate small gifts. Kishor gives his consent.
We go to consult an astrologer, who finds an auspicious time for the wedding. We dis-
cuss how many guests the groom’s party should bring to Sammagaon, briefly talk about
what kind of gifts both sides should exchange.5 Finally, there is talk of what vehicles the
groom’s party should use to bring the bride back to her new village. Kishor is annoyed
that the groom’s relatives want to come on motorbikes and insists that a more prestigious
vehicle, perhaps a 4x4, be rented for the occasion.
On the first visit to Kishor’s house, I almost missed Ganga’s fleeting mention that Basanti
and the groom had a ‘desire’ for the wedding to happen. But when I did hear it, I was
puzzled. Only later did I learn that Basanti and the groom had been in a relationship for
a prolonged period before these events, and that they had carefully planned the marriage
request together. Kishor himself did not know about his daughter’s intentions until the
first visit by his son-in-law’s relatives. Fromhis point of view, almost everything proceeded
as if this was a regular māgi vivāha: people came to ask for his daughter’s hand, he asked
about the groom’s suitability, thought it through, and finally gave consent. If anything,
by demanding tomeet the groom in person before approving, it would appear that Kishor
was asserting the importance of his approval.
And yet, in reality, Kishor’s approval—which is supposedly critical—is perhaps not quite
so. Consider the following excerpt frommy fieldnotes, taken after the first visit, but before
the second and Kishor’s final consent:
I ask Ganga if Kishor has the right (adikhār) to see the potential son-in-law
before giving his daughter away. Ganga says that he does, but that before,
people would often marry their daughters without seeing the potential son-in-
law. I ask if Kishor has the right to refuse to give his daughter, and Ganga tells
me that he does; the ultimate decision lies in his hands. So what will happen
if he does refuse? The answer here is really interesting: Ganga says that in this
case Basanti will have the right (adikhār) to run away (baghnu), i.e. to elopewith
5. While it is common for the relatives of the bride to give more than those of the groom to
newly-weds, there is no formal dowry in this part of Nepal, and no dowry negotiation.
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the boy without her father’s consent.
By the rules of māgi vivāha, the father is the person who can ultimately decide whether or
not the daughter will marry the man. But the possibility of the daughter eloping, an act
that could potentially bring shame to her family, including to the father, places pressure on
the father to accept. This is especially the case in a marriage like Basanti’s, which others
approve of. It is significant that, were Kishor to refuse the marriage, Ganga says Basanti
would have the right to run away. Kishor may technically have the power to refuse the
wedding, but if he does, the result will be an elopement that others consider legitimate
and that is likely to reflect poorly on him as much or even more than on his daughter. This
is why Ganga encourages Kishor to say yes from the very first visit.
Arranged and love marriage as a cooperation game
It is illuminating to think of Basanti’s marriage and themarriages which Preeti and Sirjana
aspire to as cases of cooperation between fathers and daughters. Basanti shows respect to
her father by seeking his consent—sending her future husband to ask for her own hand
formally—and in return, her father consents to her marrying the man of her choice. The
result is a situation which it is optimal for both Basanti and her father.6
Father
agree refuse
Daughter seek consent A B
do not seek consent C D
Table 10.1: Arranged and love marriage as a cooperation game between father and daugh-
ter.
This situation can be formalised as per table 10.1. Here, a daughter who is considering
marriage in Nepal has two options. She may either seek consent from her father, the co-
operative option, or she may not seek consent, the non-cooperative option. The father also
has two options. He may accept a daughter’s chosen husband or refuse him. Again, these
6. It would be more ethnographically appropriate to use the terms ‘father or elder male rela-
tive’ here, since in a father’s absence it is traditional for an uncle, for example, to have authority
over a daughter’s wedding. I use the term ‘father’ here for simplicity, but one should bear this
qualification in mind.
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are, respectively, cooperative and non-cooperative options. This formalisation is a sim-
plification of reality. It is the very opposite of a ‘thick’ description (Geertz 1973b), and
as such, it might raise suspicion in the anthropologically minded reader. The ‘thinness’,
however, is by design: this formalisation is useful because it shows very clearly why mar-
riages that are simultaneously ‘love marriages’ and ‘arranged’ are optimal for both fathers
and daughters.
Let us consider the possible outcomes. If the daughter seeks her father’s consent and the
father agrees to let her marry her chosen spouse, what obtains is a case similar to Basanti’s
(cell A). The marriage is a ‘love marriage’ and an ‘arranged marriage’ at the same time,
or, to give this a more succinct name, an ‘arranged love marriage’. If a daughter seeks
her father’s consent but the father does not accept the spouse she has chosen, two things
may happen. The daughter might marry another man, chosen by her father (cell B). In
this case, what obtains is a ‘simple’ arranged marriage. The other possibility is that the
daughter will ignore her father’s refusal, stop seeking his consent, and elope (cell D).
This model clearly shows that young women are not powerless in the face of fathers who
refuse to let them marry who they want. As a father, to pronounce such a refusal is to
expose oneself to the risk of one’s daughter eloping. This is not merely a hypothetical pos-
sibility; elopement is quite a common phenomenon and, to an extent, seen as a legitimate
option. Recall both Gita and Sirjana speaking of elopement as a viable alternative if their
parents will not let them choose who they marry, and recall Ganga saying that Basanti
would have had the right to elope if Kishor had refused the marriage.
Nevertheless, even if elopement is seen as somewhat legitimate, it is undeniably an out-
come far less preferable than an arranged cum love marriage, for all parties. There are
negative connotations to elopement which will lead to a loss in social prestige both for
those who elope and those whose daughters elope. It is highly unlikely that a wedding
ceremony—a highly significant life cycle ritual—will be organised. A mother might be-
come resentful towards her husband if he forces his daughter to elope. A daughter who
elopes will find her relations with her maiti (her father’s household) spoiled. In extreme
cases, it can lead to disownment. In sum, there are a host of reasons why daughters as
well as fathers may want to avoid this.
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The threat of seeing his daughter elope is therefore an important motivation for a father
to agree to arrange a marriage with the husband of her choice.
A question remains as to cell C. According to the model, this is when a father is willing
to let his daughter choose her own spouse, but the daughter nevertheless does not seek
consent from her father. The motivation for a daughter to act this way seems unclear, but
if this were to happen, it would count as elopement by Nepali standards. This possibility
only occurred to me as I was formulating the model; I did not discuss it with people in
Nepal. It would stand to reason that this type of elopement is seen as less legitimate than
the one which can take place after a father’s refusal, but this is speculation on my part; I
have no data to back this up.
Sandeep – an accomplished fact
So far, I have presented the ‘arranged love marriage’ as a phenomenon that emerges
through cooperation between fathers and daughters. What of sons? I have much less data
on the marital aspirations of young men in Nepal because there were far fewer of them in
Sammagaon. This is mostly down to labour migration. Many Nepali men of marriageable
age work in the Arabian peninsula or elsewhere abroad;7 they typically only come back
to Nepal once every two years, sometimes less frequently still.
The effect of migration on young men’s marital prospects is unclear. A pattern I encoun-
tered several times is for a young man to return to Nepal solely to get married and then
to leave again only months after his wedding.8 Though I do not have suﬀicient data to
fully substantiate the following claim, it is possible that one of the long-term effects of out-
migration will be a mitigation of virilocality. I met a number of recently-married women
in their twenties and thirties whose husbands were working abroad, and who had con-
tinued to live with their own parents. In some cases, these women have children whom
they raise with the help of their own mothers, in a fairly drastic break from what is seen
as normal in the area. Another way in which outmigration may be shaking the founda-
tions of Nepali kinship is by providing those women whose husbands work abroad with
7. Labour migration to India is common in other parts of Nepal, but not in the Eastern hills.
8. Such wedding are sometimes only arranged, and sometime arranged and love marriages. In
the latter case, the spouses will have maintained a relationship over Facebook and other commu-
nication technologies.
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substantial monetary resources, through remittance. Muna, our neighbour, was a good
example. Her husband, Ganga’s younger brother, had been working abroad for almost
ten years when I arrived in Sammagaon. On one occasion, Muna explained to me that,
while she had initially felt sad about his absence, by now she had gotten used to it and
enjoyed the fact that she could run her household as she saw fit, without having to defer
to a man, but while still being able to count on his financial assistance.
Setting aside these considerations on migration, there are some young men who do not
leave. I was able to follow in some detail the marriage of one young Bishwakarma man
named Sandeep, and the way in which this played out is relevant to the argument made
in this chapter.
Sandeep lives with his father, mother and paternal uncle in Sahu Bajar. I paid them a
chance visit in May 2014 when I was attending an important festival in the vicinity, with
Muna’s daughter and two sons, and they decidedwe should drop by. We sat in front of the
house, were offered some tea, and started chatting idly with other relatives who happened
to be there. After a while, I noticed that there was an unusual amount of scuffling around
and a palpable tension in the air. The reason quickly became clear. I was told that Sandeep,
who was not there at the time, was ‘bringing back a girl’. This left me quite puzzled. It
turned out that the night before, Sandeep hadphoned his uncle and told him that hewould
be returning home the next day with the woman he wished to marry. Some of his cousins
were already in the know, but his parents and uncle had not heard anything about it until
then.
There was some confusion. The parents were not sure what to do about the new arrival.
Sandeep’s uncle took charge. He instructed his brother to place two amkara (brass vessels)
containing flowers on either side of the front door. Someone was sent to buy sindur (ver-
million), which was then mixed with rice and yoghurt, making the substance used to give
tika (a blessing given by placing a mark on the forehead) during weddings and other im-
portant rituals. A third amkara was filled with water and a small, leafy branch placed in
it.
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Sandeep arrived in the afternoon, a woman following close behind him. Everybody fell
silent. At this stage, I was not sure what would happen and I began to feel uneasy. I feared
that Sandeep’s parents and uncle would be angry at him. Sandeep stood, motionless and
awkward, on the porch for a few seconds. His uncle was the first to speak: ‘So, how long
are you going to keep carrying your bag like that?’ At this, Sandeep snapped back to life
and put down his backpack. The tension receded. The uncle approached Sandeep, a child
following him with the water-filled amkara. The child was instructed to sprinkle Sandeep
and the womanwho had arrived with himwhile the uncle recited a few lines from a chant.
From then on and for the rest of the day, Sandeep and the woman were referred to as beula
(groom) and beuli (bride). Everybody present, including myself, gave tika to them. The
bride was asked to greet everybody formally, then she and the groom were fed yoghurt
from metal glasses held up to their lips. Sandeep’s uncle led the couple up to the front
door and told the bride to pronounce some words, including ‘from now on, this is my
house’. She remained silent, but her attitude was not defiant. As she later told to me, she
was simply too nervous to talk. Sandeep’s uncle and everyone else seemed to understand
this; they did not insist, and shortly thereafter, the bride entered the house.
Later that day, Sandeep’s uncle came up to me and said, ‘We must be satisfied with
whomever the times bring (Samaya le jo dinchha, tyo hāmilāi santushti hunnu parchha).’
It was only later, talking with people who had been there, that I understood what I had
witnessed. What had happened was a wedding, but one condensed to a few of its key
components. The rituals performed that day—the tika, the yoghurt feeding, the sentences
which the bride was too nervous to pronounce—had taken no more than an hour. But
still, from this day onwards, there was no question that Sandeep and the woman whom
he had ‘brought home’ were husband and wife. On every visit I made to the house after
these events, the woman was there; she was referred to as ‘daughter-in-law’ by Sandeep’s
parents and she did all the cooking, cleaning, and work that was expected of her. I tried
on several occasions to get her perspective on the wedding, but she never seemed keen to
tell me about it.
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Severalmonths later, amore formalweddingwas organised for Sandeep and hiswife. This
was a two-day ceremony, with more priests and rituals than I had seen at most weddings.
Darji musicians came to play, and Darji tailors made clothes for the bride and groom. Had
it not been for the absence of guests from the bride’s side, this would have been a regular
ceremony. The reason for organising it, I was told, was that the previous wedding—the
condensed version which took place on the bride’s first arrival at the house—had not been
appropriate. The reason for the absence of guests from the bride’s side was that, in the
eyes of the bride’s family, this was an elopement. No one had asked the bride’s family for
consent, and so they did not want to come to the wedding.
In summary, Sandeep’s wedding shows that it is easier for young men than for young
women to marry the spouse they choose without facing negative consequences from their
parents. Unlike Basanti, Sandeep did not need to carefully plan to get his family to accept
his marriage. He simply announced, less than twenty-four hours before doing so, that he
was ‘bringing back a girl’. Once he did so, hismarriage to thiswomanwas an accomplished
fact. Nobody challenged it. As his uncle said, Sandeep’s relatives had to be ‘satisfied with
the person that the times had brought’. The stark contrast between Sandeep’s relatives’
immediate acceptance of themarriage and his wife’s relatives’ refusal to attend the second,
large ceremony only reinforces the point. Both men and women can have a marriage with
the person they choose and get their parents and elder relatives to acknowledge it, but
doing so is much harder for a woman. This being said, even the accomplished fact of
Sandeep’s wedding was recognised by his family only because the woman he ‘brought
back’ belonged to the same caste. Had he attempted to do the same with a Darji woman,
his family would not have been as welcoming.
Endogamy
What can we conclude from the ethnography presented in this chapter? A number of
obvious points could be made about gender inequality. On the one hand, men have it
much easier than women when it comes to choosing their spouse. On the other hand, I
hope to have also shown that young women are far from powerless in the matter. They are
not simply the passive ‘gift’ made during a wedding’s central ritual of khanyādān. If they
plan wisely, as Basanti did and Preeti and Sirjana intended, they can ‘arrange’ the love
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marriage of their choice. The fact that a woman can elope puts pressure on her father to
accept the marriage which she desires, and in doing so, he has the capacity to transform
his daughter’s ‘love’ marriage into an arranged one.
There are, however, limits to the choices which women andmen can make, and this is the
critical point with which I wish to conclude this chapter. Thewhole edifice of the arranged
love marriage, such as I have presented it here, is entirely dependent on caste endogamy. Ar-
ranged love marriages are, so to speak, a clever ‘trick’. They enable spouses and their
parents, under the right circumstances, to have their cake and eat it too. When such a
marriage works out, the formalities of an arranged marriage are respected but spouses
are still given (some degree of) freedom to choose each other. The undesirable negative
connotations of elopement are avoided, but the desirable freedom to choose one’s partner,
central to the Nepali imagination of modernity, is maintained. None of this is possible in the
case of intercaste marriage. In the institution of māgi vivāha, marriage by asking or ‘arranged
marriage’, it is only possible to ask to marry someone who belongs to one’s own caste. All
cases of intercaste marriage are, therefore, cases of elopement.
With this observation, we have the answer to the question asked in the opening section of
this chapter. One reason young Nepalis do not fall in love ‘randomly’, a reason they seem
towant tomarry people of their own caste even in a context where romantic love is increas-
ingly being emphasised andwhere ideologies ofmodernity are becoming prevalent, is that
doing so represents an optimal compromise between giving in to the traditional form of
māgi vivāha and choosing one’s spouse with complete freedom. By restricting their choices
to people of the same caste as themselves, young people and young women in particular
can please their parents, avoid the negative associations that come with elopement, and
yet nevertheless experience relative freedom in their choice.
To conclude this chapter and the third part of this thesis, although ‘mixing’ is seen by
some as a strategy to do away with caste as a whole, a number of obstacles remain. The
previous chapter showed how (upper-)caste status is being increasingly ‘guarded’, so to
speak, against the risk of dilution through mixing. This chapter addressed an altogether
different obstacle. It showed that caste endogamy (which is antithetical to mixing through
intercastemarriage) does not depend solely on the ‘imposition’ of a spouse that takes place
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in traditional ‘arranged marriages’. It is therefore not likely to ‘die off’ as love marriage be-
comes more prominent. Young Nepalis who aspire to a ‘modern’ lifestyle and a love mar-
riage are nevertheless careful to choose a spouse who belongs to the same caste as them-
selves. Dalits do so in part because they fear the discrimination which their in-laws would
subject them to, were they to marry a non-Dalit, but, as this chapter has shown, there is an-
other, more complex process which explains why caste endogamy endures. What kind of
incentive Dalit–non-Dalit marriage would need to make it as desirable as the endogamous
‘arranged love marriage’, beyond the financial reward offered by the Ministry of finance,
is a question which remains open.
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Norms and actuality
This thesis opened with an incident during my fieldwork which puzzled me. After a long
walk Ganga, Chini Maya and I were unexpectedly hosted by a Sherpa couple, contrary to
the rule according to which Dalits should not be let into non-Dalit houses. On the very
same night, Ganga said that I had come to Nepal to study ‘why Dalits used to be untouch-
able but are not any more.’
I opened with this episode because it made me attentive to the complexity of the attitudes
displayed by people in Sammagaon towards caste and caste-based discrimination.
Ganga’s statement, taken literally, is quite simply incorrect: there are still many behaviours
that can legitimately be described as forms of untouchability in Sammagaon. And yet,
after spending a year and a half in the field, I do not believe that Ganga’s statement was a
complete misrepresentation of the way things are. This is so for the following two reasons.
The first is that the statement is partly true. One might say that it accurately assesses the di-
rection of travel of caste-based discrimination, but that it is mistaken in suggesting that the
end point—its eventual elimination—has already been reached. Chapter 2 showed that
there has been significant change in the way in which the Bishwakarma and Dalits more
generally are treated. In Sammagaon, full-blown untouchability has all but disappeared
from public spaces and, generally speaking, Dalits are treated with more dignity than in
the past. Gone are the times when entering a tea-shop would lead to a beating, when spe-
cial terms of address had to be used, when Dalits gave a wide berth to non-Dalits whose
paths they crossed. Remarks made by Bahuns and quoted in chapter 9 confirm that this
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change has occurred. Indeed, upper castes are no longer worried that they will be defiled
by Dalits, and therefore they no longer ‘bother’ to enforce strong avoidances. But none
of this means that caste-based discrimination and untouchability have disappeared alto-
gether. First, there is a host of ways in which the Bishwakarma and other Dalits continue
to be singled out as ‘lowly’, ‘dirty’, ‘ignorant’, and as having a number of other stigma-
tising properties. Second, in spaces and contexts where kinship is a prominent mode of
relation—in what I have called the ‘domestic sphere’—untouchability still prevails. There-
fore, it might have beenmore judicious for Ganga to say that ‘Dalits used to be untouchable
but are not fully so any more’.
The second reason is that the intent of Ganga’s statement was arguably normative rather
than descriptive. Ganga was perhaps not so much describing Sammagaon factually as he
wasmaking a statement about what ought to be. Indeed, there is today an explicit norm ac-
cording to which untouchability and caste-based discrimination should not exist, and this
norm is known to all. It is communicated by NGOs, by the media, and in school. It was
inculcated by Maoist insurgents during the ‘People’s War’ and it is part of the law. More
generally, this norm is part and parcel of the modernist ideologies which prevail in Nepal.
As chapter 6 noted, this norm has affected the way in which ordinary Nepalis imagine
society. The explicit social ontology to which most adhere is one in which humans are not
divided into multiple castes, but instead are all fundamentally the same. Caste is portrayed
as man-made rather than god-made, as a historical and ‘accidental’ phenomenon that so-
ciety must ‘get over’ rather than an ontologically deep and timeless reality. In this sense,
Ganga might more judiciously have said, ‘Dalits used to be untouchable but ought not to
be any more’.
The gap between norms and actuality, between what ought to be and what is, has been an
undercurrent in much of this thesis. Some chapters addressed the topic explicitly, others
only implicitly. In the first part of this conclusion, I wish to return to this topic. I will start
by summarising how the various chapters addressed it.
In part I, I described various strategies used in an attempt to bring about a world in which
caste-based discrimination and untouchability are not only said no longer to exist, but in
which their practical relevance is effectively eliminated. In other terms, part I was ded-
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icated to attempts to actualise the norm according to which Dalits should not be treated
differently from others.
The first strategy which I addressed, in chapter 3 was that of Ganga himself. By and large,
it consists in trying to make the Bishwakarma similar to the upper castes. It is, in this
sense, a version of sanskritisation. Ganga became the first Dalit teacher in his district,
acquired considerable personal prestige (eventually achieving a guru-like status), and tells
alternative myths of origin according to which his caste is, in fact, a brahmanical one. He
has given up on some of the habits which others say make Dalits ‘dirty’, in particular,
the consumption of alcohol. He favours education and hopes that the Bishwakarma will
become a ‘learned’ people, thereby shifting their public image to one which resembles
that of the Bahun. Put simply, Ganga’s strategy is to accumulate brahmanical cultural
capital. I argued that this strategy is effective, but that its effect is restricted and limited. It
is restricted to Ganga and his household, and it is limited insofar as even Ganga himself
continues to be seen as a Dalit, and is thus prevented from entering non-Dalit houses, and
so forth. Ganga has unquestionably improved his own social status, but he nevertheless
remains resolutely Dalit.
Of the strategies I addressed, Ganga’s is the least confrontational. Ganga sees the dis-
crimination which he and other Dalits are subjected to and agrees that this discrimination
should cease. His response, largely, consists in trying to change not those who display
prejudiced behaviour, but instead those who are subjected to it. In some parts of India,
the imitation by subaltern people of the upper castes (in particular by giving up alcohol)
has been analysed as a way of co-opting or undermining the power inherent in upper-caste
purity practices (Hardiman 1987:157ff; Shah 2011:1101). Ganga’s adoption of brahmani-
cal practices, in contrast, is more in line with the standard explanation of sanskritisation;
it is conformist rather than subversive. To be sure, Ganga criticises those who dispense
discrimination, but here too his reaction is ‘gentle’; it consists in patiently educating such
people until they realise that they are wrong about Dalits.
The second strategy I described, in chapter 4, also consists in acquiring cultural capital,
but of another kind. I described how Ilesh, a young activist, is in the incipient stages
of creating a ‘culture of their own’ for the Bishwakarma, modelled after the success of
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indigenous and ethnic politics in Nepal. The culture which hewants to create is onewhich
would distinguish the Bishwakarma from the Bahun. In this sense, his aim is diametrically
opposed to Ganga’s.
Though this enterprise had barely begun when I met him, Ilesh was already facing signifi-
cant diﬀiculties. Most critically, he was butting against the reified, rigid understanding of
‘culture’ that has emerged in Nepal with the rise of ethnic and indigenous politics. What
the Bishwakarma would need to be able to claim that they have a ‘culture of their own’ is
a distinct mother tongue, distinct religious practices, and a distinct material culture. Ilesh
had no hope of finding or creating the first two. The third, a distinctmaterial culture, could
in principle be found in the Bishwakarma’s traditional ‘caste occupation’, blacksmithing.
However, the cultural capital contained in the objects which the Bishwakarma make—
most significantly the khukuri—is associated with the Nepali nation as a whole rather than
with the Bishwakarma. The khukuri comes to stand for Nepali military bravery, but none
of the prestige inherent in this symbol flows back to the Bishwakarma, who find them-
selves alienated from the symbolic capital contained in what they make. In Ilesh’s words,
what they make is ‘somebody else’s culture’.
Ilesh’s strategy is less conformist than Ganga’s in one central regard: it is not based on
negotiating one’s place within the traditional, caste-based understanding of Nepali social
hierarchy. Rather, it is based on rejecting this hierarchy altogether in favour of identity
politics. The reason it fails is that identity politics—at least in their current guise in Nepal,
which is based on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘indigeneity’—do not put everybody on equal grounds.
Such politics are based on a rejection of the hierarchy of caste, but they create new divi-
sions between those who do and those who do not have the ‘right’ kind of culture. The
Bishwakarma find themselves on the wrong side of this divide. This kind of identity pol-
itics, therefore, does not represent a promising avenue for Dalits trying to bring about a
world in which all people are fundamentally ‘the same’.
The third strategy is based on force. In chapter 5, I described how Maoist insurgents, dur-
ing the 1996–2006 ‘People’s War’, attempted to eliminate untouchability by threatening
to violently punish anybody exercising it. Of the three strategies, this is the one which is
most explicitly and directly confrontational. It was also themost effective, but its effectwas
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temporary. As the ex-Maoist commander interviewed in that chapter stated, and as many
others agreed, with regards to the elimination of caste-based discrimination, the Maoists’
success was only temporary and only due to the fear they inspired. In other words, the
Maoists succeeded in actualising the norm according towhich Dalits should not be treated
as a distinct kind of human, but they did so by forcefully imposing this norm rather than
by eliciting free and spontaneous adherence to it. Consequently, once the Maoists were
no longer in control, many of the old discriminatory practices returned.
Part I, on the whole, showed how diﬀicult it is for Dalits to be perceived and treated as
equal to others. Ganga’s strategy operates within dominant cultural forms; Ilesh’s tries to
move around them; and the Maoists’ clashed against them. None of these have, so far, been
fully successful. The stigmawhich affect Dalits is, as the title of this thesis suggests, highly
resilient. Part II of the dissertation is where I engaged more explicitly with this resilience.
Chapter 6 explicitly asked why people who profess that there is only one kind of human
do not behave consistently with this assertion. It opened by showing how deep this con-
tradiction runs. It is not just non-Dalits who do not behave in line with their assertions
about the unity of humankind: Dalits themselves do the same. The Bishwakarma, who
are regular recipients of caste-based discrimination, are also dispensers of it when they
interact with the Darji.
I offered several potential explanations for why an ‘ethic of castelessness’, while easily
proclaimed, may be hard to adhere to in practice. First, I explored the possibility that the
ethic is merely performative, one which people pay lip service to because doing so makes
them appear ‘modern’, a highly desirable feature in Nepal. Second, I explored whether
the mismatch between people’s professed ethical standards and their behaviour could be
down to a lack of coordination. According to this explanation, it is only if everybody gave
up on caste-based discrimination simultaneously that the phenomenon would disappear. I
found both of these explanations unsatisfactory, and instead suggested that we must as-
cribe contradictory mental states to the people of Sammagaon. We must admit that they
simultaneously and quite genuinely believe that all humans are fundamentally the same,
and yet at another level, believe that Dalits are somehow different. A useful theoretical
framing for this, I suggested, is Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) concept of alief, propositional
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attitudes which individuals can hold unconsciously but which nevertheless motivate be-
haviour. Gendler herself argues that aliefs have been vastly overlooked in philosophy.
This might be the case in anthropology as well, and what is certain is that aliefs are hard
to study ethnographically. I will return to this point below.
Re-phrasing the conclusion of chapter 6, the norm that Dalits should not be treated differ-
ently is one which people explicitly agree with. What makes the norm hard to actualise
is a more deeply embedded, more implicit representation according to which Dalits are a
deeply different kind of human.
Chapter 7 offered one explanation for why such an implicit representation may endure,
based on the cognitive bias known as ‘psychological essentialism’. The main manifesta-
tion of this bias is to dispose humans towards thinking in ‘kinds’. In the case of social
categories, psychological essentialismmakes it easy for humans to acquire the type of con-
ception of social groups which Geertz (1973a) called ‘primordialist’. It makes it easy to
come to believe that the members of a given social group—Dalits being the one which con-
cern us here—share an invisible ‘essence’ which makes them what they are. Conversely,
it makes it diﬀicult for humans to reject such understandings. The ethic of castelessness
being fundamentally premised on a rejection of a primordialist social ontology, psycho-
logical essentialism represents an obstacle to its adoption. The bias shows why, despite
the ethic being adhered to at an explicit level, implicit representations diverge.
It is important to be very specific about the role of psychological essentialism. Alone,
this bias does not explain the full-blown, culturally specific, historically formed notions
of caste and untouchability. Nor, for that matter, does psychological essentialism suﬀice
to explain the cultural intricacies of other essentialised social categories such as race, eth-
nicity, or gender. What psychological essentialism does, however, is provide a cognitive
‘advantage’ to essentialised construals. The history of the emergence of the conception of
Dalits not only as a distinct kind of people, but as a ‘lowly’, ‘impure’, and ‘defiling’ kind is
complex and deeply intertwined with issues of political power and economic exploitation.
Once the concept was in place, however, it was sustained not only by power and exploita-
tion, but also by psychological essentialism itself. The latter—in addition to, not rather
than, political and economic factors—helps explain why such a concept has reproduced
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so reliably. Macroscopic historical trajectories and microscopic cognitive processes come
together in creating caste and untouchability. The removal of these categories must there-
fore be concerned both with the macroscopic historical level and the microscopic cognitive
one.
Part III discussed a strategy for alleviating caste-based discrimination that was only tan-
gentially touched upon in part I, but which does have the potential to mitigate the effect
of psychological essentialism. This strategy consists in ‘mixing’ Dalits and non-Dalits. Un-
like the strategies discussed in part I, mixing is not an attempt to change how others view
and treat Dalits. Instead, mixing is couched in a desire to change the social ontology or
social composition of Nepal so that the distinction between Dalits and others either ceases
to exist, or becomes irrelevant. In this sense, this strategy does not aim to actualise norms
specifying how Dalits ought to be treated. Instead, it seeks to remove the very conditions
under which there is a need for such norms.
Chapter 8 described two different understandings of the eﬀicacy of mixing. I encountered
the first at a blood donation programme organised by Ilesh, whose goal was to blur the
boundary separating Dalits and others by establishing what he called a ‘relation of the
body’. Ilesh’s commitment to mixing seems motivated by the hope that suﬀicient blurring
of the boundary between Dalits and others could, ultimately, lead to the abandonment
of the very idea that Dalits form a distinct group. This is in tension with the identity
politics which he simultaneously engages in, but his lack of consistency, I suggested, can
hardly be held against him. The second understanding of mixing described in chapter 8
was explained to me by Abeer BK, a politician involved in promoting marriage between
Dalits and non-Dalits. Abeer stated that such marriages have the potential to transform
non-Dalits into Dalits because of traditional beliefs about permanent defilement. This un-
derstanding of mixing aims to bring people into the same social category rather than blur
the distinctions between categories.
The rest of part III confronted Ilesh’s and Abeer’s hopes with the conceptions of
‘ordinary’—by which I mean, politically non-engaged—Nepalis. Chapter 8 concluded
with excerpts from interviews with actual Dalit–non-Dalit couples. My overall evaluation
was that the extent to which such couples perceive their marriage as an instance of socially
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transformational mixing depends on a host of external factors, including class, education,
political awareness, etc.
Chapters 9 and 10 analysed some of the obstacles which mitigate the success of mixing
as a strategy for the alleviation of caste-based discrimination. Chapter 9 focused on the
possibility of mixing itself. A classic debate in the anthropology of South Asia concerns
whether persons are conceived of as ‘static’ or ‘malleable’ entities. Mixing is only possible
if the latter holds true, and only makes sense if it is believed to change people. I showed
that such change—which is thought to occur through permanent defilement—is no longer
feared by upper-caste people, so that the only way in which such defilement can happen
nowadays is through marriage. Moreover, I presented some early signs that, in the future,
even marrying a Dalit may no longer be considered to transform a non-Dalit into a Dalit.
The obstacle discussed in chapter 10 is caste endogamy. Mixing through intercaste mar-
riage can only start blurring social categories if it becomes a lot more common than it is
today. One might expect that the well-documented shift towards love marriage in Nepal
would suﬀice to put a dent in caste endogamy, but by and large, this is not the case. One
reason Dalits do not marry non-Dalits is for fear of the discrimination which they would
be subjected to by their hypothetical in-laws. I showed, however, that there is a more gen-
eral process which sustains endogamy in a context where love marriage is increasingly
popular. Namely, unlike exogamous elopement, a love marriage that respects the rule of en-
dogamy can be ‘passed off’ as an arranged one, and by doing so, the newly-weds and their
parents reap the social prestige associated with the latter.
There are, therefore, major obstacles standing in the way of mixing and the bringing about
of a situation in which there is no longer a need for anti-discriminatory norms.
Avenues for future research
Cognitive constraints on the actualisation of ethical norms
As of late, a number of anthropologists have been pushing for a more deliberate and sys-
tematic study of ethics. The label ‘ordinary ethics’ is used by some (e.g. Lambek 2010; Das
2012; Stafford 2013) to emphasise two points. First, that ethical deliberation and decision
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making are ‘banal’, that is, that they are embedded in everyday life rather than the exclu-
sive purview of philosophical consideration or an otherwise detached, intellectual pursuit.
Second, the label emphasises the all-encompassing character of ethics, which means that
the ‘ethical’ is present in all domains of life, including those that anthropologists have
tended to compartmentalise into distinct sub-fields (religion, politics, economy, etc.)
In this thesis, I did not engage explicitly with the ‘ethical turn’ which some are pushing
for in anthropology, nor with the theoretical discussions which this push has fostered.
However, I do believe that the issues which I have addressed are, by and large, ‘ethical’
in the broad sense defended by proponents of the turn. Indeed, I have been centrally
concerned with how Nepalis—Dalits and non-Dalits—say and imagine that one ought to
behave, and with what they think a ‘good’ social organisation would be like (namely, one
inwhich caste is irrelevant and untouchability no longer exists). I have discussed attempts
to bring about such behaviours and, perhaps most centrally, the shortcomings of these
attempts.
A topic which I have barely touched upon, and which is in need of further consideration,
concerns the way in which Nepalis relate to anti-casteist norms. What does it mean when
Nepalis say that Dalits ought not to be mistreated? Is this an assessment of what it takes
to be a good, virtuous person? Is this norm inscribed in wider projects of self-cultivation,
perhaps as ‘modern’ individuals? If so, are the shortcomings in applying this norm expe-
rienced as personal failure? Or perhaps, is the norm not about the self, or about cultivating
personal virtue, but instead, simply an (almost utilitarian) recognition that what is ethi-
cal is what is beneficial to others and to society at large? In this case, do shortcomings in
applying the norm have phenomenological valence at all? Or again still, is the norm just
perceived as a rule, part of a wider, deontological understanding of ‘the good’? My exist-
ing ethnographic data does not allow me to answer such questions satisfactorily. Future
research may do so.
I can, however, offer some thoughts on what a judicious approach to ethical shortcomings
might look like. Laidlaw, in The Subject of Virtue (2014) makes the following claim:
The reason then that an anthropology of ethicsmust bemore thanmerely a new
sub-discipline is that for it to succeed requires the development of a notion of
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explanatory adequacy—of what an effective social explanation might be—that
does not re-describe the conduct of responsible agents as the effects of causal
‘forces’ or the mechanical self-reproduction of ‘objective structures’. This, ob-
viously, requires making ‘freedom’ a part of our conceptual vocabulary: not
just a ‘discourse’ that is an object of ideology-critique, but a concept we think
about and also think with. Unless we can develop conceptual resources to en-
able us to do this, ethics will remain necessarily outside our purview, and an
anthropology of ethics is a contradictions in terms. (2014:10)
On the whole, anthropology has, according to Laidlaw, displayed too great a tendency to
explain away, overlook or even negate deliberate, responsible, agentive behaviour. With
a few exceptions, it has not, until recently, considered seriously the possibility that agents
are free—in a fairly strong sense of the term—and that their behaviour may not be best
explained in terms of forces external to the agent, but rather as the result of a process of
ethical deliberation and decision-making. Anthropology has mistakenly concentrated on
various supra-agentive forces that exert themselves upon agents: structures, culture, ideol-
ogy, etc. In emphasising how powerful such forces are, the discipline has lost sight of the
fact that agents do not simply obey these forces blindly, but engage with them evaluatively.
The suggestion is relevant to the question of ethical shortcomings. When, for example,
Chini Maya does not permit a Darji to enter her house, she is acting contrary to a norm
which she otherwise endorses. Following Laidlaw’s recommendation, we should not ‘re-
describe’ her conduct in terms of macroscopic structures or forces that exert themselves
upon her. Instead, we must consider it the ‘conduct of a responsible agent’ and, presum-
ably, the result of a process of ethical deliberation that she has engaged in.
Much of Laidlaw’s book is dedicated to discussing which understanding of ‘freedom’ an-
thropologists should adopt to account for ethical engagements in this way. Another key
question which he discusses concerns the nature of ‘agents’, and whether these must nec-
essarily be individuals. These are important questions, but do not concern me here.
I am broadly sympathetic to Laidlaw’s warning against excessively mechanistic and de-
terministic approaches. More generally, I am sympathetic to his critique of top-down ex-
planations of agentive behaviour. I generally agree with the precept of methodological
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individualism (Weber 1922). So, in explaining the reproduction of, say, caste-based dis-
crimination, we must account for the way in which individual agents encounter the wider
social environment in which they are born and in which they deliberate, eventually com-
ing to behave in ways that reproduce this environment. We must explain the reflective
process through which Chini Maya decides not let the Darji in. In explaining the erosion
of discrimination, we must do the same, except we will have to explain why certain indi-
viduals choose not to behave in discriminatory ways.
What is less clear in my mind, however, is what Laidlaw’s defence of agentive freedom
implies when it comes to an entirely separate set of constraints—if not ‘forces’—that apply
to ethical deliberation. I am referring here to cognitive and psychological constraints. That
anthropology should treat ethical deliberation and decision-making as irreducible to so-
cial forces is, in my view, an unproblematic claim. What is not clear, however, is what
anthropology should do with the fact that humans, as they come to the task of thinking
ethically, do so with a psychological make-up that is, arguably, far from ‘free’.
In this thesis, I have suggested that psychological essentialism, an inherent disposition of
the humanmind, plays an important role inmaking it diﬀicult forNepalis to behave inways
that they otherwise judge ethical. This does not re-describe Chini Maya’s behaviour as the
effect of systemic forces.9 It does, however, raise the question of how ‘free’ her actions are,
and of how to evaluate her ethical shortcomings.
Moreover, this is but one example of how cognitive constraints may weigh into ethical de-
liberation; there are sure to be many more. Thus it seems to me that an anthropology that
treats ethical engagements seriouslymust confront the question of whether its own central
objects of investigation—ethical deliberation and freedom—may in fact be re-descriptions
of more microscopic cognitive processes, similarly to how ‘structures’ are re-descriptions
of agentive conduct. The ultimate question that such an anthropology faces may be no
less than that of free will itself, but before we get to that point, there are many less in-
tractable psychological constraints on ethical deliberation which need to be addressed. To
do so, anthropology will necessarily have to cross academic boundaries and engage with
disciplines who have for decades been concerned with individual ethical deliberation and
9. Though of course, Chini Maya’s behaviour would not make sense outside of the cultural en-
vironment that she lives in.
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decision-making. Philosophy is one. Others, more empirically-inclined, include cognitive
and social psychology, behavioural science, and perhaps even micro-economics.
A cognitively informed comparison of caste and race
The comparison of caste and race emerges sporadically in the history of anthropology;
a good summary of the topic can be found in Fuller (2011), who paints an overarching
picture in which an earlier generation of researchers used the term ‘caste’ to describe the
black-white divide in the American South in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Later, once the
term ‘race’ was stripped—in scholarly circles—of its biological connotations, anthropol-
ogists became less reticent in using it and adopted it for the United States. Actual com-
parisons between race in the USA and caste in South Asia came, for the most part, later.
Fuller points to 1960 as a key year, in which ‘Berreman and Dumont independently pub-
lished articles comparing caste in India and the United States that expressed diametrically
opposed views’ (2011:616). Dumont, who famously viewed caste as distinctly Indian, ar-
gued against any such comparison. Berreman, on the other hand, contended that caste and
race were fundamentally similar phenomena. Little was done to solve this debate, though
Fuller points to Harper (2007[1968]) and Béteille (1991[1971], 1991) as interventions that
tried to steer a middle course. Fuller’s own view is that the overall tendency of Indianists
to overlook the literature on race led to certain questions being unnecessarily asked and
answered twice. For example, the question of the extent to which Dalits accept or reject
their lowly position could have been answered much more quickly, Fuller suggests, had
Indianists paid attention to research studying the same issue among blacks in the USA.
The comparison between race and caste re-surfaced for a while in the wake of the United
Nations’ World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Re-
lated Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban, 2001 (Thorat andUmakant 2004). In addition, there
are a few later attempts to compare caste and race in anthropology (Reddy 2005; Pandey
2013; see also a review of Pandey 2013 in Still 2015; Roberts 2017), but these are, on the
whole, rare. I sometimes wonder whether we are today in an analogous situation to that
described by Fuller. Indeed, there is an extensive body of research—outside of anthro-
pology this time—on race and racial prejudice, and more specifically, on its cognitive and
psychological foundations. As far as I can tell, very little of this research is being consid-
272
CONCLUSION
ered in contemporary studies of caste and caste-based discrimination. This, in my view, is
a problem not only because those of us interested in caste today risk, once again, lagging
behind the research on race; it is also a problem because the research conducted in these
other disciplines is concerned, in part, with the reduction of prejudice. We should at the
very least ask whether any practical recommendation made by those who study racial dis-
crimination could carry over to the South Asian context and help to alleviate the prejudice
faced by Dalits.
While I would not be so bold as to suggest that caste and race are cognitively identical,
there are at the very least reasons to believe that they are processed similarly by the human
mind. Almost fifty years ago, in a paper entitled Race, Caste, and other Invidious Distinctions
in Social Stratification, Berreman (1972) outlined a comparison of social systems in which
status is ascribed at birth (rather than ‘acquired’). Drawing on ethnographic literature
on a wide variety of contexts—caste in India and in Swat, race in the U.S.A. and in South
Africa, ethnicity in Rwanda and the Buraku system in Japan—he offered the following
summary:
In sum, ‘race’, as commonly used by social scientists, emphasizes common
physical characteristics (as does ‘sex’); ‘caste’ emphasizes common rank, occu-
pational specialization, endogamy, and corporate organization ; ‘ethnic stratifi-
cation’ emphasizes cultural distinctiveness. These are real differences in mean-
ing, but the degree of empirical overlap in systems so described, and the commonalities
in the existential worlds of those who live within them are so great as to render the dis-
tinctions among them largely arbitrary, and irrelevant, for many purposes. Individual
cases differ, but as types of social stratification, they are similar. With equal fa-
cility and comparable effect, they utilize as evidence of social identity anything
which is passed on within the group: skin colour, hair form, stature, physiog-
nomy, language, dress, occupation, place of residence, genealogy, behaviour
patterns, religion (1972:393, emphasis added).
Later in the article, he more succinctly states that
[i]n short, the further one probes into the nature and dynamics of race and
caste, and into the experience of those who live them, the more it becomes
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apparent that they are similar, comparable phenomena (1972:393).
Berreman bases this claim on a number of commonalities. Both caste and race are in-
timately tied to colonial histories (1972:397–398),10 both lead to class distinctions that
map onto ascribed status (1972:398–400), and both imply systems of ‘ranked pluralism’
(1972:400–401). Beyond these historical and structural similarities, however, two aspects
of Berreman’s work make it stand out.
The first is his proposal that having one’s status ascribed at birth is the key common denom-
inator of caste, race, and other similar categories. One reason this claim is significant is
that it falls broadly in line with some of the observations made by researchers focusing on
psychological essentialism. Indeed, one of the manifestations of psychological essential-
ism is what is known as ‘birth bias’ (Gelman 2003:94–107). This is a tendency, observed
cross-culturally and in children as young as five years of age, to attribute properties to
individuals on the basis of birth rather than rearing.
A method commonly used to test for this bias is known as the ‘switched-at-birth’ task. In
this, a subject is told a story in which two children are born to two different sets of parents.
The story will say that child A is born to parents belonging to social category 1, and child
B to social category 2. In the story, the children are switched immediately after birth, such
that child A is raised by parents of social category 2, and child B by parents of social cat-
egory 1. Subjects are then asked questions about the traits that the children in the story
will develop. For example, will child A resemble its birth parents or its adoptive ones?
Will child A belong to category 1—that is of the birth parents—or to category 2—that of
the rearing parents? This inferential task makes it possible to tap into how subjects rea-
son about the transmission of properties, including group aﬀiliation. Answering that a
child will develop the same property as its birth parents implies reasoning that the prop-
erty is innate and transmitted biologically. Conversely, answering that a child will develop
the same property as its adoptive parents means reasoning that the trait is acquired, trans-
mitted through rearing. The ‘birth bias’ observed by Gelman and others is a tendency to
favour the first answer. Children (and, to an extent, adults) have a tendency to attribute
many properties, including psychological ones (for instance, intelligence) and social ones
(for instance, group aﬀiliation), to birth rather than to rearing.
10. Berreman does not limit the concept to European colonialism
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Astuti (n.d.) has recently suggested that the universality of psychological essentialism
provides a good ‘anchoring’ for cross-cultural comparison. In this vein, I would suggest
that birth bias is likely to play an important part in explaining the commonalities Berreman
notes in social systems where birth-ascribed categories occupy the front stage. The exact
connection between the bias and its wider social implications is a topic for future research.
If such a connection can be established, however, this would provide some justification for
a cognitively informed comparative study of caste and race.
The second aspect of Berreman’s workwhichmakes it stand out is his insistence on the fact
that birth-ascription leads to similar lived experiences. In a sub-section of the paper entitled
Psychological Consequences, Berreman states:
Oppression does not befall everyone in a system of birth-ascribed inequality.
Most notably, it does not befall those with power. What does befall all is the im-
position by birth of unalterablemembership in ranked, socially isolated, but in-
teracting groups with rigidly defined and conspicuously different experiences,
opportunities, public esteem and, inevitably, self-esteem. The black in Amer-
ica and in South Africa, the Burakumin of Japan, the Harijan [Dalit] of India,
the barber or washerman of Swat, the Hutu or Twa of Ruanda, have all faced sim-
ilar conditions as individuals and they have responded to them in similar ways. The
same can be said for the privileged and dominant groups in each of these so-
cieties, for while painful consequences of subordination are readily apparent,
the consequences of superordination are equally real and important. Thus,
ethnic stratification leaves its characteristic and indelible imprint on all who
experience it. (1972:405, emphasis added)
In Berreman’s terminology, ‘subordination’ and ‘superordination’ are lived experiences
of ascribed inferiority and superiority, respectively. In the quotation reproduced above,
Berreman states that these experiences are psychologically similar in caste- and race-based
systems. To what extent this is the case is a topic of enquiry which deserves renewed at-
tention, not least because, since Berreman’s article was published, there have been tremen-
dous advances in psychological research. These advances concern not only what is known
about social prejudice but also, and perhaps more importantly, the methods used to study
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it. It is high time, I believe, that the methods used routinely in psychology and cogni-
tively informed disciplines to study prejudice might be carefully adapted and applied by
anthropologists and cultural psychologists in other parts of the world. Existing research
on psychological essentialism, which has been cross-cultural almost from the start, can
serve as a model of how to do so.
It is hard to say what the results of such an endeavour would look like. I will offer one
tentative example.
In social psychology, vast amounts of energy have been dedicated to the study of ‘stereo-
type threat’, which is formally defined as ‘being at risk of confirming, as self-characteristic,
a negative stereotype about one’s group’ (Steele and Aronson 1995:797). Research has
shown time and again that individuals who feel at risk of confirming a stereotype about a
social group to which they belong do in fact tend to under-perform at certain tasks in pre-
cisely the ways in which the stereotype suggests they would. A well-cited study (Stone
et al. 1999) provides a clear illustration: the performance of White and Black American
students on the exact same task varied significantly depending on the way in which the
task was described to research participants. If the task was described as a diagnostic of
‘sports intelligence’, Black participants performed significantly worse than without such a
description. If, however, the task was described as a diagnostic of ‘natural athletic ability’,
it was White participants who performed worse than without such a description.
Despite the existence of literally hundreds of studies confirming this effect for a multi-
plicity of stereotypes (gender, race, ethnicity, etc.), my searches only revealed one study
which addresses stereotype threat and caste (Hoff and Pandey 2006). The study, based in
Uttar Pradesh, tested the performance of upper-caste and Dalit students in a maze-solving
problem.11 When three upper-caste and three Dalit students were asked to perform the
task simultaneously and in the same classroom, their performances varied significantly de-
pending onwhether or not their individual caste had previously been revealed to the other
participants. If the students’ castes had been revealed prior to the test, Dalits performed
significantly worse than upper castes. The effect went away when the students’ identity
was not revealed; then, there was no significant difference in the performances of upper
11. There was a second component to the study, but its details are too complex to report and not
relevant to the discussion at hand.
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castes and Dalits. This is in line with the broader literature on stereotype threat: it sug-
gests that it was the fear of conforming to stereotypes that led to Dalits under-performing
when their identity was revealed.
My intent is not to discuss one study in detail, nor even to focus on stereotype threat.
Rather, the argument I want to make here is that there would be much to learn about the
commonalities of caste and race (and differences between them) if anthropologists were
to adopt some of the experimental designs used in the rich literature on social prejudice.
Doing this would achieve two further goals. One would be to put to the test some of the
results reached in social and cognitive psychology on the basis of experiments conducted
mainly inWestern contexts. In doing so, wemight contribute in newways to psychology’s
ongoing ‘replication crisis’. Manypsychologists are currently coming to the realisation that
their existing results do not withstand the test of thorough quantitative methods, more
rigorous than thosewhich have been in use until recently. An anthropological intervention
could be to question the extent to which results hold true if tested in different cultural
environments.
Another goal would be to encourage a comparative stance in anthropology. As I come to the
end of a six-year PhD in the discipline, I am left with the strong impression that current
trends in social anthropology favour particularism. Ethnographies produce deep and de-
tailed descriptions of specific places, but cross-cultural comparisons are set somewhat to
the side. Though attention to local detail is commendable, I believe anthropology should
not give up on questions that concern human nature as a whole (Bloch 2005). Attention
to human cognition is a promising way forward.
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